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# ***CENTRAL EURASIA***



# FBIS Report: Central Eurasia

FBIS-USR-94-003

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12 January 1994

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## POLITICAL AFFAIRS

### Deputies Elected to State Duma, Part I

944E0331A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 28 Dec 93 pp 2-3

["List of Deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly Elected in the Federation-Wide Electoral District," preceded by Decree No. 155 of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation "On Establishing the Overall Results of the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly." For Part II listing of deputies of the State Duma elected by single-seat electoral districts, please see pages 8-21 of the 5 January 1994 FBIS Report: Central Eurasia, FBIS-USR-94-001.]

[Text]

#### Decree of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation "On Establishing the Overall Results of the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly"

An election of deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly was held on 12 December.

Based on a protocol of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation on the results of the election in the federation-wide electoral district, dated 25 December 1993, protocols of district electoral commissions for elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, and in keeping with Article 40 of the Statute on Elections of State Duma Deputies in 1993, the Central Electoral Commission has established that, as a result of voting, 444 deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation have been elected, of whom: 225 were elected in the federation-wide electoral district and 219 were elected in single-seat electoral districts.

Elections were null and void in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan in five electoral districts: Almetyevskiy No. 23, Moskovskiy No. 24, Nizhnekamskiy No. 26, and Privolzhskiy No. 27. In each of the districts, the total number of valid ballots came to less than 25 percent of the total number of registered voters. In Naberezhnochelnskiy Electoral District No. 25, an election of the deputy was not held in view of the fact that one candidate had been registered.

Elections were not held in Electoral District No. 32 (the Chechen Republic).

The Central Electoral Commission RESOLVES:

1. To recognize the election of deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly as valid in the federation-wide electoral district and 219 single-seat electoral districts.

2. To publish in the press a report of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation on the

overall results of the election of deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly and a list of deputies of the State Duma.

[Signed] Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation N.T. Ryabov

[Signed] Secretary of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation V.A. Zagulyayev

Moscow, 25 December 1993

No. 155

#### List of Deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly Elected in the Federation-Wide Electoral District

##### The Agrarian Party of Russia

Mikhail Ivanovich Lapshin, born in 1934, Russian, higher education, chairman of the Agrarian Party of Russia, president of the Lenin's Commandments joint-stock company, village of Dubnevo, Moscow Oblast.

Aleksandr Semenovich Davydov, born in 1932, Russian, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, chairman of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Employees of the Agro-Industrial Complex of Russia, city of Moscow.

Aleksandr Kharlampiyevich Zaveryukha, born in 1940, Ukrainian, higher education, no party affiliation, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government, city of Moscow.

Aleksandr Grigoryevich Nazarchuk, born in 1939, Ukrainian, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, chairman of the Agro-Industrial Union, city of Barnaul.

Magomedtagir Medzhidovich Abdulbasirov, born in 1935, Avar, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, chairman of the Russian Federation Committee for the Food and Processing Industry, city of Moscow.

Igor Yevgenyevich Klochkov, born in 1939, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, chairman of the board of the Solidarity Russian Bank, city of Moscow.

Ivan Petrovich Rybkin, born in 1946, Russian, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, deputy chief of the Main Directorate of Water Management of the Russian Federation Ministry of Agriculture, city of Moscow.

Gennadiy Timofeyevich Dyudyayev, born in 1947, Russian, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, chairman of the Kemerovo Oblast Agrarian Union, city of Leninsk-Kuznetskiy.

Sergey Nikolayevich Bystrov, born in 1937, Russian, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, chief of the of the economics department of the



Stavropolye scientific-production association, village of Shpakovskoye, Stavropol Kray.

Nikolay Savelyevich **Kotov**, born in 1936, Russian, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, general director of the Kuban joint-stock company, village of Berezanskaya, Krasnodar Kray.

Vladimir Borisovich **Isakov**, born in 1950, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, professor of the Ural State Legal Academy, city of Yekaterinburg.

Gennadiy Aleksandrovich **Medentsov**, born in 1936, Russian, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, chairman of the oblast committee of the Trade Union of Employees of the Agro-Industrial Complex, city of Volgograd.

Aleksandr Dmitriyevich **Mikhaylov**, born in 1929, Russian, higher education, deputy chairman of the Agrarian Party of Russia, chief of the Main Administration for Kolkhoz Affairs of the Russian Federation Ministry of Agriculture, city of Moscow.

Andrey Anatolyevich **Popov**, born in 1963, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, engineer-economist at the Kompozit small enterprise, city of Volgograd.

Gennadiy Vasilyevich **Kulik**, born in 1935, Russian, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, consultant to the Ineks-Intereksport company, city of Moscow.

Nikolay Vasilyevich **Ivanov**, born in 1952, Russian, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, chief of the Dubrovskiy Rayon Agricultural Administration, settlement of Dubrovka, Bryansk Oblast.

Vasily Fedorovich **Vershinin**, born in 1940, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, member of the peasant-owner farm Dieko-3, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Ivanovich **Naumov**, born in 1929, Russian, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, chief of the Main Territorial Administration of the Russian Federation Ministry of Agriculture, city of Moscow.

Vitaliy Vladimirovich **Gukov**, born in 1948, Russian, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, chairman of the Kursk Agro-Industrial Union, city of Kursk.

Nikolay Avksentyevich **Sukhoy**, born in 1941, Ukrainian, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, vice president of the Rosselkhozvodstroy republic corporation, city of Moscow.

Petr Vasilyevich **Ivantayev**, born in 1942, Chuvash, higher education, member of the Agrarian Party of Russia, chairman of the Chuvash Republic Committee

of the Trade Union of Employees of the Agro-Industrial Complex, city of Cheboksary.

#### The Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc

Grigoriy Alekseyevich **Yavlinskiy**, born in 1952, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, chairman of the board of the Center for Economic and Political Research (EPIcenter), city of Moscow.

Aleksey Yuryevich **Mikhaylov**, born in 1963, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, leading research associate of EPIcenter, city of Moscow.

Mikhail Mikhaylovich **Zadornov**, born in 1963, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, leading research associate of EPIcenter, city of Moscow.

Sergey Viktorovich **Ivanenko**, born in 1959, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, leading research associate of EPIcenter, city of Moscow.

Aleksey Yuryevich **Melnikov**, born in 1964, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, senior research associate of EPIcenter, city of Moscow.

Tatyana Vladimirovna **Yarygina**, born in 1953, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, leading research associate of EPIcenter, city of Moscow.

Viktor Leonidovich **Sheynis**, born in 1931, Jewish, higher education, no party affiliation, deputy chairman of the Committee for Legislative Proposals of the Russian Federation President, city of Moscow.

Nikolay Yakovlevich **Petrakov**, born in 1937, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, director of the Institute of Market Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences, city of Moscow.

Vyacheslav Vladimirovich **Igrunov**, born in 1948, Russian, incomplete higher education, no party affiliation, director of the Institute of Humanities and Political Research, city of Moscow.

Anatoliy Leonidovich **Adamishin**, born in 1934, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, city of Moscow.

Igor Aleksandrovich **Yakovenko**, born in 1951, Russian, higher education, member of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, director of the Monitoring Russian Sociological Service, city of Moscow.

Anatoliy Grigoryevich **Golov**, born in 1946, Russian, higher education, chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of the Russian Federation, city of St. Petersburg.

Valeriy Vasilyevich **Borshchev**, born in 1943, Russian, higher education, member of the party Russian Christian-Democratic Union—New Democracy, city of Moscow.

Petr Borisovich **Shelishch**, born in 1945, Jewish, higher education, no party affiliation, chief of the chair of social work at the Northwestern Cadre Center, city of St. Petersburg.

Vladimir Petrovich **Averchev**, born in 1946, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, counselor of the Russian Federation Embassy in the United States of America.

Ivan Dmitriyevich **Grachev**, born in 1952, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, department chief at the Kazan Tekhfotoproekt scientific research institute, city of Kazan.

Oksana Genrikhovna **Dmitriyeva**, born in 1958, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, chief of the regional diagnostics laboratory of the St. Petersburg Economics and Finance University, city of St. Petersburg.

Vyacheslav Nikolayevich **Shostakovskiy**, born in 1937, Ukrainian, higher education, chairman of the Political Council of the Russian Federation Republican Party, director of the Center for Social Knowledge of the International Foundation for Socioeconomic and Political Research, city of Moscow.

Yevgeniy Arshakovich **Ambartsumov**, born in 1929, Armenian, higher education, no party affiliation, member of the Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Russian Federation President, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Nikolayevich **Lysenko**, born in 1956, Russian, higher education, member of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, member of the Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Russian Federation President, city of Moscow.

#### Russia's Choice

Yegor Timurovich **Gaydar**, born in 1956, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government, city of Moscow.

Anatoliy Borisovich **Chubays**, born in 1955, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government, city of Moscow.

Dmitriy Antonovich **Volkogonov**, born in 1928, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, adviser to the president of the Russian Federation for defense and security issues, city of Moscow.

Sergey Aleksandrovich **Filatov**, born in 1936, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, chief of the Administration of the Russian Federation President, city of Moscow.

Aleksey Mikhaylovich **Yemelyanov**, born in 1935, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice

electoral association, chief of the chair of agrarian economics at the imeni M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, city of Moscow.

Mikhail Nikiforovich **Poltoranin**, born in 1939, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, chief of the Federal Information Center of Russia, city of Moscow.

Pavel Grigoryevich **Bunich**, born in 1925, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Initiative Party, first prorektor of the Academy of the National Economy, city of Moscow.

Gennadiy Eduardovich **Burbulis**, born in 1945, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, chairman of the Strategy Center, city of Moscow.

Boris Andreyevich **Zolotukhin**, born in 1930, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, deputy chairman of the Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Russian Federation President, city of Moscow.

Petr Olegovich **Aven**, born in 1955, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, general director of the FinPA [expansion not identified], city of Moscow.

Aleksey Leonardovich **Golovkov**, born in 1956, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, executive director of the All-Russian Association of Privatized and Private Enterprises, city of Moscow.

Yuliy Solomonovich **Gusman**, born in 1943, Jewish, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, director of the Central House of Cinematographers, city of Moscow.

Arkadiy Nikolayevich **Murashev**, born in 1957, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, chairman of the Center for Liberal-Conservative Policy, city of Moscow.

Sergey Nikolayevich **Yushenkov**, born in 1950, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, first deputy chief of the Federal Information Center of Russia, city of Moscow.

Gleb Pavlovich **Yakunin**, born in 1934, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Russia movement, member of the Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Russian Federation President, city of Moscow.

Vasiliy Illarionovich **Selyunin**, born in 1927, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Russia movement, retired, city of Moscow.

Nikolay Nikolayevich **Vorontsov**, born in 1934, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Russia movement, chief research associate of the imeni Koltsov

Institute of Developmental Biology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, city of Moscow.

Andrey Aleksandrovich **Nuykin**, born in 1931, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, deputy director for science of the Scientific-Research Institute of Cinema Art, city of Moscow.

Mikhail Mikhaylovich **Molostvov**, born in 1934, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, temporarily not working.

Aleksandr Petrovich **Aulov**, born in 1952, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, laboratory chief at the Urals Cadre Center, city of Yekaterinburg.

Ilya Iosifovich **Zaslavskiy**, born in 1960, Jewish, higher education, member of the Democratic Russia movement, adviser to the minister of the economy of the Russian Federation, city of Moscow.

Valentin Ivanovich **Tatarchuk**, born in 1937, Ukrainian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, vice president of the Russian Timber Merchants joint-stock company-corporation, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Vasilyevich **Gritsan**, born in 1937, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, chief of the legal center of the AKKOR [Association of Peasant Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives of Russia] Kuban Chapter, city of Krasnodar.

Anatoliy Yefimovich **Shabad**, born in 1939, Armenian, higher education, member of the Democratic Russia movement, leading research associate of the Physics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, city of Moscow.

Boris Mikhaylovich **Titenko**, born in 1954, Ukrainian, higher education, member of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, chairman of the Rostov regional organization of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, city of Rostov-na-Donu.

Kirill Borisovich **Ignatyev**, born in 1966, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, first deputy chairman of the company—chief of the administration of the RGTRK [Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company] Ostankino, city of Moscow.

Anton Yuryevich **Fedorov**, born in 1961, Russian, incomplete higher education, no party affiliation, deputy chief of the Administration of the Russian Federation President, settlement of Usovo, Moscow Oblast.

Viktor Ivanovich **Danilov-Danilyan**, born in 1938, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, minister of environmental protection and natural resources of the Russian Federation, city of Moscow.

Grigoriy Alekseyevich **Tomchin**, born in 1947, Jewish, higher education, member of the Democratic Russia movement, director of the department of privatization—deputy chairman of the Committee for the Management of St. Petersburg Property.

Vladimir Vladimirovich **Tetelmin**, born in 1944, Russian, higher education, member of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, professor at the Krasnoyarsk Institute of Civil Engineering.

Beia Anatolyevna **Denisenko**, born in 1941, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Russia movement, laboratory chief at the Institute for the Economy of the Period of Transition, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Nikolayevich **Yuzhakov**, born in 1951, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Russia movement, rector of the Volga Area Cadre Center, city of Saratov.

Gennadiy Alekseyevich **Alekseyev**, born in 1945, Russian, secondary technical education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, specialist-expert of the Administration of the Russian Federation President, city of Irkutsk.

Olga Kirillovna **Zastrozhnaya**, born in 1944, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, deputy chairman of the Voronezh City Soviet of People's Deputies, city of Voronezh.

Andrey Ivanovich **Generalov**, born in 1964, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the city of Tutayev, Yaroslavl Oblast.

Yevgeniy Stepanovich **Kuznetsov**, born in 1944, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, representative of the Russian Federation president in Volgograd Oblast, city of Volgograd.

Yevgeniy Yuryevich **Sidorov**, born in 1938, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, minister of culture of the Russian Federation, city of Moscow.

Mikhail Aleksandrovich **Danilov**, born in 1937, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Russia movement, chief of the analysis division of the Office of the Russian Federation President's Representation in Arkhangelsk Oblast, city of Arkhangelsk.

Boris Georgiyevich **Saltykov**, born in 1940, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, minister of science and technical policy of the Russian Federation, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Aleksandrovich **Ryzhkov**, born in 1966, Russian, higher education, member of the Russia's Choice electoral association, secretary of the head of the Altay Kray Administration, city of Barnaul.



### The Democratic Party of Russia

Nikolay Ilyich **Travkin**, born in 1946, Russian, higher education, leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, head of the Shakhovskoy Rayon Administration, Moscow Oblast.

Stanislav Sergeyevich **Govorukhin**, born in 1936, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, filmmaker, city of Moscow.

Oleg Timofeyevich **Bogomolov**, born in 1927, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, director of the Institute of the World Economy, city of Moscow.

Nikolay Vasilyevich **Fedorov**, born in 1958, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, attorney, city of Moscow.

Sergey Yuryevich **Glazyev**, born in 1961, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, laboratory chief at the Central Institute of Mathematical Economics, city of Moscow.

Sergey Vasilyevich **Zapolskiy**, born in 1947, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, chief of a legal services office, city of Moscow.

Valentin Alekseyevich **Kotlyar**, born in 1951, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Party of Russia, deputy head of the Voronezh Oblast Administration, city of Voronezh.

Nikolay Maksimovich **Tropin**, born in 1947, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Party of Russia, temporarily not working.

Irina Borisovna **Zubkevich**, born in 1944, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Party of Russia, chairman of the Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast organization of the Democratic Party of Russia, city of Nizhniy Novgorod.

Viktor Lvovich **Talanov**, born in 1951, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Party of Russia, temporarily not working.

Aleksey Ivanovich **Revushkin**, born in 1967, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Party of Russia, chairman of the Samara Oblast chapter of the Democratic Party of Russia, city of Samara.

German Yuryevich **Karelin**, born in 1956, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Party of Russia, chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblast organization of the Democratic Party of Russia, city of Yekaterinburg.

Yuriy Nikolayevich **Yakovlev**, born in 1950, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Party of Russia, chairman of the Maritime Kray organization of the Democratic Party of Russia, Maritime Kray.

Feliks Semenovich **Pashennykh**, born in 1952, Russian, higher education, member of the Democratic Party of

Russia, director of the fund of the Krasnoyarsk Kray organization of the Democratic Party of Russia, city of Krasnoyarsk.

### The Communist Party of Russia

Gennadiy Andreyevich **Zyuganov**, born in 1944, Russian, higher education, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, city of Moscow.

Vitaliy Ivanovich **Sevastyanov**, born in 1935, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, instructor-cosmonaut-test pilot, deputy department chief at the Energiya scientific production association, city of Moscow.

Valentin Vasilyevich **Chikin**, born in 1932, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, editor in chief of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, city of Moscow.

Valentin Semenovich **Martemyanov**, born in 1932, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, department chairman at the State Legal Academy of Moscow, city of Moscow.

Anatoliy Vasilyevich **Ionov**, born in 1946, Russian, secondary education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, heat treater at the Ryazan instrument-making plant, city of Ryazan.

Gennadiy Nikolayevich **Seleznev**, born in 1947, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, vice president of the PRAVDA international joint-stock company, member of the editorial board of the newspaper PRAVDA, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Vladimirovich **Semago**, born in 1947, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, general director of a joint venture, city of Moscow.

Kazbek Aslanbekovich **Tsiku**, born in 1935, Adyg, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, chairman of the economic theory department at the Adyg State University, city of Maykop.

Yuriy Konstantinovich **Sevenard**, born in 1935, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, general director of the Lengidroenergospetsstroy production, construction, and installation association, city of St. Petersburg.

Viktor Ilyich **Zorkaltsev**, born in 1936, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, temporarily not working.

Valentin Alekseyevich **Kovalev**, born in 1944, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, professor of the Law Institute of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, city of Moscow.



Oleg Orestovich **Mironov**, born in 1939, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, professor at the department of constitutional law at the Saratov Law Institute, city of Saratov.

Yevgeniy Sergeyevich **Krasnitskiy**, born in 1951, Russian, secondary education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, secretary of the standing commission for communications and information science of the St. Petersburg Soviet of People's Deputies.

Aleksandr Nikolayevich **Zaytsev**, born in 1953, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, serviceman, city of Moscow.

Yuriy Pavlovich **Ivanov**, born in 1944, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, attorney, member of the Moscow Oblast bar, city of Moscow.

Ruslan Georgiyevich **Gostev**, born in 1945, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, professor at the Voronezh Pedagogical Institute, city of Voronezh.

Vladimir Anatolyevich **Bokov**, born in 1927, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, temporarily not working.

Valentin Ivanovich **Nikitin**, born in 1948, Ukrainian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, chief of the State Inspectorate of Quality of Services and Consumer Services to the Population of the Republic of Bashkortostan, city of Ufa.

Yevgeniy Alekseyevich **Kosterin**, born in 1949, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, section chief of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Mordvinia, city of Saransk.

Viktor Stepanovich **Shevelukha**, born in 1929, Ukrainian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, academician-secretary of the division of plant cultivation and selection of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences, city of Moscow.

Vadim Donatovich **Filimonov**, born in 1931, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, chairman of the criminal law department of the Tomsk State University, city of Tomsk.

Sergey Nikolayevich **Reshulskiy**, born in 1951, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, temporarily not working.

Nikolay Gavrilovich **Bindyukov**, born in 1945, Belarusian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, director of the Institute of Pedagogical Education of the Novgorod State University, city of Novgorod.

Yuriy Yuryevich **Leonov**, born in 1963, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, chairman of the executive committee of the Zashchita republic trade union association, city of Moscow.

Leonid Nikolayevich **Petrovskiy**, born in 1948, Belarusian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, chairman of the Gorki collective enterprise, Smolensk Oblast.

Aleksandr Konstantinovich **Frolov**, born in 1949, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, political commentator of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, city of Moscow.

Nikolay Mitrofanovich **Pyatchits**, born in 1947, Russian, secondary education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, engine test operator of the ZIL [imeni Likhachev Plant] joint-stock machine-building association, city of Moscow.

Lyubov Vasilyevna **Oleynik**, born in 1949, Ukrainian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, temporarily not working.

Omar Omarovich **Begov**, born in 1937, Avar, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, general director of the association of railway restaurants of the Makhachkala Division of the North Caucasus Railroad, city of Makhachkala.

Viktor Grigoryevich **Kosenko**, born in 1945, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, chief physician of the Krasnodar Kray clinical psychiatric hospital, city of Krasnodar.

Tatyana Semenovna **Teletkova**, born in 1949, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, teacher of mathematics at the Bolshaya Sosnovka Secondary School, village of Bolshaya Sosnovka, Perm Oblast.

Alevtina Viktorovna **Aparina**, born in 1941, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, first secretary of the Volgograd Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, city of Volgograd.

#### The Liberal-Democratic Party

Viktor Vasilyevich **Kobelev**, born in 1943, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, chief of staff of the Central Committee of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Vyacheslav Antonovich **Marychev**, born in 1939, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, director of the club of a steel-rolling plant, city of St. Petersburg.

Vladimir Pavlovich **Ivanov**, born in 1946, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, head of the Krasnoyarsk regional organization of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Krasnoyarsk.

Aleksey Valentinovich **Mitrofanov**, born in 1962, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, minister of foreign affairs in the shadow cabinet of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Stanislav Mikhaylovich **Zhebrovskiy**, born in 1942, Russian, higher education, deputy chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Zakharovich **Gvozdev**, born in 1951, Ukrainian, higher education, deputy chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Aleksandr Dmitriyevich **Vengerovskiy**, born in 1953, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, deputy director of the All-Russian Intersectoral Study and Science Center for Computer Technology and Information Science, city of Moscow.

Sergey Nikolayevich **Abeltsev**, born in 1961, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, deputy director of the imeni Lenin Kolkhoz, Moscow Oblast.

Anatoliy Mikhaylovich **Kashpirovskiy**, born in 1939, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, president of the Foundation for Researching the A.M. Kashpirovskiy Phenomenon, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Kuzmich **Gusev**, born in 1932, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, vice president of the Industrialist scientific-production corporation, city of Moscow.

Yuriy Yevgenyevich **Buzov**, born in 1955, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, regional director of the Neva-Chup-Chups joint-stock company, city of Moscow.

Anatoliy Stepanovich **Sidorov**, born in 1933, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, general director of the Institute of Entrepreneurship Economics and Organization of the Russian Academy of Sciences, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Aleksandrovich **Lisichkin**, born in 1941, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, president of the Futurum concern, city of Moscow.

Mikhail Yakovlevich **Lemeshev**, born in 1927, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, consultant to the Russian Academy of Sciences, city of Moscow.

Oleg Aleksandrovich **Finko**, born in 1941, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, editor in chief of YURIDICHESKAYA GAZETA, city of Moscow.

Aleksandr Ivanovich **Kozyrev**, born in 1949, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, chief learned secretary of the AENPD [expansion not identified] of Russia, vice president of the International Association of Economic Historians, city of Moscow.

Yuriy Pavlovich **Kuznetsov**, born in 1947, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, psychoanalyst with the International Institute for the Reserve Potential of Man, city of St. Petersburg.

Vitaliy Yevgenyevich **Zhuravlev**, born in 1964, Russian, higher education, member of the Social Justice Party, chairman of the Humanism and Democracy humanitarian foundation, city of Moscow.

Sergey Vyacheslavovich **Kalashnikov**, born in 1951, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, president of the Neftekim Trading House joint-stock company, city of Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast.

Mikhail Nikolayevich **Sidorov**, born in 1947, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, deputy director for scientific work of the Economic Scientific-Research Institute of the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Viktorovich **Pchelkin**, born in 1967, Russian, special secondary education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, chief of the youth department of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Mikhaylovich **Borzyuk**, born in 1952, Russian, secondary education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, head of the regional organization of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia in Orel Oblast, city of Orel.

Sergey Aleksandrovich **Korobov**, born in 1958, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, coordinator of the Penza Oblast organization of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Penza.

Viktor Ulyanovich **Korniyenko**, born in 1937, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, department chief of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Yevgeniy Yuryevich **Loginov**, born in 1965, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, serviceman, cadet of the Humanitarian Academy of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, city of Moscow.

Sergey Aleksandrovich **Churkin**, born in 1956, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic

Party of Russia, coordinator of the Vologda Oblast organization of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Vologda.

Sergey Vladimirovich Sychev, born in 1962, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, student of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, city of Moscow.

Mikhail Nikolayevich Snezhkov, born in 1945, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, chairman of the Colleague student, creative, cooperative scientific-technical society, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Ilyich Novikov, born in 1960, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, director of the Lakur limited-liability company, city of Glazov, the Udmurt Republic.

Tatyana Ivanovna Bulgakova, born in 1945, Russian, special secondary education, no party affiliation, director of the Meteor club for children and teenagers, city of Moscow.

Eleonora Valentinovna Mitrofanova, born in 1953, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, chief of the EKOLEKS law firm, city of Moscow.

Viktor Grigoryevich Vishnyakov, born in 1931, Russian, higher education, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, leading research associate of the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law Studies, city of Moscow.

Nikolay Pavlovich Astafyev, born in 1940, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, department chief in the Moscow Oblast Procuracy, city of Lyubertsy, Moscow Oblast.

Yevgeniy Petrovich Ishchenko, born in 1946, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, chairman of the department of criminal law of the Urals State Legal Academy, city of Yekaterinburg.

Viktor Petrovich Ivanov, born in 1938, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, deputy editor in chief of the newspaper VSEROSSIYSKIYE NOVOSTI, city of Moscow.

Yevgeniy Vyacheslavovich Tuinov, born in 1954, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, chief of the department of information of YURIDICHESKAYA GAZETA, writer, journalist, city of St. Petersburg.

Boris Vasilyevich Moiseyev, born in 1935, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, deputy editor in chief of the YURINFORM agency, city of Moscow.

Vyacheslav Viktorovich Kiselev, born in 1948, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, chief of the Shchelkovo legal services office of the Moscow Oblast bar, city of Shchelkovo, Moscow Oblast.

Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Bolshakov, born in 1949, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, general director of the AV and AS joint-stock company, city of Vladivostok.

Aleksandr Vladimirovich Pronin, born in 1955, Russian, secondary technical education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, deputy chief of staff of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Mikhaylovich Kostyutkin, born in 1948, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, aide to the chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Yuriy Mikhaylovich Ruda, born in 1958, Ukrainian, secondary technical education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, foreman of the rayon consumer services administration, settlement of Gorshechnoye, Kursk Oblast.

Georgiy Grigoryevich Lukava, born in 1925, Georgian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, department chairman at the Moscow State Technical University of Civil Aviation, city of Moscow.

Viktor Ivanovich Ustinov, born in 1937, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, adviser to the chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Konstantin Nikolayevich Panferov, born in 1932, Russian, higher education, adviser to the chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, professor of the Moscow State Technical University of Civil Aviation, city of Moscow.

Stanislav Konstantinovich Zarichanskiy, born in 1962, Ukrainian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, employee of the organizational department of the Central Committee of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Aleksandr Valentinovich Filatov, born in 1967, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, administrator of affairs of the shadow cabinet of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Larisa Sergeyevna Maksakova, born in 1946, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, deputy coordinator of the Moscow regional organization of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Luiza Dmitriyevna Gagut, born in 1949, Greek, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, senior research associate of the Institute of Economics of Ferrous Metallurgy, city of Moscow.

Edvard Georgiyevich Zhuk, born in 1960, Belarusian, higher education, no party affiliation, deputy manager of the Aura-Bank, city of Moscow.



Dmitriy Aleksandrovich **Skum**, born in 1961, Ukrainian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, aide to the deputy chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Aleksey Alekseyevich **Zvyagin**, born in 1936, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, professor at the Commercial University of Moscow, city of Moscow.

Aleksey Alekseyevich **Zuyev**, born in 1970, Russian, secondary technical education, no party affiliation, adviser to the president of the GMM company, city of Moscow.

Vadim Ivanovich **Bolshakov**, born in 1930, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, consultant of the sociological group of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, city of Moscow.

Nina Viktorovna **Krivelskaya**, born in 1948, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, senior research associate of the Instructional and Scientific Complex of Psychology and Work With Personnel, city of Moscow.

Anatoliy Vladimirovich **Kapustin**, born in 1939, Belarusian, higher education, no party affiliation, chairman of the board of the Fund for Protection Against Unemployment, city of Moscow.

Mikhail Petrovich **Burlakov**, born in 1952, Russian, higher education, member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, department chairman on the Tolyatti Campus of the Samara Pedagogical Institute, city of Tolyatti, Samara Oblast.

Anatoliy Semenovich **Moiseyev**, born in 1947, Russian, special secondary education, no party affiliation, administrator of the Berezka musical group, settlement of Zapovednoye, Kaliningrad Oblast.

Aleksey Viktorovich **Vasilishin**, born in 1945, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, consultant for the operation of engines of the Omega company, city of Tobolsk.

#### The Party of Russian Unity and Accord

Sergey Mikhaylovich **Shakhray**, born in 1956, Russian, higher education, leader of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government, city of Moscow.

Aleksandr Nikolayevich **Shokhin**, born in 1951, Russian, higher education, member of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government, city of Moscow.

Konstantin Fedorovich **Zatulin**, born in 1956, Russian, higher education, chairman of the coordination council of the association Entrepreneurs for a New Russia, city of Moscow.

Yuriy Khamzatovich **Kalmykov**, born in 1934, Circassian, higher education, member of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, Russian Federation minister of justice, city of Moscow.

Valeriy Aleksandrovich **Kirpichnikov**, born in 1946, Russian, higher education, member of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, president of the Union of Russian Cities, city of Sosnovyy Bor, Leningrad Oblast.

Gennadiy Georgiyevich **Melikyan**, born in 1947, Armenian, higher education, member of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, Russian Federation minister of labor, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Aleksandrovich **Tumanov**, born in 1940, Russian, higher education, member of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, professor of the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, city of Moscow.

Anatoliy Yakovlevich **Sliva**, born in 1940, Belarusian, higher education, member of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, deputy chief of the State-Law Administration of the Russian Federation President, city of Moscow.

Vyacheslav Alekseyevich **Nikonov**, born in 1956, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, adviser to the Reform international fund, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Nikolayevich **Kozhemyakin**, born in 1956, Russian, higher education, member of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, deputy chief of the Secretariat of the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation Government, city of Moscow.

Vladimir Anatolyevich **Lepekhin**, born in 1959, Russian, higher education, supporter of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, instructor at the imeni M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, city of Moscow.

Aleksandr Vladimirovich **Turbanov**, born in 1950, Russian, higher education, supporter of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, chief of the legal administration of the Inkombank joint-stock bank, city of Moscow.

Igor Aleksandrovich **Shichanin**, born in 1955, Russian, higher education, member of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, chief of the department of international cooperation and CIS affairs of the staff of the Russian Federation Government, city of Moscow.

Konstantin Eduardovich **Zuyev**, born in 1961, Russian, higher education, supporter of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, chairman of the board of directors of the Technology joint-stock company, city of Moscow.



**Murad Magomedovich Kazhlayev**, born in 1931, Lak, higher education, no party affiliation, chief conductor and artistic manager of the Academic Grand Orchestra of the Ostankino State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, city of Moscow.

**Sergey Borisovich Stankevich**, born in 1954, Russian, higher education, member of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, temporarily not working, city of Moscow.

**Sergey Aleksandrovich Shapovalov**, born in 1951, Russian, higher education, member of the electoral association Party of Russian Unity and Accord, deputy head of the Rostov Oblast Administration, city of Novochoerkassk.

**Irek Sharipovich Muksinov**, born in 1932, Bashkir, higher education, member of the movement Joint Creativity of Nations in the Name of Life (The Senezh Forum), research associate at the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, city of Moscow.

#### The Women of Russia Political Movement

**Alevtina Vasilyevna Fedulova**, born in 1940, Russian, higher education, member of the Council of Representatives of the Women of Russia Political Movement, chairman of the Union of Women of Russia, city of Moscow.

**Yekaterina Filippovna Lakhova**, born in 1948, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, adviser to the president of the Russian Federation for the affairs of women, families, and children, city of Moscow.

**Natalya Georgiyevna Gundareva**, born in 1948, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, actress of the imeni Mayakovskogo Moscow Academic Theater, city of Moscow.

**Natalya Dmitriyevna Malakhatkina**, born in 1949, Russian, higher education, member of the Women of Russia Political Movement, chairman of the D.O.M. (Childhood, Society, Charity) Center, city of Moscow.

**Lyudmila Nikolayevna Zavadskaya**, born in 1949, Russian, higher education, member of the Women of Russia Political Movement, acting chief of the section of theory and sociology of law at the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, city of Moscow.

**Marina Karamanovna Dobrovolskaya**, born in 1960, Russian, higher education, member of the Council of Representatives of the Women of Russia Political Movement, chairman of the Union of Women of the Navy, city of Moscow.

**Galina Ivanovna Klimantova**, born in 1944, Russian, higher education, member of the Women of Russia Political Movement, chief of the department for family affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Udmurt Republic, city of Izhevsk.

**Fanuza Sharafiyevna Arslanova**, born in 1951, Tatar, higher education, no party affiliation, chief of the legal department of the Urengoygazprom joint-stock company, city of Novyy Urengoy, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

**Antonina Aleksandrovna Zhilina**, born in 1949, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, president of the commercial and industrial joint-stock company Tsaritsyn Dvor, city of Volgograd.

**Irina Yevgenyevna Vybornova**, born in 1951, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, vice president of the Free Economic Society of Russia, city of Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast.

**Yelena Yevgenyevna Chepurnykh**, born in 1955, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, chairman of the International Federation of Children's Organizations, city of Moscow.

**Raisa Ivanovna Skripitsyna**, born in 1942, Russian, higher education, member of the Women of Russia Political Movement, vice mayor of the city of Obninsk, Kaluga Oblast.

**Valentina Grigoryevna Martynova**, born in 1942, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, deputy general director of the Farmimeks state enterprise, city of Moscow.

**Yekaterina Mikhaylovna Popova**, born in 1941, Komi, higher education, no party affiliation, chief physician of the Komi Republic Hospital, city of Syktyvkar.

**Svetlana Yuryevna Orlova**, born in 1954, Russian, higher education, member of the Women of Russia Political Movement, general director of the Anna Women's Commercial Charitable Organization, city of Vladivostok.

**Valentina Vasilyevna Kozhukhova**, born in 1950, Russian, higher education, member of the Women of Russia Political Movement, chairman of the board of the Stavropol Kray Fund for Compulsory Health Insurance, city of Stavropol.

**Galina Petrovna Chubkova**, born in 1945, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, chairman of the department of sociology and psychology at the Astrakhan Technical Institute of the Fishing Industry, city of Astrakhan.

**Larisa Vladimirovna Babukh**, born in 1949, Russian, higher education, no party affiliation, general director of the Larina-Servis joint-stock company, city of Moscow.

**Zhanna Mikhaylovna Lozinskaya**, born in 1944, Russian, higher education, member of the Women of Russia Political Movement, senior research associate of the State Technical University of Tula, city of Tula.

**Irina Yefimovna Novitskaya**, born in 1951, Russian, higher education, member of the Women of Russia

Political Movement, ward chief at the city emergency service hospital for children, city of Vladimir.

Lyudmila Nikolayevna Markina, born in 1940, Russian, higher education, member of the Women of Russia Political Movement, director of the Milling Combine No. 3 leased enterprise, city of Moscow.

### Yakovlev Views Election Results

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No 22, 17 Dec 93 p 1

[Article by Yegor Yakovlev, under the "Breakfast on the Grass" rubric: "Barbed Wire for Ourselves"]

[Text] What do I think about the words that sounded from the podium of the night rally in the Kremlin? "Russia, stop and think! You have lost your mind." I do not know about you, but I was deeply insulted by this statement. And although it came from a person who sometimes is considered nearly a forefather of our democracy, in my opinion he is no better than Zhirinovskiy. One set out to order Russia to lie down by his boot. The other also addresses her in the familiar form, and at the same time gives her a kick in the butt when she does something different than he would have wanted her to.

How wise were my people, who refused this time to give their support to those who, having found themselves in power, wanted to stay there in the manner of business as usual. The people have not forgotten unfulfilled promises. They have not forgiven mutual devouring. They did not hear from those in power in Russia how they intend to pull it out of the pit that they themselves had dug. In short, the people did not believe the electoral bloc where political cheats, the talentless, and the greedy freely mingled among unquestionably decent and respected people.

But why then, why have these wise people of mine have given their support to Zhirinovskiy? Well, because they have been very, very much treated like a doormat over the past two years. Now those who have been ardently arguing lately in favor of political expediency and the moral necessity of choosing between the lesser of two evils can congratulate themselves. This is the result. Evil in power is always more prominent than evil in opposition.

We had fun painting, and then cried when the count came in. The wave of fear of Zhirinovskiy's victory is rising higher and higher, hypnotizing and paralyzing. The democrats already are preparing to stock up on barbed wire for themselves. The newspapers, instead of congratulations on the New Year, congratulate us on a new monster. Everybody sees fascism walking across Russia behind every corner.

Come on! Calm down! Breathe through the nose. One has to be a good sport both in winning and in losing.

Yes, Zhirinovskiy's program is pro-fascist. There is no doubt about it. But neither is there any doubt that this program of imperial aspirations, propped by the palisade of shameless promises, cannot possibly be implemented in our time.

Of course, Zhirinovskiy's election triumph does not evoke anything other than sadness and painful contemplation. But are you so certain that the victory of Russia's Choice would have brought you what we have been deprived of for quite a while—a feeling of deep satisfaction? An absolute predominance of this bloc in the parliament would have meant that the executive branch, which now has freed itself from any checks and balances, would retain this indecent posture of free-for-all. Who will argue with it when a minister becomes a lawmaker, and a lawmaker a minister?

Many tears have also been shed on the subject of a split in democratic forces. It seems to me, though, that it would have been much worse had they come to the elections in a single formation. The latter would mean that all democrats, big and small, ignore the realities of life. Which has convinced us quite graphically that in the environment of festering crisis, only opposition forces can count on popular support. Had the democrats dared to take a more oppositionist stance, had they judged the events more critically, they would have gathered more votes. But had they all merged in one pro-government bloc, they would not have collected even those they have now.

So who needs to fan up these fears, this unstoppable funeral toll? I think it is not just the naive ones.

Some think that the more fear they pump into the public atmosphere, the sooner they will get back—no, not the votes, they have already gone to Zhirinovskiy—at least the benevolence of those who had rejected them at the elections. Others, having reached a sense of comfort when the executive branch prevailed everywhere and in everything, want to prolong this pleasure. That is why they are calling us to the barricades, seeing the latter as the most convenient place. Our foreign friends are also pumping up the fears. Of course, they absolutely need to: Otherwise, how can they explain their unquestioning support for everything that has been happening in Russia lately?

And what has been happening went precisely in accordance with the scenario that originated with the president and was supported by the ruling elite. Disbanding the parliament; elections that resembled roach races; and blindfolded approval of the Constitution. Except that the result turned out differently. Since all of this went according to a scenario, its authors and executors now have to make an effort to find interaction with those they have brought into the legislature.

Some people think that everything in life is prepaid. I think differently: One has to pay for everything. They assured us: We will violate the Constitution ever so slightly, disband the parliament somewhat, shoot at it a

little bit, and then everything will be fine. It does not happen this way! You have to pay. It would not be too bad if only those who violated the Constitution and disbanded the parliament had to pick up the tab. Alas, most often it is all of us who have to pay.

### **TRUD on Parliament's Work Preparations**

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Night Edition pp 1-2

[Article by Nikolay Kishkin: "What To Think About in the Duma: The First Post-Soviet Parliament Will Begin Its Work Next Week"]

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission of Russia has finally published the final results of the election. Behind us are the tension and confusion of the preelection weeks and the dissonance of the first, frequently excessively emotional postelection assessments. It is already possible to take a calmer look at what has happened and to think about what to expect from the new parliament and how its activity will be reflected in our life.

The first conclusion to be drawn from looking at the lists of elected deputies is perhaps simple: There were no winners in these elections. No single bloc and no single party received a majority in parliament or even an appreciable preponderance. The preelection predictions of almost all of them were two to five times greater than what they actually received.

Perhaps only Zhirinovskiy's LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] (with all of its ambitions) was not counting on such an impressive number of votes. So the "Zhirinovskiy phenomenon" consists not in his victory (as it turned out, in terms of general results he did not have one) but in the unexpectedness of his success. Right after the fact, this success was explained by a multitude of factors, including extreme ones—from an affinity for neo-Nazi slogans on the part of a low-life and young "supermen" to mass "hypnosis" by the Kashpirovskiy method. But the essence probably consists in the fact that while there was no single reason for the success of the LDPR, finally what was decisive was the dissatisfaction of a considerable part of the population with the current situation and their standard of living.

Of course, questions immediately arise. Why did this voter give his vote to Zhirinovskiy and not, for example, to Travkin, who, with Govorukhin's help, was criticizing the government almost down to his last words, and, in spite of this, barely passed the 5 percent mark? Why did this voter not see the danger of the neo-Nazi slogans and recoil from their author? Why did he "buy" these promises which he knew could not be kept? And the answer is simple and obvious: Because several generations of our people have been educated in a belief in simple and clear solutions, and these are what Zhirinovskiy offered. After all, did we not believe at the beginning of almost any five-year plan that at the end of it there would be a burst of prosperity? Were there not many people who believed Nikita Sergeyevich when he said that communism would

arrive in 20 years? So why not believe Vladimir Volfovich now? "Thanks to the party and the government"—this is not simply a slogan of "those" years; it is a level of belief in the idea that someone will give us something, it is the way of thinking of the masses of people. Of course, one can say that a certain part of the voters did not have enough political sophistication to figure all this out. Yes, one could say that, but it is wrong to blame the voters for this: For decades they had no political choice when they went to vote. And if now, without getting into the intricacies of politics, a person has made his choice at the level of a naive, everyday awareness, it is his choice, and now the politicians will have to deal with it.

The paradox of the recent elections consists in that while there are no winners, there are still losers. And, unfortunately, they are the reform blocs. If after counting on a majority in parliament they do not receive it, you cannot call it anything but a defeat. And now all parliamentary tactics will have to be arranged in a new way, based on existing realities. How will the breakdown of political forces in the Duma look and how will the blocs behave?

Let us stipulate at the outset that a final conclusion about the alignment of forces will not be possible until after there have been two or three votes on fundamental issues. In the first place, a considerable share of the deputies were elected as independents, they are not bound to any bloc, and therefore their propensities may be revealed only during the process of the parliament's work. In the second place, even those who ran under the banner of a specific bloc will certainly not necessarily vote on one question or another in line with this bloc's program. It is now possible to construct suppositions about the tactics of these blocs as a whole with a greater or lesser degree of probability.

Russia's Choice, according to initial estimates, will be the largest faction, including more than 100 deputies, which, however, is clearly not enough to confidently defend the course of reforms. Therefore this course can be maintained without special fluctuations only with cooperation with the Yavlinskiy, Shakhrai, and Women of Russia blocs along with independent deputies. The leaders of the Russia's Choice bloc have already announced their readiness to interact in parliament "with all political forces." But even then a majority is not guaranteed. In search of this majority, the bloc will obviously be prepared to make partial concessions except for those that would mean a rejection of the reforms that have been started. And this presents a major difficulty, for even the blocs of Yavlinskiy and Shakhrai, which are kindred in spirit, diverge from Gaydar's bloc fundamentally with respect to a number of economic problems, particularly concerning the speed of the reforms and social priorities.

An extremely impressive force is represented by the team of the Agrarian Party and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which together received more than 110. One can obviously argue about this, but I lump



them together because, to be honest, I see no special differences in their political positions. Their orientation toward "socialist values" binds them firmly together in their voting. It is from this team (retaining reformist phraseology) that there may come proposals that essentially exacerbate inflation, such as price regulation, support for failing enterprises in the city and country—that is, the very proposals that could mean an end to the reforms and "Ukrainianization" of the Russian economy. The danger of such proposals is fairly great if one considers that on the surface they appear to be concern for the public good and can attract a certain part of the deputies.

Strange as it may be, with respect to a number of issues this team might be joined by the Democratic Party of Russia, which is headed by anticommunists Travkin and Govorukhin. Having assumed during the election campaign a tone that was not simply critical but abusive to the reformers, the government, and the president, these leaders sharply reduced the playing field. In general, judging from the election battles, the impression was created that Travkin's party is not going to parliament to work but to fight, unmask, and brand people. If this tone is assumed by the communists as well, nothing good awaits our parliament—we will simply get another copy of the Supreme Soviet and further heightening of the confrontation in society.

And what about Zhirinovskiy's party? I shall allow myself to make the suggestion that Vladimir Volfovich has kept all his ultranationalistic slogans that shocked Russia and the world "in reserve" and will not use them in parliament; he will save them for better times, hoping to gain all the power. He will quite probably regard the next two years as a campaign stretched over the time until the 1996 presidential elections. He will try to create for himself the image of the pike that lives in the lake to keep the small fish alert. From his standpoint it is a win-win situation. If things get better in the economy, he will take credit for it; he will say look: My party came to office and things were straightened out. If it becomes harder to live—again he has a ready explanation: You did not allow me to create a government and this is what you get. Although in his heart I think that the last thing Zhirinovskiy would like would be to end up in government: Because then he would have to be responsible for everything he promised. Incidentally, he is not being offered a position in the government, of course: That would be too much of a price to pay to see how a soap bubble filled with empty promises might burst...

Another scenario looks surprising but it is worth mentioning: The LDPR could end up as the least stable parliamentary formation. During the election campaign Zhirinovskiy made one tactical error: In response to the question of how the deputies of his party would vote in the Duma, he said: The way their leader tells them to. As long as Vladimir Volfovich was playing the role of a steamship and pulling several dozen completely unknown politicians into parliament, he was forgiven everything. But now, looking at the list of deputies of the

LDPR, you would think that they would not be willing to play the role of extras while their leader is bucking for president. A split in the party has already been noted: Zhirinovskiy's former close ally and his candidate for vice president, A. Zavidiy, announced that he was going to break with the boss, stop financing him, and lead his people away from him. So the LDPR faction (and it includes about 70 people) with various votes could have the most unexpected versions of forming a bloc.

And so the new parliament will begin its work in a couple of days. What are our hopes and concerns in this connection?

We have but one hope, and it is that from the first days all the political forces will reject confrontation and political accusations against one another and will understand that this path has already been followed to the end and has led to nothing but trouble. It has led to bloodshed. Our hope is that the deputies have come to the Duma to work, and that means, above all, not to seek that which separates them but places where they come together, decisions that are mutually acceptable, even if they involve concessions. If they approach things reasonably they must understand that there simply is no other path. With the current alignment of forces not only no single faction but not even any conceivable combination of them can produce a majority. And this means that with any other approach the parliament might not be able to decide anything at all.

And we are alarmed by the still remaining possibility, albeit theoretical, of rejecting the course of reforms with a subsequent collapse of the entire economy. Parliament could adopt some antireform law, but it would be extremely difficult to do so: In the first place, any draft laws that in one way or another affect expenditures from the federal budget may be submitted only with a recommendation from the government. So any populist resolutions to increase expenditures without actually covering them will be practically impossible to pass. In the second place, any law adopted by the Duma will have to be monitored by the Council of the Federation, whose disapproval will have to be overcome not by a simple majority of Duma votes but by two-thirds. In the third place, the president, who even after the elections confirmed the unchanging course of the reforms, still has the right to a veto, which also can be overridden only by two-thirds. And proponents of reforms and those who support them do have a third of the votes in the Duma. True, further advancement of the reforms will require new laws that work in their direction which the deputies are quite capable of blocking. Proponents of reforms have only one way of preventing this: working constantly with the deputies, especially the centrist part of them, convincing them that they are right and, with all the difficulty of the situation, showing unwavering concern for the social direction of the reforms.

It is assumed that the Federal Assembly will begin its work with a joint session of the two chambers at which they will hear the message from the president. Then they



will have to adopt their regulations, a draft of which has been drawn up by the commission on legislative proposals, and elect speakers and their deputies. We are no longer threatened by the return of a "chief of all deputies" like Khasbulatov. There will simply be no such position; each chamber will have its own chairman whose role will be to conduct the meetings and take charge of the daily routine. And he will have no power over the parliamentary committees. The speaker of the Duma, his two deputies (all three from different factions), and delegates from the factions and groups with voting power in proportion to their numbers will make up a Conference for purely organizational business—determining the agenda, convening extra sessions, sending draft laws to committees, etc. The Conference will make none of the decisions the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet essentially allowed itself.

The question of the speaker of the Duma has already been hotly discussed in the press, even in spite of this figure's obvious weakness as compared to the recent past. There are many in the running—each faction would like to see its own representative. Many well-known politicians would be willing to occupy this position: Even if the speaker has basically representative functions, they allow him to be constantly in view, which is of no small importance for politicians who are working out far-reaching plans. At various times interest in this post has been expressed by S. Shakhrai and V. Zhirinovskiy; V. Lukin would not reject it; and Russia's Choice would not be against recommending S. Kovalev. It will not be possible, of course, to decide on a mutually acceptable candidacy at the session itself. This will be done through preliminary consultations, which are proceeding with difficulty so far. It seems that none of the influential factions will achieve success. It will be necessary to agree on some neutral figure who has not plainly announced his political sympathies. We will not guess—there is not long left to wait.

Now the main thing is to get ready for productive work so that parliamentarism in Russia will finally acquire features that are attractive to society and will actually become a real means of creating a new Russia.

### **Constitutional Democrats' Squabbles Viewed**

944F0246A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 51,  
15-21 Dec 93 (Signed to press 14 Dec 93) p 3

[Report by Nikolay Polyakov: "Constitutional Democrats of National Salvation"]

[Text] A few days ago in a conference hall of Rossiya hotel, a theatrical production with the intriguing title "The 14th Congress of the Constitutional Democratic Party" (Astafyev's) took place. Unfortunately, we have to register the fact that the production went unnoticed by the theater-going public—no playbills, and the tickets were distributed only among those who have proven in deed their loyalty to the idea of "national salvation" in the National Salvation Front [FNS] version. About 30

such persons have indeed been found. The congress was preceded by a thorough purge of the party, conducted after the Central Electoral Commission had disqualified a considerable number of signatures collected with the help of the Communist Party, Baburin's ROS [Russian All-People's Union], Nevzorov's Ours movement, and other kindred organizations. The first step was the unmasking of the "gang of four," headed by Dmitriy Rogozin, which consisted of members of the Constitutional Democratic Party (the Party of the People's Freedom) Central Committee, who were expelled from the organization "for losing touch with the party."

A listless fight had been going on in the cadet [Constitutional Democratic Party] party for a year between the supporters of the National Salvation Front and its opponents, who considered cooperation with communists impossible in principle. The latter congregated in the Renewal Union and the Congress of Russian Communities.

The events of September-October 1993 sharply changed the situation. Having agreed to consider Boris Yeltsin's actions unconstitutional, the "Astafyevites" and "Rogozinites" disagreed on a main point: The way out of the crisis. And while the former continued to follow the line of irreconcilable opposition, the latter, having encountered the inability of the Supreme Soviet's leadership to offer a constructive alternative, bet their chips on the Federation Council and the tough position of the regions. The military action at Ostankino and the White House drew the line on this discussion. At a hastily convened plenum, Mikhail Astafyev was asked to brief his colleagues on his activities in the FNS leadership and to pay the bills by giving up the position of Central Committee chairman.

Mikhail Astafyev rejected the accusations directed at him, and characterized the activities of his opponents as "an attempt to split the party on the eve of the elections."

After numerous violations of procedural matters and manipulation of the votes of the absent Central Committee members, delegations of regional party organizations left the meeting hall in protest. As is known, however, a sacred place is never empty, and at the next get-together, about 20 people who have never been cadet party members gathered in the hall. Among them were persons of certain renown—Artem Artemov and Nikolay Andrianov, members of the FNS executive committee. To the question when these gentlemen had managed to join the cadet party, Mikhail Astafyev answered without blinking an eye that it had happened between the two "conferences." That figures. After the suspension of FNS' activities, its membership began converging in droves under the Constitutional Democratic Party's banners. Will Mr. Astafyev continue to claim now successorship to the party of P. Milyukov, P. Struve, and V. Nabokov? According to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, it was the cadet party that expressed the interests of liberal intelligentsia, thus clearing the way for the Bolsheviks by its radicalism. Future generations do have something to blame them for. But not to this extent.

**A necessary afterword.**

In January 1994 the supporters of constitutional democracy are convening for their next congress.

**Sobchak on Russian Statehood, Presidential Plans**

944F0246B Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 51,  
15-21 Dec 93 (Signed to press 14 Dec 93) p 3

Interview with Mayor of St. Petersburg Anatoliy Sobchak, by Pavel Yablonskiy; place and date not given: "Anatoliy Sobchak: 'It Is Not Easy To Bring Oneself To Become a Kamikaze'"

[Text] *In reply to the question who may become the next president of Russia, Gavriil Popov stayed away from personalities. He explained that it is much more important to define the set of qualities that a contender for this job must possess. Popov put at the top of this list experience of running an individual region. It is hard to argue with this. In the United States, too, in most cases the president is a politician who has sat in a governor's chair. How many such people do we have, with names familiar to most? Boris Nemtsov, Yuriy Luzhkov, Anatoliy Sobchak.... It is true that the image of the latter has faded somewhat since we saw him first at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. But, as they say, it is not over yet. Society's moods are changeable....*

[Yablonskiy] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, to what extent were you aware of the preparations for the president's Edict No. 1400 of 21 September?

[Sobchak] I anticipated it, although the precise date was a surprise for me. I learned of this edict from television, just like everybody else. Such decisions had to be made sooner or later. Not long before this edict, the Supreme Soviet handed the president another set of amendments to the Constitution. For all practical purposes, they abolished the office of the president, and there was no doubt that the Congress would pass these amendments to the Constitution. This way, they would have dealt with the president without any impeachment.

[Yablonskiy] Have you ever advised the president to take this step?

[Sobchak] This issue has never been discussed directly. At the presidential council we always discuss the situation and propose some or other way to resolve it. Immediately after the Constitutional Conference, when three-quarters of its participants approved the draft Basic Law, I proposed immediately to move toward holding a referendum or to attempt to bring the question of approving the new Constitution at the Congress of People's Deputies, putting only this one issue on the agenda. Otherwise, the president himself would have to make a decision on calling for early elections.

[Yablonskiy] As a jurist, however, do you see here some things that are incorrect from the standpoint of law?

[Sobchak] During a period of transition, things that are incorrect from the standpoint of law happen all the time. In 1991 the Congress practically unanimously voted to strip USSR people's deputies of their powers, although it had no power to make such a decision.... People's deputies voted not only for themselves, but sometimes for up to 10 people, which makes any decision ever passed by the parliament, or even the existence of this body, questionable.

We have a lot of things that are not legitimate. This is inevitable, because we live by a mixed law, 90 percent of which is still a holdover from the communist era.

[Yablonskiy] Were you against the disintegration of the Soviet Union?

[Sobchak] Yes.

[Yablonskiy] In your opinion, does Russia face the same problem now?

[Sobchak] The situation in the Soviet Union was different. Russia is not facing a problem of disintegration today. Here is why. All the former republics of the Soviet Union have had a taste of independence and now want to unite. They understand that even such a strong power as Ukraine cannot survive alone.

[Yablonskiy] But purely Russian regions now are talking about seceding from Russia. Are you not concerned that....

[Sobchak] A trend is developing of disintegrating into individual fiefdoms? This process does present, of course, a certain danger. But if the federal government acts firmly and decisively, this will not happen. I think it would suffice simply to stop allocating money from the federal budget to any region, and it will immediately collapse financially.

[Yablonskiy] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, what is Russia? What kind of country is it—neither a Soviet republic nor the sovereign RSFSR?

[Sobchak] I believe that Russia ceased to exist as a state in October 1917. And did not exist until October 1991; it had been completely integrated into the structures of the unitary Soviet Union, just like all the other republics. Such system existed only for administrative convenience, keeping track of CPSU members, and organizing party committees. Here are two examples that show that in essence the Russian state did not exist. In 1922 the Politburo of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party's Central Committee makes a decision to transfer to Ukraine Russian territories with centers in Kharkov, Odessa, Yuzovka (Donetsk), and Kherson. With this wording: "For the purpose of strengthening the proletarian stratum and influence in Ukraine, to make these Russian provinces part of Ukraine." The second decision: in 1954, under Khrushchev—on transferring the Crimea to Ukraine. Again, it is the party leadership that makes the decision—not other bodies, even though they exist for the sake of formality. What kind of state is it?

There was no Russian state. This period is a black hole in its history. The Russian state was restored only in 1991....

[Yablonskiy] But this time within the borders of some Russian SFSR [Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]....

[Sobchak] Yes, but on a different basis. I believe that today Russia cannot raise the issue of border revisions, because it will inevitably lead to a war. It is in the interests of Russia today to ensure normal development within the RSFSR's borders. I do not preclude the possibility, however, that in time many Russian territories that have been transferred to Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus will return to Russia. The historic trend in this respect is very clear.

[Yablonskiy] You had said that it is necessary to close the borders with the Baltics. One gets the impression, however, that you want to preserve this unstable equilibrium, with the Russian border seemingly being here, and at the same time not here.... So what do we do about the border?

[Sobchak] I believe that the border should be closed. We can use for this purpose the troops being withdrawn from the Baltics and Europe—deploy them along the border and shut off uncontrolled exports of material valuables from Russia. We need to establish normal customs ties and movement of goods between Russia and the countries of the former USSR. A considerable number of crimes here—between 60 and 80 percent—are committed by persons from the Caucasus region, most of whom are citizens of other countries. They come here, commit crimes, and then go back to their republics, and you cannot initiate criminal proceedings against them. This by itself is a good reason to close the borders. If we have economic agreements with our neighbors on the freedom of movement of goods, we have to put in place such customs and border controls that would check the legality of movement of people from one republic to another.

[Yablonskiy] Speaking of economic cooperation between countries of "a different caliber," can one say seriously that Russia has lost political influence after the disintegration of the COMECON and the USSR?

[Sobchak] It depends how you define "political influence." There is influence that is exerted purposefully, crudely, visibly.... Such crude influence is becoming a thing of the past. But there also is another kind. When people cooperate, communicate well, and know one another, it is a completely different kind of influence. One should not be afraid of it. And one should exert influence. For instance, the conflict in Yugoslavia could have been stopped had influential arbiters, with whom the country had traditional and very strong ties, been brought in in time. It was Yugoslavia's back luck that Russia, and others among its traditional friends, were at the time busy with their own affairs.

[Yablonskiy] Do you intend to run for president?

[Sobchak] I do not intend to answer that question until the presidential election campaign begins. When it is announced, I will make my decision. I do think that today being the president of Russia is a kamikaze job. And it is not easy to decide for yourself whether it is worth it to be a kamikaze.

### **Liberal Democratic Party Program, Charter**

944F0240A Moscow LDPR Press Release in Russian  
Dec 93 pp 4-15

[Texts of Liberal Democratic Party of Russia "Program" and "Charter," received by FBIS 23 December 1993]

[Text]

## **PROGRAM OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF RUSSIA**

### **I. GENERAL PROVISIONS**

The purpose of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] is to create in the country conditions for the unfettered practical expression of the creative abilities of the people populating the country and assiduous use of our country's natural resources.

The LDPR program is a program of our society's development in accordance with its needs without any outside interference.

A member of the LDPR is a person who does not separate his personal interests from those of the motherland;

—he is a creator, making a contribution to fulfillment of the motherland's priority goals, which are aimed at preserving peace and raising the living standard of the entire population of our vast country.

The LDPR's political activity is aimed at restoring by peaceful means and preserving the Russian state built over centuries; restoring and protecting the country's borders; ensuring inside the country peaceful cohabitation of all the peoples populating it—large and small—with the right to preserve traditions and customs, develop national culture, and exercise freedom of conscience. Russia is a motherland without any kind of discrimination.

### **II. DOMESTIC POLICY**

Domestic policy is implemented by the executive branch, headed by the president, on the basis of observing the law and freedom of entrepreneurial activities.

Strict observance of the law is the main guarantee of establishing and maintaining order, an immutable condition for building and functioning of a law-based state.



The internal system is based on the administrative-territorial principle: the basic unit is the province (oblast). There shall be no national state entities on the territory of Russia.

Legislation is enacted by the Parliament (State Duma), formed by holding elections on the territorial principle. The parliament adopts laws, adopts a Constitution, and amends it if necessary.

The entirety of executive power is vested in the head of state—the president, elected by citizens eligible to vote, through a secret ballot. The president appoints the prime minister, who forms the cabinet of ministers, which is approved by the president. The president has the right to disband the parliament, call for new elections, and veto laws. The president is answerable to the parliament in the event he commits anticonstitutional actions.

The judiciary is independent from the legislative and executive branches. All citizens are equal before law and enjoy equal rights.

### III. THE ECONOMY

The goal of the LDPR's economic policy is to create a life of dignity and well-being for every inhabitant of Russia—gradually, without "revolutionary leaps" or cataclysms. This is impossible to accomplish by "decrees from the top": This task can only be accomplished by uniting society and providing everyone the opportunity to work in peace and creatively, to support themselves and their family, while enjoying life.

Only a central power, and only with active and concerted help from the regions, can put in motion the production flywheels of such an immense country as Russia. Russia possesses the necessary resources—raw material, land, industrial, and human, including intellectual—to enable it to develop its own economy fast, without any prompting or enslaving credits from "outside."

It is necessary to ensure for everyone the opportunity to participate in production. Unprofitable enterprises and those producing output that is not in demand should be retargeted and provided with resources to produce goods in short supply and spare parts for our equipment. The population should not experience unemployment or live in fear of it.

Wages should be no lower than the sustenance minimum. Highly skilled specialists should get higher wages that correspond to the complexity, difficulty, and quality of their labor.

At the initial stage, privatization should only extend to small enterprises and the service sphere. Enterprises that are being privatized cannot be sold to outsiders—they must be transferred to the ownership of the collective. Only at a later stage should it be permitted to sell them on the open market.

Housing should be transferred free of charge to the ownership of the people living in it. Those on the waiting

lists should be given an opportunity to purchase housing on credit with subsequent repayment of its cost to the state over 25-50 years, interest-free, beginning with the fourth year of occupancy.

At the initial stage, land remains the property of the state. Those wishing to do so may have land on a long-term lease (25-50 years) without prepayment, with right to inherit, but with the mandatory condition that the land will lie fallow, and that the lessor with work it and produce agricultural output.

Profitable kolkhozes and sovkhozes are equated in their land-use rights to private lessors. All unused land should be returned to the state.

All kinds of speculative reselling must be stopped.

Well-organized production and uninterrupted material supply of industrial enterprises in the state sector with the resources necessary for production will allow for uninterrupted and profitable work. At the same time, state enterprises' output will be sold at fixed prices. Key economic sectors in industry, agriculture, and science needed to raise the level of production and quality of goods in other production sectors will be provided targeted financing out of tax revenue.

Providing agriculture with the needed equipment supplied by state enterprises, as well as fuel and power resources, state assistance in setting up local food-processing industry, and preferential rates for transportation of agricultural output will enable the products produced by the arduous effort of the rural population to be fully utilized.

Export of surplus resources with state assistance and under state control will increase the inflow of hard currency into the country.

### Legislation on Use of Foreign Manpower

#### Edict

944F0237A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian  
23 Dec 93 p 5

["Edict of the President of the Russian Federation No. 2146, dated 16 December 1993, On the Recruitment and Use of Foreign Labor in the Russian Federation"]

[Text] With a view to implementing a state policy of the Russian Federation with regard to recruiting foreign labor and ensuring the priority right of citizens of the Russian Federation to fill vacant jobs, and in keeping with Edict of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1598, dated 7 October 1993, "On Legal Regulation During the Period of Phased Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation," I resolve:

1. To approve the appended Statute on the Recruitment and Use of Foreign Labor in the Russian Federation.



2. To establish that a fee amounting to the minimum monthly wage established by the legislation of the Russian Federation shall be collected from employers for the issuance of permits to recruit foreign labor for each recruited foreign employee. The funds collected shall be credited to the revenue side of the relevant budgets.

3. To establish that certificates of the right to labor activities shall be issued free of charge to foreign citizens hired by employers within the quota of the recruited foreign labor.

Fees in amounts established by the Federal Migration Service of Russia, jointly with the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, which ensure the recovery of costs associated with the issuance of certificates, shall be collected from employers for the issuance of certificates of the right to labor activities to foreign citizens in cases in which the processing of permits is not required.

4. Employers shall be held accountable through procedures established by the legislation of the Russian Federation for recruiting foreign labor without the requisite permits.

Foreign citizens who have entered the Russian Federation with a view to engaging in professional activities and have been hired in violation of the Statute on the Recruitment and Use of Foreign Labor in the Russian Federation shall be subject to deportation from the Russian Federation by the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation at the expense of the employer.

5. Employers who, as of the moment of the issuance of the present edict, have labor arrangements with foreign citizens temporarily staying on the territory of the Russian Federation shall bring them into compliance with the Statute on the Recruitment and Use of Foreign Labor in the Russian Federation within three months.

6. The present edict shall be submitted to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for consideration.

7. The present edict shall take effect at the moment of signing.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin  
Moscow, the Kremlin  
16 December 1993  
No. 2146

### Statute

944F0237B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian  
23 Dec 93 p 5

["Statute on the Recruitment and Use of Foreign Labor in the Russian Federation," introduced by Edict of the Russian Federation President No. 2146, dated 16 December 1993]

[Text] 1. The present Statute shall set forth conditions and procedures for the issuance of permits to recruit

foreign labor in the Russian Federation, as well as certificates of the right to labor activities on the territory of the Russian Federation to foreign citizens.

2. The issuance of permits to recruit foreign labor (henceforth referred to as permits) and the monitoring of their use shall be effected by the Federal Migration Service of Russia on the suggestions of the organs of executive power of republics belonging to the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and cities with federal status.

3. The permits shall establish quotas for the recruitment of a certain number of foreign citizens, as a whole and by professional groups, who are hired by employers to work on the territories of republics belonging to the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and cities with federal status.

4. The permits may be issued to Russian legal entities, enterprises with foreign investment operating on the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as particular Russian and foreign individuals and stateless persons who reside on the territory of the Russian Federation and use the labor of hired employees in their personal economic units (henceforth referred to as employers). In the process, the duration of professional activities of the recruited foreign citizens shall not exceed the duration of validity of the permit.

5. An employer shall submit the following to the Federal Migration Service of Russia in order to obtain a permit:  
a petition;

a proposal (findings) by the relevant organs of executive power of a republic belonging to the Russian Federation, kray, oblast, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, or city with federal status, substantiating the feasibility of the recruitment and use of foreign labor by the employer;

a draft labor contract, or other documents, confirming a preliminary agreement with foreign citizens, or partners from abroad, concerning the intention and terms for the recruitment of foreign employees. In the process, the terms, wages, and occupational safety for foreign citizens, and their social welfare and insurance, shall be governed by the norms of the legislation of the Russian Federation, taking into account the specifics envisioned by state-to-state and government-to-government agreements of the Russian Federation with foreign countries.

Enterprises, offices, and organizations reporting to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation shall also submit, in order to receive permits, statements of consent by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation for the recruitment of foreign employees.

6. Proposals (findings) by organs of executive power of republics belonging to the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and cities with federal status, concerning the recruitment of foreign labor by employers shall be based on the principle of the priority right of Russian citizens to fill vacant

jobs, and shall be prepared taking into account the availability of equivalent labor on the territory in question and the absence of an opportunity to redistribute labor resources from other regions of the country, the provision of equal terms and wages for foreign employees compared to the citizens of the Russian Federation, and the prevention of any unfavorable impact on the employment conditions for Russian citizens due to the hiring of foreign citizens.

7. Decisions to issue permits shall be made by the Federal Migration Service of Russia within 30 days of the filing of the documents envisioned in point 5 of the present statute by the employer. If an expert review is required in order to make a decision, the decision shall be made within 15 days after the receipt of expert findings, but no later than 45 days from the date of the filing of the documents indicated.

A substantiated denial of the issuance of a permit shall be forwarded, in writing, to the employer within five days after the decision to deny the issuance of a permit is made.

8. As a rule, permits shall be issued for a term of up to one year. Based on a substantiated request from an employer, the effect of a permit may be extended after it expires, but for no longer than one year.

When the validity of a permit is extended, a fee in the amount envisioned for the issuance of a permit shall be collected from the employer.

9. A permit shall not be transferred to other employers. Foreign employees recruited on the basis of the permit may not be transferred to work for another employer.

10. A permit shall indicate: the name of the organ issuing the permit, the name and address of the employer to whom the permit has been issued and information on its state registration, the territory on which the permit applies, the number and breakdown of the recruited employees by profession, their country of origin or regular residence, grounds for the issuance of the permit, its duration of validity, and other data in keeping with the format given in Appendix No. 1.

A permit shall be signed by the executive official empowered by the chief of the Federal Migration Service of Russia, and is certified with a seal.

11. Employers who have received permits to recruit foreign labor must, within one month, forward to the Federal Migration Service of Russia information on the signing of labor contracts with foreign employees on the basis of the permits.

12. In the event that an employer violates the conditions of the present statute indicated in the permit, as well as

the legislation of the Russian Federation, as a result of which the rights of foreign employees are infringed upon, the Federal Migration Service may suspend the effect of the permit until the violations that have been allowed to occur are rectified, or give instructions to rectify them by a certain date. In the event of a failure to rectify the violations before the specified date, the permit may be revoked by a decision of the Federal Migration Service of Russia.

An employer may be deprived of the right to use a permit, without notice, for an action, or a failure to act, that results in the danger of death for people or injury to their health.

13. An issued permit shall cease to be valid, regardless of the expiration of the term for which it was issued, in the event that an employer discontinues his economic operations or implements measures to reduce the number or authorized complement of employees.

14. A foreign citizen who has entered the Russian Federation with a view to engaging in professional activities may work for hire on the territory of the Russian Federation only if he holds a certificate of the right to labor activities issued in his name on the basis of a permit received by the employer, in keeping with the format given in Appendix No. 2.

In cases envisaged by point 16 of the present statute, certificates of the right to labor activities in the territory of the Russian Federation shall be issued to foreign citizens without permits being processed.

15. Certificates of the right to labor activities shall be issued to foreign citizens working as hired labor for an employer within the limits of the number of recruited foreign labor established in a permit, as well as in the cases envisioned by point 16 of the present statute, by the territorial organs of the Federal Migration Service of Russia, in response to a petition in keeping with the format given in Appendix No. 3, provided that a foreign citizen agrees.

16. Foreign citizens from among highly skilled specialists shall be recruited on the basis of the certificate of the right to labor activities without permits being processed in the event of being hired by employers to work at enterprises with foreign investment operating on the territory of the Russian Federation in the positions of enterprise managers, their deputies, and chiefs of divisions (including separate divisions) of these enterprises.

17. The Federal Migration Service of Russia shall forward, to the relevant diplomatic missions and consular establishments of the Russian Federation abroad, information concerning the permits issued, which shall constitute grounds for the receipt, by foreign citizens, of the entry and exit visas with the right to be hired for work.

18. The compulsory procedures for the issuance of permits, as well as certificates of the right to labor activities, established by the present statute shall not apply to foreign citizens who, in keeping with the legislation of the Russian Federation:

have been officially recognized as refugees;

permanently reside on the territory of the Russian Federation;

have been granted asylum on the territory of the Russian Federation;

have filed petitions to be granted refugee status and have been issued temporary residence permits.

Nor shall the aforementioned procedures apply to foreign citizens:

science and cultural personalities working on the territory of the Russian Federation at establishments created in keeping with state-to-state agreements;

staff of diplomatic and consular establishments, as well as organizations enjoying diplomatic status and located on the territory of the Russian Federation;

religious personalities who engage in professional activities on the territory of the Russian Federation in officially registered religious organizations and societies;

crew members of Russian seagoing and river vessels;

students in production training during breaks within the framework of the curricula of Russian educational establishments of higher professional education;

correspondents and journalists accredited in the Russian Federation;

lecturers and instructors invited to offer lecture courses and do other work at Russian academies and educational establishments of higher professional education;

individuals for whom different job placement procedures are set forth in state-to-state and government-to-government agreements of the Russian Federation with foreign countries.

#### Appendixes to Statute

944F0237C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 5

[Appendixes Nos. 1, 2, and 3 to the Statute on the Recruitment and Use of Foreign Labor in the Russian Federation introduced by edict of the president of the Russian Federation, dated 16 December 1993, No. 2,146 On the Recruitment and Use of Foreign Labor in the Russian Federation]

[Text] Appendix No. 1  
to the Statute on the Recruitment  
and Use of Foreign Labor in the Russian Federation

#### Federal Migration Service of Russia PERMIT to Recruit Foreign Labor

No. \_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_ 199\_\_

Employer \_\_\_\_\_

(for legal entities: name, address,

registration number, date of registration;

for individuals: first and last names, patronymic,

passport particulars, home address)

Territory in which the permit applies \_\_\_\_\_

Number of workers and specialists recruited \_\_\_\_\_

Jobs broken down by profession \_\_\_\_\_

Country of origin (regular residence) \_\_\_\_\_

Code \_\_\_\_\_

Grounds for the issuance of the permit \_\_\_\_\_

(proposal by territorial organ of executive power)

(name of foreign partner, contract)

Permit valid from (day, month, year) to (day, month, year)

Special conditions \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Seal \_\_\_\_\_



Appendix No. 2  
to the Statute on the Recruitment  
and Use of Foreign Labor  
in the Russian Federation

CERTIFICATE  
OF THE RIGHT TO LABOR ACTIVITY

In keeping with the Statute on the Recruitment and Use  
of Foreign Labor in the Russian Federation, citizen of

\_\_\_\_\_ (country of origin)

Last and first names, patronymic \_\_\_\_\_

information on the national passport \_\_\_\_\_

shall be granted the right to work (extend work) for (with)

\_\_\_\_\_ (name, address, number and date of registration for legal  
entities, or the last and first names, patronymic, passport  
particulars, and address for individuals)

for the period from (day, month, year) to (day, month, year)

Territory in which the permit applies \_\_\_\_\_

Certificate is valid for professional activities with the  
employer indicated as

\_\_\_\_\_ (profession, position)

Issued by \_\_\_\_\_  
(name of the territorial organ of the Federal Migration  
Service of Russia)

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Seal \_\_\_\_\_

Appendix No. 3  
to the Statute on the Recruitment  
and Use of Foreign Labor  
in the Russian Federation

\_\_\_\_\_ (name of the territorial organ

of the Federal Migration Service of Russia)

PETITION  
TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF THE RIGHT  
TO LABOR ACTIVITY

Data on the foreign citizen \_\_\_\_\_

First and last names, patronymic \_\_\_\_\_

Citizenship \_\_\_\_\_

Address of permanent domicile \_\_\_\_\_

Date of birth \_\_\_\_\_

Sex (male, female) \_\_\_\_\_

Residence permit (yes, no) \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ (by whom issued and until when)

Grounds \_\_\_\_\_  
(number and date permit issued)

Certificate of the right to labor activities requested:

for the period from (day, month, year) to (day, month, year)

for (with) \_\_\_\_\_

(name, address, number and date of registration for

legal entities or the last and first names, patronymic,

\_\_\_\_\_ passport particulars, and address for individuals)

Location of work (territory)

\_\_\_\_\_ Type of work performed \_\_\_\_\_

Signature of employer \_\_\_\_\_

Signature of citizen \_\_\_\_\_

Date Seal \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

**Foreign Intelligence Official on Activities, Doctrine**  
 944F0239A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
 in Russian 23 Dec 93 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Vyacheslav Trubnikov, first deputy director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, conducted by Andrey Poleshchuk: "Vyacheslav Trubnikov: 'There Is No Great Difference Between a Journalist and an Intelligence Agent': The First Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Once Worked Under a Journalistic Cover"]

[Text] Vyacheslav Trubnikov was born on 25 April 1944 in Irkutsk. However, he does not consider himself Siberian, because his family, which had been evacuated to Irkutsk, returned to Moscow six months after he was born. After graduating from high school Vyacheslav Trubnikov enrolled in the Institute of International Relations, upon graduation from which he entered an intelligence school. He regards himself as an "absolutely professional" intelligence officer: "I have no other specialty, no other profession. It is my full-time job, and one that I truly love. I feel that the choice I made has proven to be 100 percent correct. Despite the difficulties and demands of this profession. Despite the fact it leaves almost no time for family. It is a way of life."

V. Trubnikov's wife is also a graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Unfortunately the Trubnikovs' oldest was killed in 1989. Their daughter is in the tenth grade.

Vyacheslav Trubnikov speaks English and Hindi. He spent 15 years in South Asia, in India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan. He considers himself an Indophile to the core. In his free time, if his eyes do not hurt too much, he likes to read and watch movies.

In his opinion, interviewing an intelligence officer is a thankless task: "Your job is to get as much information as possible, and mine is to say as little as possible."

[Poleshchuk] The country has just gone through an election, and what happened, happened. Your service is not directly involved in domestic affairs. Nevertheless, one would assume that your officers stationed outside of Russia received instructions from the Center to keep up with the reaction "over there" to events here...

[Trubnikov] Of course.

[Poleshchuk] Could you give a summation of what people are saying about these events? Are there perhaps some nuances of which not everyone is aware?

[Trubnikov] At this point I would not venture to say that there is a stable, unambiguous opinion abroad about the things that have happened here. But the responses and statements that we are currently collecting tell us one thing: in the opinion of people abroad the democratic process is taking hold in Russia. There were genuinely free elections, according to outside observers; they were democratic and most likely expressed the will of the

people in its most concentrated form, quite aside from the issue of what that will is. The outside world may or may not like the outcome of Russia's election, but the most important thing is that our democratic process is working.

That is what I can tell you at this time. I do not wish to go into any more details right now, because the assessments vary widely. We need to wait for the final results.

[Poleshchuk] Foreign intelligence, like other intelligence services, is there to protect the interests of the state...

[Trubnikov] National interests...

[Poleshchuk] ...national interests, regardless of current political factors. But is it really possible for your organization to remain "above the fray" at this time of intensive political struggle in Russia? Is political neutrality and non-participation in the parties and movements that exist in our country today mandatory for those who work for or want to work for the Foreign Intelligence Service?

[Trubnikov] It is rather difficult to answer that question. Why? Because it is impossible to live in a society and attempt to remain apart from it. Of course, each of us has his own political sympathies and antipathies. Living among real people, any intelligence officer is definitely going to have his own internal guideposts. Otherwise we would probably not go vote. But the intelligence service did vote.

[Poleshchuk] Am I correct to say that the leadership was not interested in who voted and how?

[Trubnikov] Not only was it not interested, that is not a determining factor in the work of an intelligence officer. There is one determining factor: patriotism. Regardless of one's own political sympathies or antipathies. An intelligence officer is a person who guards the state. The current state, no matter what kind it is. Therefore no one would think of inquiring who voted or how they voted.

[Poleshchuk] Fine, then here is a question—one, I hope, that is purely out of the realm of fantasy—but here it is: if, God forbid, the country began to slip back into the past, something that people fear so much, what position would intelligence take?

[Trubnikov] That is a hypothesis, and I am not very inclined to discuss hypothetical scenarios. My absolutely firm conviction is that a return to the past is impossible. The country has made its choice. No one wants to go back to the past. Nor does the intelligence service.

[Poleshchuk] Who receives information from you nowadays?

[Trubnikov] We have a very broad range of recipients and consumers. From the president on down to structures that work on our economy. But all of them are, of course, state structures. We do not provide information to the private sector. We base that on what is in my opinion a very important principle: we are living off the

taxpayers' money. Taxpayers pay for the state. Therefore we work for the state. If some private structure wants to enjoy the fruits of intelligence efforts, then it should create its own intelligence service, maintain it and pay for it.

[Poleshchuk] Are there any cases of that happening?

[Trubnikov] Well, in any event in the West any more or less upstanding corporation has its own intelligence service. And similar structures are being created here. Structures whose job it is to protect the interests of a specific economic association, financial group, bank... Incidentally, there are former members of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies working for these.

[Poleshchuk] As you are aware, 20 December was Intelligence Officers' Day. This year state security celebrated its 73rd birthday—not a major anniversary, but still a date...

[Trubnikov] That is definitely our holiday, because 73 years ago a foreign department was established as part of the All-Russian Cheka.

We are not the kind who forget where we come from. And we never intend to repudiate our own past. Fighting with monuments... That is paganism, and we are opposed to that. The Queen of England, for example, is not bothered by the monument to Cromwell. And for some reason France continues to celebrate the day the Bastille fell. Therefore we continue to remember our holidays and, of course, to celebrate them.

[Poleshchuk] Does your service have any awards, badges or certificates?

[Trubnikov] Yes, we do have what is, in my opinion, a fairly limited range of badges and incentive insignias. Currently our highest award is the badge "For Service in Intelligence." That is what we award our personnel for actual results. But I should note that intelligence officers are no strangers to state awards, either. In 1993 the intelligence service received, if not ten, then approximately ten state awards. For absolutely specific cases not connected with any dates or anniversaries. So the country does notice us. However, we do not proclaim it or make a big fuss about it, and we present the awards right here where you and I are sitting now.

[Poleshchuk] It has not been all that long since the Foreign Intelligence Service became a separate intelligence branch. Has the Russian intelligence service formulated a new doctrine yet?

[Trubnikov] That is an exceptionally complex question, and an exceptionally serious one. Intelligence doctrine cannot be in the forefront or be "ahead" of foreign policy doctrine or military doctrine. Therefore we are still formulating it in its final form, because only now do we have a security doctrine, a foreign policy doctrine and military doctrine.

I am not inclined to go into great detail about intelligence doctrine. You can well understand that in a situation when our country is at a crucial point, when it is going through a so-called "transition period," doctrine, whether intelligence doctrine or otherwise, cannot be firmly stated very far in advance. The situation in the country is changing too rapidly. Therefore I would put it this way: we have a document that formulates the basic principles of our operations during the transition period away from confrontation, which was typical of the cold war era, toward a doctrine of partnership.

[Poleshchuk] You said that intelligence doctrine lags somewhat behind other doctrines. We have a military doctrine and a foreign policy doctrine. However, as you are aware, attitudes toward them vary. To what degree do you have to accept as a given things developed by other ministries and agencies?

[Trubnikov] We accept everything that is law as a given. Intelligence cannot perceive anything that is legitimate in any other way. We are in the service of a legal government and a president who was elected by the people. For us legitimacy is the definitive concept. Regardless of our personal political leanings. Of course, we can express our thoughts on various aspects of our foreign policy, and we do so. In any event, the fact that the intelligence service has made two public reports is an indicator that we want to be heard. Both on the issue of the spread of weapons of mass destruction and on the issue of NATO expansion, and what that could mean to Russia. We express our point of view as we deem necessary. But that does not mean that we are casting doubts on various principles of military and foreign policy doctrine which have been unambiguously approved by a legitimate authority and are a guide for action.

[Poleshchuk] As you are aware, the first parliamentary inspection of Foreign Intelligence Service operations was conducted in the summer of 1993. What is your view of the outlook for parliamentary monitoring of the intelligence service?

[Trubnikov] The issue of parliamentary monitoring has remained on the agenda, thank God. That is an absolutely essential element in the life of today's intelligence service. For us it was a very serious psychological test, to have outsiders come into our "house." The intelligence community had a very mixed reaction to that. We hide from each other things that have suddenly become the subject of discussion and investigation by deputies in parliament. At the initial stage we had a problem getting used to it, but when we tallied up the results of what had been done, we concluded that the parliamentary commission's work enabled us to look at ourselves from the outside. For the first time in the history of our country's foreign intelligence service. When the KGB existed, the inspection administration oversaw our expenditure of funds, etc., but that was our own in-house inspection. This time we for the first time found ourselves the focus of attention by people in whom the people's confidence



had been placed. I can say that on the whole the commission proved itself to be a very mature commission. There was not a single unnecessary question. Every intelligence officer had an opportunity to go to the commission in complete anonymity and say whatever he felt needed to be said. Our deputies were able to obtain exhaustive information regarding any violations or problems. But there were no such cases. I hope that the new members of parliament will establish similar commissions for defense and security, or a subcommittee on intelligence.

[Poleshchuk] Everyone knows that the Foreign Intelligence Service has made significant cuts in the number of its stations abroad. Is the optimization process over? And, in the same connection, what are your comments on a report by MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETs concerning impending deep personnel cuts in the intelligence service and serious structural changes in the Foreign Intelligence Service?

[Trubnikov] I want to say one thing. First of all, no dramatic events are occurring in the intelligence service. No dramatic cuts are occurring in the intelligence service. Nor will they. The normal process of retirement and resignation is occurring, just as in any other state structure. Only one station was closed in 1993. No targeted cutbacks have been carried out, nor will they.

As for changes within the intelligence service, they have occurred, are still occurring and will continue to occur. Some sections—due to the fact that we are being given new assignments—will be reinforced and assume leadership roles. Other sections may be cut back.

[Poleshchuk] The information you mention could in principle have appeared in any other popular newspaper. Would you characterize it as a classic leak?

[Trubnikov] Everyone has their source of information. If you believe that source, then by all means go ahead and report it. But I have become accustomed to repeating and I repeat once again: anything pertaining to intelligence, if you want to have authentic, reliable information, can come only from inside the intelligence service itself. And never in the form of a leak. Ideally this would mean a legitimately posed question and an exhaustive answer up to the limits to which intelligence regards it as essential to reveal itself.

[Poleshchuk] Often journalists, specifically those from our newspaper, are accused by the authorities of using so-called "dubious information sources" in our work. I would like to see the faces of members of the presidential press service or Mr. Shumeyko's staff if they—purely hypothetically—were to learn the names and the positions of those "dubious sources" that are providing us with exclusive information. But that is true, as a matter of fact... I agree that information about foreign intelligence, like information about any other intelligence service or any other agency, is best obtained from an official primary source. But, firstly, not everyone has as

good a press service as you do. Secondly, an overwhelming majority of our officials were raised on hatred of cunning journalists and are unwilling to talk to us. Unless, of course, they get paid good money for it, or if they themselves have a vital need to do so. Incidentally, of late we have not had any particular need to seek out "sources." They come to us... And we know that they are fully competent and well-informed. What are we supposed to do: refuse to work with them?

[Trubnikov] I can say with absolutely certainty, as I myself once worked under a journalistic cover: there is no great difference between a journalist and an intelligence officer when it comes to getting information. Now, the means and methods that an intelligence officer can use and the degree to which a source's reliability are verified and the source studied are a different matter... In that regard an intelligence officer stands head and shoulders above a journalist. Because first there is the process of studying the source. When you do conclude that a source is reliable, then you can accept information from that source. Not the other way around. Intelligence obtains information and makes use of it through closed channels, without bringing it before the court of public opinion. Intelligence can make mistakes. But perhaps no one except the consumer will ever find out. A journalist's mistake will be public knowledge the next day. He takes a much bigger risk. I would put it this way: a normal journalist should use normal information sources.

[Poleshchuk] Good advice, but hard to follow in our business... Do you personally have enough time and energy to read newspapers, which, as you are aware, are one of the main sources of open intelligence information?

[Trubnikov] There is very little time left over for that.

[Poleshchuk] And what do you as a professional see there?

[Trubnikov] Unfortunately, the more I read the more disillusioned I become by the things I am reading. There is a great deal of one-day sensationalism, a great deal of half-baked information, information that does not even answer the questions of "why?" and "to what end?" People splash something across the page without the slightest notion whether they have done good or ill.

I do not envy my Western colleagues, because there is hardly any point in other countries' intelligence officers looking to our mass media for information. Much sensation and quite a lot of unreliable information. Much speculation. But an intelligence service is used to dealing with facts. And when the press so rarely provides actual facts it is very difficult for intelligence to work with it. More likely our press misleads them and keeps them busy with nonexistent problems.

[Poleshchuk] The Foreign Intelligence Service's operations are regulated by an appropriate law. Can you tell us whether that law currently takes into consideration all the nuances in the operations of such a sensitive organ as

foreign intelligence? Will some passages in the law require revision or amendment?

[Trubnikov] I am glad that you asked that question. We are presently discovering that real life is much richer than one could possibly set forth in any regulating document. And it seems to me that foreign intelligence is already prepared to ask our legislators to reconsider some points.

[Poleshchuk] What, specifically?

[Trubnikov] Well, at least the degree to which the law on military service applies to foreign intelligence. For example, a person has achieved a certain title and position... He can easily be dismissed from the army, because younger replacements are following close on his heels. But how can we take a unique specialist, say one with unique language knowledge, and dismiss him simply because he has reached some maximum age? Most likely the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service needs to be given some additional authority and the right to extend the intelligence service of a unique specialist for several years. There are also other things that intelligence could recommend as amendments or additions to the current law.

[Poleshchuk] I have heard that the Foreign Intelligence Service has established a new administration that will interact with intelligence services in foreign countries. Is it true that that administration maintains contacts with the stations of foreign intelligence services active in Russia?

[Trubnikov] Yes.

[Poleshchuk] Are these direct contacts? Does an agent come to you...

[Trubnikov] Yes.

[Poleshchuk] Has that ever been done before?

[Trubnikov] It is a recent phenomenon. Just like the fact that the heads of some of our stations abroad go to the heads of local intelligence services. And find things to talk about. The same thing happens here.

[Poleshchuk] To the man on the street that sounds incredible...

[Trubnikov] I understand how any interaction with another intelligence service might sound like treason to the man on the street. But we regard that interaction as one aspect of our intelligence efforts. We must get used to the fact that some things which were inconceivable only two or three years ago are now possible and are proving their worth. Therefore the operations of that administration are beneficial to intelligence.

[Poleshchuk] That is most likely one of the most sensitive administrations, if that is the right way to phrase it...

[Trubnikov] Definitely. Precisely that word "sensitive" is very appropriate here.

[Poleshchuk] I would have given a lot for the chance to attend a meeting like that and observe this game...

[Trubnikov] The thing is, there is very little about this that resembles a game. In this business either you say something or you say nothing. In contrast to diplomats, whose skill is being able to say a great deal and yet have said nothing.

[Poleshchuk] But how great the risk is! Suppose you say the wrong thing, or say too much...

[Trubnikov] Well, that's what common sense is for. And a clear understanding of who it is that is sitting across the table from you. In matters like this everything is based on mutuality. We are not about to bare our souls to a partner who is not giving us anything.

[Poleshchuk] You have established an economic security department. Why is it necessary, and with what issues does it deal?

[Trubnikov] For Russia today the issue of economic security is, of course, our #1 issue. The anything-goes situation that exists in our foreign economic relations, the raw materials that are leaking out, the capital that is fleeing the country—all these things have prompted intelligence to address these issues. We make sure that our foreign partners are not pulling a fast one on us. Tempting offers and unique contracts are flooding in, but often we are dealing with con artists. It is foreign intelligence's job to let state structures know in time that these are not the people with whom they want to be dealing.

[Poleshchuk] The CIA structures its relations with other countries on the basis of a so-called "system of concentric circles." Countries with a place in the "inner circle" enjoy the greatest trust with regard to access to intelligence information. Those countries include, for example, England, Canada and Australia. The CIA reviews countries' positions in the various "circles" every three years. In your opinion, in which of those circles does Russia fall today?

[Trubnikov] That's the CIA's business, which circle they put us in. I am convinced that Russia is the kind of state that cannot be made to fit in any "circles." In any event, we have not attempted to make a place for ourselves in any of them. But it is absolutely clear that we would not be in the closest "circle."

[Poleshchuk] In late August 1993 IZVESTIYA, citing the Swedish newspaper SVENSKA DAGBLADET, quoted the head of Sweden's security police, who said that according to information in his possession Russia's foreign intelligence service long ago stopped trying to recruit new agents among Swedish military personnel or the personnel of state institutions and private companies. This gave him reason to state that Russian foreign intelligence activity has dropped off in a way not seen since World War II...

[Trubnikov] Let that be on the conscience of the Swedes and their counterintelligence service. I think that any smart intelligence service should make its presence absolutely invisible. I am not inclined to attempt to dissuade anyone from believing anything. I can only tell you that nothing unusual is going on in the Foreign Intelligence Service's work with regard to any particular country.

[Poleshchuk] A strong response around the world greeted the Foreign Intelligence Service's open report entitled "The Prospect of NATO Expansion and Russia's Interests," which was made public in late November of this year...

[Trubnikov] In any event—and I say this based on my own experience and conversations that I have had with our partners abroad, Europe included—that report generated interest because it indicated to our partners in very concentrated form the necessity of reckoning with Russia's national interests. That was our main objective.

[Poleshchuk] Will you continue to publish a series of open Foreign Intelligence Service reports?

[Trubnikov] The series will definitely continue. At this time I am not prepared to announce the subject of our next report, but it is already begging to be published. Anyway, it could pertain to our economic interests.

[Poleshchuk] How soon might that be?

[Trubnikov] Everything depends on the degree of our readiness to express our opinion on a given issue. Information that can become public knowledge without damaging its source is a very tricky matter. We could express a very strong opinion on something tomorrow and thereby put our sources at risk. We are not going to do that. We are only going to express our opinions when our sources can be absolutely sure of their safety.

[Poleshchuk] How important is it to ensure a source's safety?

[Trubnikov] That is the most important issue in any intelligence service's operations. The reliability of secret communications and maintenance of the source's cover is the main thing that guides any source. If he sees that the intelligence service is not able to keep its secrets, then the source will quit.

[Poleshchuk] It is no secret that agent recruitment also involves dirty methods: blackmail, bribery, threats...

[Trubnikov] In the overall picture those methods comprise only a fairly narrow part of the spectrum of methods and means utilized by intelligence. Intelligence services prefer to work with people on an ideological basis. That makes for the most reliable, high-quality and long-term sources. As for sources recruited by dirty means, they comprise only a tiny fraction of the entire agent apparatus.

[Poleshchuk] Last year several Foreign Intelligence Service officers went over to the other side. The Foreign

Intelligence Service openly acknowledged those cases. This year there has not been a single report of that nature. Does that mean that there were no incidents?

[Trubnikov] Yes, that is true. If you are talking about treason.

[Poleshchuk] That naturally pleases you...

[Trubnikov] That pleases us. But, on the other hand, that also alarms us. The traitors of 1992 were the end result of efforts directed against us by Western intelligence services over a long period of time. These were not people who just happened to leave. They were mainly agents. These were people who had been in our ranks and who were recruited a long time ago. Yet the time chosen to activate them was 1992. They believed that we were in a very difficult situation, that these betrayals would make us look bad, and that our intelligence service could be dealt with easily. Maybe even at the hands of legislators or the public. These were not incidents, they were a fully intentional plan to undermine Russian foreign intelligence. But we survived.

[Poleshchuk] You said that, on the one hand, you are pleased that there have been no incidents of treason by Foreign Intelligence Service personnel this year, yet that on the other hand you find that alarming. Why?

[Trubnikov] It is alarming in the sense that no one has halted their efforts against Russian intelligence. Therefore our own security is currently our top concern.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Edict on Ingush Refugee Return Increases Tension

944F0248A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA in Russian  
No 22, 17 Dec 93 p 8

[Article by Yevgeniy Krutikov: "Situation of Conflict. After Nalchik Everything Is Back to the Way It Was"]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has kept his promise: An edict was published concerning organizing the return of Ingush refugees to four villages of Prigorodnyy Rayon of North Ossetia. But observers are noting with alarm that this has not brought the long-awaited peace to the Northern Caucasus.

As we know, the edict was adopted while developing the agreements reached on 7 September in Nalchik when a declaration was signed which envisions Ingushetia's abandoning its territorial claims to North Ossetia, removing the thesis about the impossibility of Ossetians and Ingush living together, disbanding illegal armed formations, returning refugees to densely populated places, and "sealing off" the border between Russia and Chechnya. But as early as the next day the parliament of North Ossetia, under pressure from a rally of many thousands in the central square of Vladikavkaz, adopted a decree that actually disavows the results of the meeting in Nalchik. Justifying himself to the deputies, the head of



the Supreme Soviet of North Ossetia, Akhsarbek Galazov, admitted that he had agreed to a partial return of the Ingush refugees under pressure from Boris Yeltsin. He himself, as before, considers this measure to be an illegal act that creates an impasse situation.

In turn, the president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev, never tires of saying that he signed no documents in Nalchik, that the land from which the Ingush—citizens of North Ossetia—were deported has been Ingush territory for centuries, and that their return to Ingushetia is just a matter of time.

One statement after the other, the discussion among the leaders of the two republics has returned to its former tracks, assuming its previous tonality. For example, a couple of days ago Ruslan Aushev again accused the Ossetians of murdering the head of the temporary administration of the emergency region, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Viktor Polyanichko. According to information from the president of Ingushetia, on 1 August Viktor Polyanichko went to the village of Tarskoye for negotiations with the commander of the Ossetian home guard, Bibo Dzutsev, in order to discuss with him the details of returning to the Russians the weapons of the Russian special forces that were seized by the Ingush in the Dzheyrakhskoye Ravine. Polyanichko was to have reached an agreement with Dzutsev not to intervene in the transfer of the weapons. This partially explains why Polyanichko did not have the proper guard—Bibo Dzutsev is in practically complete control of the actions of the fighting men in the region and enjoys respect in North Ossetia. Dzutsev, incidentally, turned up at the scene of the tragedy 10 minutes after the murder of Polyanichko and Koretskiy. Aushev thinks that the terrorists were urged on by the fact that on 2 August Polyanichko was to have been working on determining four population points of Prigorodnyy Rayon to which the Ingush would be returned.

According to a different version, Viktor Polyanichko was going to negotiations with the Ingush field commanders who had seized the weapons from the Russian special forces. A day before this Ruslan Aushev had told Polyanichko that the weapons would be returned but it would be necessary to pay 40 million rubles for them. Aushev asserts that he was prepared to forward this money himself and Polyanichko would then return this sum after the weapons had been turned over. On the morning of the murder Aushev again spoke with General Anatoliy Koretskiy and again offered his services for immediately buying the weapons. But the temporary administration thought that the price of the purchase could be considerably reduced and therefore Polyanichko went to the village of Tarskoye to negotiate the price of the purchase with the Ingush field commanders and the head of the Dzheyrakhskiy rural soviet, Tsurov.

In addition to this one there are several other versions of the murder of Viktor Polyanichko and General Anatoliy Koretskiy. The Russian investigatory group, in spite of the optimistic statements of certain of its members and

the sworn promises of Sergey Shakhrai, has still made no progress in investigating the terrorist act against the deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation.

The situation in South Ossetia has also unexpectedly become much worse. Not far from Tskhinval a Niva truck was blown up by a mine and another light vehicle following it was fired upon with an automatic weapon. In the vehicle were Georgian peasants from villages of the Tamarashenskiy corridor: Two were killed on the spot and four more, according to Georgian information, are missing. The next day this report was confirmed by the press center of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, which also announced that in Gori there was a meeting of representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia and the Ministry of Defense of South Ossetia at which they discussed the extremely dangerous aggravation of the situation in the region.

Observers think that the attack on the Georgian vehicles near Tskhinval was organized in response to the murder of the four Ossetians several days earlier. Recently in a number of Georgian villages of South Ossetia, especially Tamarashen, Kekhvi, Achabeti, Nikozi, Ergneti, and Eredvi, there has been tension, and active military preparations have been underway. The Ossetians are expressing concern not only about the mobilization activity of Georgia but also the inaction of the peace-keeping forces and military command. The Ossetians have been forced to "fill out" their own defense in spite of the fact that recently, as a result of internal feuds and disagreements, the political situation in South Ossetia has been considerably weakened.

#### **Kuban Elections, Political Situation Reviewed**

944F0248B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Todres: "Steppe Leadership. The Kuban: Typical Characteristics in Typical Circumstances"]

[Text]

#### **The Territories**

The broad (about 30 cm wide) and deep (three stories) crack in the wall of the KUBANSKIY KURYER building has been gaping there for a month already. The reasons, the objective, and the perpetrators of the terrorist act are still unknown, but the result is known: At that time a 20-year-old proofreader at the newspaper died on the spot under debris falling from above. Local authorities expressed alarm and sympathy, law enforcement organs swore to find the perpetrators and punish them, and democrats added one more item to their list of communist crimes.

The unpoliticized majority of Krasnodar residents recalled this apotheosis of the election campaign with sarcasm and cynicism: "Even the Decembrists were

unable to blow up the newspaper properly: For some reason they placed the bomb in the men's john...."

### Personalities

The elections in Kuban were a competition among three individuals, and they were by no means Gaydar, Zyuganov, and Zhirinovskiy. Vying for places in the senate were titans of local significance, each of whom had managed to be the master of Krasnodar Kray and become a symbol of a certain epoch.

The decades of socialism and kolkhoz construction in the Kuban—Nikolay Kondratenko, chairman of the kray executive committee, and then chairman of the kray soviet, who was overthrown in August 1991 for supporting the State Committee for the State of Emergency.

The troubled present of "gradual reforms" and quiet privatization without unnecessary competitions—the present head of the kray administration, Nikolay Yegorov.

The unrealized romantic dreams of members of Democratic Russia from the "living circle" of the times of the 1991 putsch—Vasiliy Dyakonov, who became governor after the fall of Governor Kondratenko but who remained in the post little longer than a year. Mr. Dyakonov remained in the people's memory because of his mass farmerization (17 farmers appeared in the kray and there was stiff resistance to decollectivization on the part of the rest of the population) and his attempt to maintain the minimum prices of bread in 1992—by collecting fees from tobacco and alcohol trade in the Kuban. The management blunders for which Mr. Dyakonov was removed are a material fact, but it is no less of a fact that his dismissal was persistently achieved by the kolkhoz leaders and the tobacco and vodka directorate.

Nonetheless, according to the assessment of the current head of the kray soviet, Aleksandr Zhdanovskiy (who ran on the Yabloka ticket), the contest for senate seats included "not so much ideologists as clans." Once united into a single party-economic elite, the chiefs now—with the disappearance of the oblast committee supervision—have recognized the differences in their branch interests. And they have not yet been able to achieve an awareness of their common regional interests which would join the local elite together with a new glue in a subsidized, slowly privatized Krasnodar Kray.

Nikolay Kondratenko ran in the elections as a representative of the "agrarian clan" of kolkhoz chiefs. Nikolay Yegorov was supported by another part of the agrarians, managers, and those who had their eyes on the ports, borders, and other transit capabilities of the kray. Among his assets were long-standing ties with Vladimir Shumeyko and Viktor Chernomyrdin and more recent ties with Sergey Snakhray. Having gained the sympathy of the president's administration, the head of a powerful construction trust Vasiliy Dyakonov competed with the mayor of Krasnodar, Yevgeniy Samoylenko.

### The Fight

Mr. Kondratenko and Mr. Yegorov became members of the Council of the Federation.

The first winner was clear long before the elections: The rating of "Ataman Kondrat," who seemed to have retired from politics, had not dropped below 40 percent among Kuban residents during the past year. Mr. Kondratenko contemptuously rejected a proposal to withdraw in exchange for the position of head of the tobacco joint venture with the Philip Morris firm: A senator's position guarantees more magnificent prospects.

The main contest was for the second position—because of it a scandal broke out throughout all of Russia when the local election committee refused to register Mr. Dyakonov as a candidate, and it ended with the dismissal of the election committee chief Yuriy Lapkin.

The opposing teams accused one another of gaining signatures through pressure on their subordinates, direct falsification of signatures, and forgery when they were being verified....

The position of the local Russia's Choice candidates was explained most clearly by the activist Lyudmila Belova, who up to this point was grateful to Vasiliy Dyakonov for the fact that it was during his governorship that her family was granted its own farm with 100 hogs: "All leadership is playing dishonestly. But the higher the leadership, the greater possibilities it has of doing this. Dyakonov has the least." Indeed, on 12 December (after campaigning had already been prohibited) at the doors of the electoral precinct of the kray hospital I encountered only two placards—of Governor Yegorov and Mayor Samoylenko. On the other hand, there is also a particle of truth in the words of the press secretary of the kray soviet, Galina Kravchenko: "If Dyakonov were from another bloc and not from 'Choice,' would Moscow really have raised such a stink?"

### Zhirinovskiy

Predictions have persistently given the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] second place in Krasnodar Kray. "It will get no higher: Unlike 'Choice' and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, they actually have no organizations here," the Krasnodar sociologist Viktor Kritskiy assured me. In the end the party outdid both the Communists (twofold) and the members of Russia's Choice (fourfold). As discussions with local residents showed, most of those who voted for the LDPR did it "out of spite"; before 12 December few people even thought about the party slates: The elections remained elections from local families. "I just found out about all of these parties—at the precinct," a 40-year-old housewife, Tatyana Boyko, confided to us.

Local journalists doubt that Zhirinovskiy's victory in points really means an increase in his influence in the party in the kray: LDPR activists have nothing to do with the local elite. In conservative Kuban up to this

point—and in the foreseeable future—things will be decided by the leadership. And up to now no one political force really has the required reserve.

### Cossacks

More than a million of the kray's population of 5 million consider themselves to be Cossacks. In the Cossack villages (and essentially more than half of the Kuban residents live in rural Cossack villages) they still distinguish Cossacks from "foreigners." "If a person could really rely on the Cossacks he would undoubtedly become a leader in the Kuban," thinks Aleksandr Zhdanovskiy.

There is no question of the authority of the current Cossack structures. Homegrown politicians with Cossack striped trousers, the majority of whom are city residents ("a real Cossack tills the soil"), have already managed to split into "red" and "white" Cossack troops. One group contains several thousand and the other—several hundred. The "whites" were openly in favor of Dyakonov, and the "reds" were cautiously in favor of Kondratenko. But both of them demanded "purging the Kuban of unwanted guests."

The traditional Kuban anti-Semitism is more of a theoretical nature: Barely 3,000 Jews live in the kray. The main "foreign enemy" is from the Caucasian Mountains. Since the beginning of the war in Transcaucasia the 350,000 local Armenians living here since Potemkin's times have been augmented by more than 100,000 refugees from Armenia. The Russians, of whom there were twice as many among the refugees, have somehow been able to blend in with the local population. Armenians, the majority of whom have set up successful businesses, constantly feel the hostility of their neighbors and attacks from politicians. The latter, naturally, never miss a chance to gratify their supporters loudly and freely. During the last campaign the triumphant Nikolay Kondratenko attacked the "outsiders" especially openly.

"In the neighboring Stavropol Kray it has already started: The Cossacks have been beating up Armenians at the bazaars and kicking them out of their homes. Let me tell you—the Kuban is on the brink," a chap standing in front of the main Krasnodar market admitted. Incidentally, Konstantin Zatulin built his entire campaign in the south of the kray on the demand to set up a strong border between the Caucasian republics. In the opinion of the sociologist Kritskiy he would inevitably have won on this if the well-known Communist, the cosmonaut Sevastyanov, had not ended up as his opponent.

### Prospects

Head of the kray administration Nikolay Yegorov gives himself special credit for "achieving political stability," by which he means mainly elimination of the conflict with the Council. After coming to the Council of the Federation Mr. Yegorov still retains the governor's post, but the prospects for "stability" are still not so clear.

Elections to the new kray parliament have been scheduled for 6 March. The current leader, Aleksandr Zhdanovskiy thinks that "the party will be, to put it mildly, much more progressive than the Council," and Nikolay Kondratenko is sure to occupy the position of its chairman.

Incidentally, one of Mr. Yegorov's closest advisers, the head of the Kuban innovation fund, Konstantin Vlasjuk, states that this will not mean a change in the politics in the kray: "Kondratenko's influence was greatly affected by the fact that he had been out of office for three years."

The administration has no way out other than to localize the activity of the new local legislators: In the first place, the openly subsidized Kuban, whose budget "could not be saved even by a single-channel system," is in no position to spoil relations with the Kremlin. In the second place, in the words of Mr. Vlasjuk, "the kray has attracted the attention of serious investors": for example, the main buyer at the auction in the Novorossiysk port (with its oil transfer terminal) was the Lukoyl Company. Many are also attracted by the stand of valuable redwood in the Caucasian foothills.

"The problem of the agrarians is that their sphere of influence remains within the kray. Ours is arising anew," asserts Konstantin Vlasjuk. "Our current task is somehow to convince the people close to the president of the Russian Federation that if Kondratenko and Yegorov win in the elections, the kray would not become a Russian Vendee. We can agree on everything to everyone's satisfaction."

### Edict on Local Self-Government Published

944F0241A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 25 Dec 93 p 6

[Presidential Edict No 2265 on Local Self-Government Guarantees in the Russian Federation, signed by President B. Yeltsin in Moscow on 22 December 1993]

[Text] To secure the continued progress and state support of local government reform, I hereby decree that:

1. Agencies of local self-government will approve their own lists of the objects (or assets) constituting municipal property in accordance with Addendum 3 of the Decree of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet of 27 December 1991 "On the Division of State Property in the Russian Federation into Federal Property, the State Property of Republics Belonging to the Russian Federation, Krays, Oblasts, the Autonomous Oblast, Autonomous Okrugs, and the Cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and Municipal Property."

The reclassification of objects (or assets) constituting municipal property as the state property of members of the Russian Federation or federal property will be carried out with the consent of agencies of local self-government or by court order.



The decisions of agencies of local self-government on the classification of objects (or assets) as municipal property may be challenged in a court of law.

2. The list of prerogatives of the representative agency of local self-government, specified in the Statute on the Fundamentals of the Organization of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation During the Period of Gradual Constitutional Reform and approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 1760 of 26 October 1993 "On the Reform of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation," will be considered complete. Other prerogatives of local self-government, as specified in the Law of the Russian Federation "On Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation," will be exercised by the local administration.

3. The decisions of agencies of local self-government may be rescinded only in judicial proceedings.

When certain state prerogatives are transferred to agencies of local self-government, a procedure may be stipulated for the rescission of the decisions of the agencies of local self-government by the transferring government agency.

4. Local self-government leaders will be empowered to hold a local referendum on the draft statute on local self-government (or charter), preside over meetings of elected representative bodies of local self-government, and serve as the heads of the corresponding administrations.

5. Elections to representative bodies of local self-government will be scheduled by a decision of the representative (or legislative) government agency of a member of the Russian Federation at the request of the head of the executive branch of government of the member of the Russian Federation.

Local self-government leaders and other officials of local administrations may be members of the corresponding representative bodies of local self-government.

6. The edict of the president of the Russian Federation "On the Reform of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation" will be amended to reword the second paragraph of Subsection 6 as follows: "Elections of previously appointed local self-government leaders may be scheduled at the same time as elections to the representative bodies of local self-government by a decision of the head of the administration (or government) of the kray, oblast, city of federal status, autonomous oblast, or autonomous okrug. In these cases the procedure for electing local self-government leaders will be defined by the head of the administration (or government) of the corresponding member of the Russian Federation."

7. The following will be invalid:

Sections 10-28, Subsection 4 of Section 34 (concerning appeals to superior soviets), Section 35, Subsection 1 of Section 92, and subsections 1-4 of Section 95 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation";

the Law of the RSFSR "On the Status of the People's Deputy of the Local Soviet of People's Deputies in the RSFSR" (with the exception of Section 36).

The head of the local administration will grant the consent required by the first part of Section 36 of this law for the dismissal of a people's deputy from his job, his expulsion from a kolkhoz, other cooperative organization, or academic institution, or his transfer to a lower-paying job as a disciplinary penalty.

8. This edict will be submitted to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for consideration.

9. This edict will go into force at the time it is signed.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of Russian Federation  
Moscow, Kremlin  
22 December 1993  
No 2265

#### **Yeltsin Edict, Statute on Self-Government Principles in Moscow City**

944F0243A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 16 Dec 93 p 1

[Edict of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin and Statute "On the General Principles of the Administrative-Territorial Division and Organization of Local Self-Government in the City of Moscow"]

[Text]

#### **Edict of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin "On the General Principles of the Administrative-Territorial Division and Organization of Local Self-Government in the City of Moscow."**

According to information of the press service of the president of the Russian Federation, an edict of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin "On the General Principles of the Administrative-Territorial Division and Organization of Local Self-Government in the City of Moscow" has been submitted for publication. The edict was signed on 10 December 1993.

We present the full text of the document and the provisional statute approved by him:

"For the purposes of ensuring the development of local self-government in the city of Moscow and the execution by the city of the functions of the capital of the Russian Federation, I resolve:

"1. To approve the accompanying provisional statute on the general principles of the administrative-territorial division and organization of local self-government in the city of Moscow.

"2. To propose to the organs of state authority of the city of Moscow to develop and adopt normative acts in January-February 1994 that regulate the procedure for conducting reforms of local self-government in the city of Moscow.

"3. To submit this edict for review by the Federal Assembly.

"4. This edict goes into effect from the day it is published."

**Statute on the General Principles of Administrative-Territorial Division and Organization of Local Self-Government in the City of Moscow:**

**I. General principles of administrative-territorial division.**

1. This provisional statute establishes the general principles of the administrative-territorial division of the city of Moscow as a component of the Russian Federation—a city with federal significance.

2. The system of administrative-territorial division of the city of Moscow is made up of:

—an administrative okrug;

—a municipal okrug.

3. The administrative okrug is an intracity administrative unit, a system of organs of authority that is built on the basis of centralized management. The procedure for managing the administrative okrug is established by a special statute approved by the mayor of Moscow.

The city of Zelenograd forms a separate administrative okrug.

The territory of the administrative okrug includes municipal rayons.

4. The municipal rayon is an administrative-territorial unit of the city of Moscow within whose borders the self-government of the population that lives on the given territory is conducted.

Municipal rayons are organized taking into account the socioeconomic characteristics of pertinent territories, their town-planning and historical features, and the presence of residential complexes and objects of the municipal infrastructure. The boundaries and the names of the municipal rayons are established by the Moscow City Duma on a representation of the mayor of the city of Moscow.

The municipal rayon is divided into microrayons (settlements) in which organs of territorial public self-government can be established. The boundaries and names of microrayons are determined by the organs of self-government of the municipal rayon.

**II. The principles of organization of local self-government.**

5. Local self-government on the territory of the city of Moscow is conducted on the basis of this provisional statute, legislation of the Russian Federation, and the normative acts of the city of Moscow, taking into account its status as the capital of the Russian Federation.

6. The organs of local self-government in the city of Moscow are municipalities that include assemblies of

representatives of the population of the municipal rayon (municipal assemblies) and the head of the local administration (head of the municipality).

**III. Local administration.**

7. The activity of the local administration is directed by the head of the municipality, who carries out the management of the municipal economy and property, develops the estimate of incomes and expenditures, ensures its implementation, and performs other executive-administrative functions.

8. The head of the municipality is appointed in coordination with the municipal assembly by the mayor of Moscow from the number of candidates recommended by the prefect of the administrative okrug.

In the event of nonconcurrence by a majority of the members of the municipal assembly in the candidacy proposed for the position of the head of the municipality, the mayor has the right to resubmit this candidacy or propose another one.

Given the nonconcurrence of a majority of the members of the municipal assembly in the proposed candidacy in this case as well, within a two-week period the mayor of Moscow appoints an acting head of the municipality for a period of one year. The indicated person enjoys all of the rights and carries all of the responsibilities of the head of a municipality.

The head of the municipality cannot engage in other paid activity, except for teaching, scientific, and other creative activity.

9. The head of the municipality, in the event of a systematic nonfulfillment of his duties or their gross violation, can be dismissed from the position by the mayor of Moscow, including on a representation of the prefect of the administrative okrug, or on the basis of an appeal by the municipal assembly. The indicated appeal is examined by the mayor within a two-week period.

10. The head of the municipality issues instructions on questions of his own jurisdiction established by legislation of the Russian Federation and normative acts of the city of Moscow.

11. The administration of the city and the municipal assembly have a right to exercise control over the activity of the head of the municipality in a procedure stipulated by legislation of the Russian Federation and normative acts of the city of Moscow.

12. The procedure for dismissal of the head of the municipality and the appointment to the position and dismissal from the position of his deputies is established by the mayor of Moscow.

**IV. Municipal assembly.**

13. The assembly of representatives of the population of a municipal rayon (municipal assembly) consists of five

to seven municipal councillors elected according to territorial election okrugs for a period of two years on the basis of general equal and direct elections in secret voting.

The procedure of elections to the municipal assembly and the number of municipal councillors are established by the Moscow City Duma on the recommendation of the mayor of Moscow.

14. The municipal assembly is convened by the head of the municipality, who heads the municipal assembly, no less than once a quarter to consider drafts of decisions proposed to him on the following questions:

- approval of estimates of incomes and expenditures and a report on their execution;
- approval of the annual program (plan) of socioeconomic development and building of the territory and a review of the report on its execution;
- approval of the procedure for managing municipal property;
- examination of other questions relating to the conduct of the municipal assembly.

15. The municipal assembly can be convened at the initiative of the Moscow City Duma, the mayor of Moscow, or by no less than two-thirds of the municipal councillors, but not more than twice a year.

16. The municipal assembly has the right to exercise control functions, including control over the activity of the head of the municipality and over the procedure for using tracts of land and municipal property.

17. The municipal assembly is competent to make decisions if more than half of the municipal councillors are present at its meeting. Decisions are adopted by a majority of the municipal councillors attending the meeting and are signed by the head of the municipality, except decisions about appealing to the mayor of Moscow on the question of dismissing the head of the municipality from his position.

18. Decisions of the municipal assembly that are adopted within the scope of its jurisdiction are obligatory for implementation by all enterprises, institutions, organizations, organs of public territorial self-government, and citizens located on the pertinent territory.

In the event that a decision of the municipal assembly contradicts legislation of the Russian Federation and normative acts of the city of Moscow, or affects the interests of the city as a whole, it can be suspended by the mayor of Moscow or official authorized by him.

19. The municipal assembly can be dissolved by the Moscow City Duma in cases established by legislation of the Russian Federation, and also as a result of the conduct of a local referendum on confidence in the assembly. The municipal assembly can adopt a decision on early dissolution.

The elections of municipal councillors must be held not later than three months from the date of the corresponding adoption by the Moscow City Duma of a decision on the dissolution of the municipal assembly, the announcement of the results of a referendum, or the adoption of a decision on self-dissolution.

#### V. Territorial Public Self-Government.

20. The population of microrayons (settlements), and also of streets, blocks, and homes, can establish organs of territorial public self-government acting in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation and the normative acts of the city of Moscow.

21. The procedure for the formation of public self-government is established by the municipal assembly on a recommendation of the head of the municipality in accordance with the standard statute on organs of territorial public self-government approved by the Moscow City Duma according to the written statement of the mayor of Moscow.

#### VI. Transitional Statutes

22. The periods and stages of the conduct of reform of the local self-government in the city of Moscow are established by the Moscow City Duma on a representation of the mayor of Moscow.

23. Before the adoption of the statute of the city of Moscow, peculiarities in the management of municipal property, including the procedure for submitting it to the management of the municipal rayons and associations in the interests of the residents of the entire city and its individual parts, are established by the Moscow City Duma on the recommendation of the mayor of Moscow.

24. Before the adoption of the statute of the city of Moscow, the procedure for the formation of estimates of incomes and expenditures of the municipal rayons is established by the Moscow City Duma on the recommendation of the mayor of Moscow. Before the creation of the necessary conditions for the formation and execution of local budgets, the formation and execution of a unified city budget, with an allocation of financial resources for the municipal rayons, is allowed.

#### Measures To Reduce Moscow City Budget Assessed

944F0243B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 15 Dec 93 p 2

[Article by Aleksey Kalmykov: "The Government Is Looking for Money; but the Metro Has Already Found It in the Pockets of the Passengers"]

[Text]

#### The Mayoralty

It finally became clear yesterday that the city budget deficit for next year will be a minimum of 1.5 trillion rubles [R]. Prim Minister Yuriy Luzhkov insisted upon



this figure despite the fact that it will require a substantial reduction in the expenditures of the government of Moscow next year—the draft of the budget, which takes into account the needs of the city in a maximum way, has a deficit of more than R7 trillion.

At a regular meeting, the Moscow government in the course of three and a half hours tried to find ways to cut the deficit. For this, priority expenditure articles that constituted the so-called protected group of expenditures and articles that were subject to reduction were determined. The government assigned social programs, the housing construction program, energy support for the city, the collection and processing of garbage, and also the reconstruction of the center of the capital to the "protected" group.

A reduction of the expenditures part, even by a total of 100 percent, will not bring the desired results, inasmuch as just the "protected" programs require more than R16 trillion, but the expected incomes of the city treasury are limited to R14 trillion. Therefore, the department of finance put forth several proposals to increase budget revenues. In particular, it was proposed to transfer housing construction projects to investors, and not to finance them directly. Moreover, the Moscow government intends to "extract" R2.5 trillion from the federal pocket in the form of subventions, "regardless of whether they are there or not."

Speaking at the meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nikolskiy reported that in view of the reduction in outlays for the renewal of the rolling stock of the city's transport, there will be a significant increase in fares next year. Starting on 1 January, a Metro trip will cost Muscovites and guests of the capital R50, and an even more substantial increase in fares on city transport is expected by the end of the year—up to R160, and on the Metro—up to R200.

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### Unresolved Issues of SupSov Foreign Affairs Committee Examined

944Q0120A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 29 Dec 93 pp 1,3

[Article by Vladimir Trofimov, doctor of legal sciences, under rubric "Position": "The Foreign-Policy Legacy of the Russian VS [Supreme Soviet]: The Deputies of the Federal Assembly Will Have To Study It for a Long Time"]

[Text] The election is over and now the new deputies have to decide in which committee of the Federation Council of the State Duma they intend to work. The overall direction of the deputies' wishes can probably be predicted. In the previous parliament several hundred people's choices wanted to link their fate with the

Foreign Affairs Committee. True, fate smiled on only 20 of them. We will probably observe a similar situation now.

The future experts on foreign affairs will be met, however, by an unpleasant surprise: they will receive from the former Foreign Affairs Committee of the RF Supreme Soviet an inheritance that can considerably damage their political reputation. We are talking, in particular, about certain treaties that were submitted to the Supreme Soviet for ratification, but that have not yet passed through it. In all instances the reason for the postponements was approximately the same: doubts had arisen as to whether those treaties conform fully to the country's national interests. Therefore it would probably be beneficial to acquaint the broad public with a certain part of that inheritance.

For example, the Supreme Soviet did not have time to ratify the bilateral agreement with Ukraine about the reciprocal recognition of property rights, or a similar multilateral agreement with other CIS countries. The originator of both documents was RS Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee on the Administration of State Property]. The agreements stipulate that each of the states recognizes certain economic objects and rest homes on their territory as belonging to another state. Also, one of the chief criteria is that those objects were created prior to the collapse of the USSR at the expense of the republic budget of the appropriate independent state. Everything would seem to be all right—Ukraine, Russia, and the other countries get back their sanatoriums and Young Pioneer camps and, at the same time, on a just basis exchange certain second-rate plants and factories. Especially since, at first glance, there are a lot of our sanatoriums in Crimea, and only a few Ukrainian ones on our territory. Definite doubts, however, have arisen in the experts' minds. The agreements were not accompanied by even a tentative list of what we will receive and what we will give back. Despite two requests from the Foreign Affairs Committee, that list has not yet been submitted. But the experts have noted the following situation. It is clear that Ukraine constructed a rather large number of objects outside the confines of its borders from its own budget. But Russia scarcely did so. Here, as a rule, everything was financed from the union budget. Thus it is completely possible that Russia will exchange one Young Pioneer camp for ten plants. Moreover, the agreements empowered specifically the Goskomimushchestvo officials to decide on an individual and final basis whose rights and whose property to recognize. The agreements were also not ideal with respect to resolving questions of military property, and also touch indirectly on certain potential territorial claims.

Despite all these doubts on the part of the deputies and experts, one of the Supreme Soviet committees submitted the multilateral agreement for ratification. Naturally, a discussion arose in the auditorium. The opposing sides began to appeal to Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. To give him his due, he displayed firm adherence to principles and,

essentially sharpening his relations with the structures of executive power, recommended postponing the ratification and clearing up all the vague areas. The consideration of the question was rescheduled, but Goskormushchestvo did not provide any explanations.

The Supreme Soviet also did not have sufficient time to ratify the agreement among the CIS countries concerning through shipments of humanitarian aid. The text of that agreement also appeared at first glance to be rather good. According to the agreement, if a shipment of humanitarian aid is being made across the country's territory, it should be given the "green light" at customs and on transportation. It would seem that it is impossible to act in a more humane manner. But definite doubts did arise in the deputies' minds.

It turned out that the sender himself decided whether or not the shipment was a humanitarian one. Objective criteria—for example, quantitative ones—were absent. In this instance, wouldn't the sender be tempted to declare all his through shipments to be humanitarian aid, attempting individually to come to an understanding with customs and transportation workers? Once again the official's arbitrariness?

A rather confused situation developed with the Agreement on the Creation of an International Scientific-Technical Center. According to that document, a number of leading countries in the West allocate \$70 million to construct that center in Russia. The center transfers those funds to our nuclear experts to develop the most interesting projects for peaceful purposes. The agreement evoked very sharp discussions in the Foreign Affairs Committee, and parliamentary hearings were held concerning it, but the matter never got to the point of ratification. There were a rather large number of objections. Here are a few of them. According to the agreement the Center is an international organization with the participation both of Russian specialists and of representatives of the Western countries. But the "Westerners" have the veto right—no money will be expended without their consent. That means that the Center chooses certain of our individual nuclear specialists with their project and makes the proviso that either the funds are allocated only to them, or to no one. Taking into consideration our impoverished situation, there can scarcely be any doubt as to whether it will be possible to refuse for a long period of time. But in this instance there arises the following danger. It is clear that, in a large collective, the role of its various scientists differs very much. There are always clear heads, and frequently they are not among the managerial staff, and those clear heads generate an ideology of investigating. All you have to do is to "pull them out" and a collective of many thousand people will not be able to create anything beneficial for a long time thereafter. The veto right has obviously created this danger.

There were also objections concerning the fact that Russia has freed both the Center itself and the representatives of the Western countries from any responsibility for any undesirable consequences from their activities on our territory (for which, indeed, ratification was

required). Meanwhile it is generally known that the compensations for the damages incurred by an individual in the West reach millions of dollars. So there is immediate discussion about nuclear technologies and about Chelyabinsk-70 and Arzamas-16. Consequently, there is no desire in the West to pay in any real manner, even in the presence of blame, for our people who have perished or been maimed. This is all very similar to the attitudes toward natives. So, for the time being, these agreements remain unratified. It is curious to note that a number of diplomats in Western countries have organized simply a pilgrimage to the Foreign Affairs Committee, proposing the discussion of what are by no means general problems of Russian foreign policy or, for example, arms reduction or regional security, but only the question of ratifying specifically this agreement.

Of course, the problem of ratifying the START-II [in Russian, SNV-2] Treaty continues to remain open. Here too there are several curious but little-known details. For example, unlike us, the leading Western countries take a somewhat different approach to the problem of international security. There little is said about collective security, but, instead, wide use is made of various modifications of force models of maintaining international security, which assume as the basic goal the guaranteeing of an order resting upon a balance of forces (which should not be confused with parity or equality of forces), upon the division of spheres of influence, and upon the concept of local wars as a method of eliminating that balance. Proceeding from that concept, they figure out various alternatives for behavior. If the regional balance has been violated or an armed conflict has arisen, then it is stopped specifically by means of the restoration of the balance. A clear example of this is the conflict in former Yugoslavia, where the Serbs obviously are enjoying the military advantage. If it proves possible to shift the global balance of forces to their advantage, then the attempt will be made to implement it, by demanding economic or political concessions. And it is important here that, in order to make a decision, it is first necessary to compute the entire chain of the possible escalation of the conflict. If the computations indicate that it will be possible to achieve victory at the key stages, then the politicians begin boldly to demand concessions. If the other side proves to be slow-witted or uncompromising, then the West, in response, frequently proceeds along the chain, building up the conflict. They begin dropping bombs on Tripoli or Baghdad, and the people there, seeing that they are losing, quickly yield.

It is possible to argue about the details of this scheme, but on the whole this is exactly what kind of scheme it is. However, if this is so, and the quantity and quality of weapons is necessary not only to be victorious in war, but also in politics and in economics, then there arises the question of how the START-II Treaty fits into this scheme. Because it is clear that, in the formation of the balance of forces a participating factor is not only nuclear weapons, but also super-accurate weapons, the latest stealth materials, and the quality of troop management. It is no secret

that the United States and NATO as a whole are strong specifically with regard to these components. And all of them remain outside the confines of the START-II Treaty. Moreover, according to the Treaty, the United States retains its main striking force—the navy—while we reduce our most combat-ready means—surface missiles. So do we ourselves, by violating the balance of military forces, want to provoke the West to an economic, political, or territorial repartition?

Experts have also expressed the following fear. As is generally known, the SDI [in Russian, SOI] program proved to be insolvent and incapable of guaranteeing the security of the United States in the event of the launching of thousands of missiles by an enemy. However, if the START-II Treaty is implemented, computations on EVM [electronic computers] indicate that, with the aid of super-accurate weapons and the use of other similar equipment, it will be possible to prevent the launching of only approximately 200 Russian missiles. But it is already possible to intercept that number with the aid of SDI. Is it necessary for us in this instance, by our own hands, to resurrect that program?

In general, questions with respect to that Treaty have arisen. It is natural that the Foreign Affairs Committee in this situation requested the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and Minoborony [Ministry of Defense] to send the committee the American and NATO concepts of the balance of forces, the maintenance of international order, and the making of foreign-policy decisions, so that, within their context, it could decide the fate of the Treaty. In half a year no replies at all have been received. But unofficially it was said: "You have the text of the Treaty, so go study it."

Of course, most of the necessary American documents and conceptual studies were on the bookshelf at the Foreign Affairs Committee. It was, however, necessary to receive an official answer in order later to ask subsequent questions. It can be assumed, however, that no reply was given to the Committee not so much because there was a strong desire to protect the Treaty, as because there was no complete understanding of exactly what those rather poor deputies wanted from them. In any case, one is led to this conclusion by the military doctrine that was recently adopted by the Russian Security Council. There nothing was stated seriously about the need to use force models, although it is clear that, as a result of that mention, there would be a rather considerable increase in the political role of armed forces.

It is also necessary to talk about the unratified open skies treaty. The essence of that treaty is: in exchange for good money, the Western countries have the right, approximately once every ten days, to fly across Russia along any flight path, carrying out aerial photo reconnaissance. Correspondingly we, in exchange for payment, have the same right with respect to those countries. It is understood that these aerial surveys are a means of carrying out a very detailed monitoring of the situation in the country. But is it necessary for us to monitor the territory

of the United States in this way? Possibly the specialists are making a mistake, but, in the opinion of several of them, it is scarcely possible by this method to prevent an attack launched by a considerably stronger opponent.

One would also scarcely think that it will be possible to obtain any substantial economically beneficial information since, in an industrial country, all the basic secrets are located most probably in the laboratories and computers. But with respect to Russia one can speak only about the economic value of various territories, natural resources, trends in foreign investments, expected harvests, plantings of narcotics, and local conflicts. In general, to put it mildly, one can notice a definite asymmetry of interests.

Of course, Russia has not been hiding anything for a long time, so one could think a bit about at least earning money on these flights. There is, however, no guarantee that our military men will not demand the earned money to pay for the same kind of flights over the United States, which are, essentially speaking, completely useless. And they may even ask for more money.

The Convention on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons is also on the approach to consideration in the VS [Supreme Soviet]. As is generally known, American chemical ammunition is most frequently thin-walled, and our, conversely, is thick-walled, which our military men always considered to be a shortcoming. But with the Americans the service life date is shorter because of the thin walls. Ours, on the other hand, can be stockpiled for many additional years, and can be gradually destroyed or reprocessed for advantageous use by ourselves. The Americans, however, did not forget the concepts of the balance of forces, and quickly organized the signing of that convention. Naturally, Russian diplomats did not fail to place their signatures wherever necessary, without having, true, unlike our transatlantic colleagues, either the funds to destroy the chemical weapons or a corresponding state program.

An agreement with Kuwait about military cooperation will also be brought to the State Duma. A draft of that agreement arrived at the Foreign Affairs Committee in late August. In accordance with that draft, Russia will sell to Kuwait a large consignment of weapons. In exchange Russia will pledge to render military aid to Kuwait in the event of aggression. Yevgeniy Ambartsumov was completely justified in proposing to the originators that they give an explanation. As a result, certain measures were planned, and, it would seem, the principle of satiated wolves and intact sheep was observed. But an oral understanding is one thing, and the text of a treaty is another. Currently one can only guess about how this question will be resolved. It should be noted that, according to the new Constitution, authorization for the use of troops abroad will be given only by the Federation Council, half of which consists of persons belonging to the executive branch of power. So there is something to think about here.



It is also worthwhile to discuss the draft of the law governing the procedure for the conclusion and denouncement of international treaties. This draft, which on the whole is a beneficial and necessary document, made its way in the Supreme Soviet to the second reading. But it did not manage to get through it. What remained a fundamental problem that was not completely resolved in it were the attempts made by the deputies to insert the right of the Supreme Soviet to the independent denouncement of any international treaties that are in effect for Russia. Objections to this, and not without certain grounds, were expressed by representatives of Boris Yeltsin and Andrey Kozyrev. They pointed out that this practice exists only in a few countries, in particular the KNDR [Democratic People's Republic of Korea], and that the Russian parliament can, in the heat of the moment and indiscriminately, denounce treaties with which, in conformity with international law, such action cannot be taken. They also pointed out that foreign partners, in the face of a threat of sudden denouncement, will trust Russia less. It was also mentioned that such steps taken by the parliament place it in opposition to the president.

There were also arguments from the other side: it was mentioned that, from the purely formal point of view, there is nothing illegal in parliament's having this right. For another state it is of no concern which agency in Russia signs or denounces treaties, so long as it acts on behalf of the entire country.

What is more substantial, however, is not the formal possibility, but the actual requirement that the parliament has in its pocket this right to independent denouncement. The fact of the matter is that, in our country, it has become a good tradition when one of the branches of authority, proceeding from certain interests, does not want to observe any reasonable rules of the game. In practical life, in the area of international relations this leads to corresponding manifestations. For example, in the summer of 1992 Russia concluded with the United States an agreement concerning the safe shipment and destruction of weapons of mass destruction. At the 7th Congress the deputies caused a ruckus on this question and, it must be said, not completely without justification. The Foreign Affairs Committee, during the winter of 1992-1993, collected the findings of many experts, organizations, and even ministries, which practically unanimously mentioned the infringement on Russia's national interests. Of course, the agreement freed the Americans of any responsibility for any actions on our territory; granted to all of them, down to the vehicle drivers and enlisted men, an almost diplomatic status; factually speaking, allowed them to ship whatever they wanted out of the country; etc. In general, it is a treaty between a white colonizer and a black aborigine. It is clear that, even on the basis of purely formal features, that agreement should have been submitted for ratification. However, that agreement is in effect to this day, and none of its originators, despite all the force of the

ruckus that was raised, even thought about stopping its action. In this kind of situation, what is parliament supposed to do?

Another good example is the agreement with the United States concerning annexation to the requirements governing the nonproliferation of missile technologies. Incidentally, it should be noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for a rather long period of time, opposed the concluding of this agreement and yielded only under the large amount of pressure exerted by both sides. Parliamentary hearings on this problem indicated, to put it very mildly, the existence of the following threats to our interests. The destruction of advantageous contracts with India (cryogenic engines), Brazil, and other countries. The doubtfulness of obtaining any income from possible commercial launches (we have been banned from attracting any customers by low prices). Becoming dependent on the United States as a result of fulfilling a production order for the Freedom station. The destruction, because of the loss of production orders, of an entire branch of rocket construction. This would make unemployed not the drunkards, but several tens of thousands of skilled workers. Naturally, in this situation the Supreme Soviet enacted a decree concerning the need to submit this agreement for ratification. The agreement, however, went into effect on 1 November without any ratification and, of course, no one is planning now to question the opinion of parliament in this regard.

In 1990 the USSR and the United States signed an agreement concerning the demarcation of sea spaces in the Bering Sea. In accordance with the opinion of experts and on the basis of the results of hearings that had already been held in the USSR Supreme Soviet, we gave the Americans, as a result of that agreement, no less than 30,000 square kilometers. It would still be possible to return to the initial situation, since the agreement has not yet been ratified. Nevertheless, by the will of the responsible statesmen, the agreement has been "applied provisionally" for more than three years. The Foreign Affairs Committee has repeatedly proposed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it submit this agreement for ratification, but it has invariably received a polite refusal. It would seem that we are waiting while the United States becomes permanently established in the disputed sector and invests considerable amounts of money in it, and then the United States will demand unbelievable compensation from us. In the minds of the originators of the agreement, our parliament should not have any formal right to raise this question independently if the executive authority does not ask it to take such action.

One could give additional examples. The documents that parliament has never seen include, for example, agreements concerning the property owned by our troops in Germany. In accordance with the first of them, we were given several billion dollars. But soon another one was

concluded, in accordance with which we ourselves, for some reason, rejected dollars and agreed to the zero version.

It is clear that the recommendations, appeals to the courts, etc., cannot help. The only thing that will help is the threat that the Federal Assembly will interact not with the other branches of authority, but directly with the foreign partner, that is, will be able to force us to take its own will into consideration. As soon as it becomes clear to other states that the signature at the bottom of a treaty was extorted from us and this is not yet everything, such attempts will end.

In practice, parliament will hardly enjoy the right of independent denouncement. We are speaking most probably about a threat, by referring to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be able to prevent various feeble impulses. Essentially speaking, in recent time it was precisely this kind of silent understanding that existed between the Supreme Soviet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From time to time the former raised a commotion concerning individual questions, and the latter threatened a brawl, and as a result it prevented actions that were not completely thought out.

It should also be mentioned that the committee has not gone halfway to meet the dynamic attempts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to guarantee the enactment of legislative acts involving the use of our troops abroad in peacekeeping operations. There was basically one

reason. The fact of the matter is that the rendering of military assistance is a very expensive service, in exchange for which it is possible to demand a lot. And it is that "in exchange for" that has not yet observed in our foreign-policy actions, and most of the deputies do not want to destroy our troops aimlessly. There has also been opposition to peacekeeping missions, and also, it would seem, for the reason that peacekeeping that stands above the conflict and outside of Russian national interests is a harmful myth that is calculated to appeal only to the man in the street.

Apparently the deputies of the future Foreign Affairs Committee will also encounter attempts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to guarantee the taking of secret actions by the Administration for the Providing of Services to the Diplomatic Corps, which possesses automobile-service facilities, hunting land, bases, and thousands of apartments. In any case the former committee agonized about this question for an entire year, but did not receive even a single positive response from the interested organizations.

It is possible with a large share of confidence to assume that, from the very first work days of the State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee it will feel a considerable amount of pressure to guarantee the rapid ratification of many of the treaties that were mentioned. For the time being, the deputies have not had sufficient time to come to their senses or acquire experience. Because they have to learn a very great deal in order to oppose such attempts effectively.

## KAZAKHSTAN

**Nazarbayev Outlines New Ideology for Kazakhstan**

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[Article by Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of the Republic of Kazakhstan: "The Ideological Consolidation of Society as a Condition of Kazakhstan's Progress"]

[Text] "...The achievement of real independence requires political, intellectual, and spiritual support. It is essential that we secure not only an economic, organizational, and personnel breakthrough in these directions but also create an atmosphere consolidating society. And we have to have here an ideological conceptualization of our activity geared both to the immediate and the more distant future."

The work "Strategy of the Formation and Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State" appeared in May of last year. It set forth my vision of the fundamental directions and content of the reform and pursued the goal of providing society with a sense of the future. Time has shown that the main priorities and their forecast characteristics as a whole were determined correctly. Many provisions of the strategy have been embodied in the new constitution, the National Program of Stabilization of the Economy and Extension of the Socioeconomic Reforms, and in a number of government programs.

An understanding that global transformations connected with a change, virtually, in a state's social and economic formation are always accompanied by complex processes of changes in people's consciousness forced me to commence in parallel the conceptualization and elaboration of these problems pertinent for the activity of any social organism. We have to negotiate a transitional period which is quite substantial both in terms of scale of work and in terms of time. It is extraordinarily important in this connection to create in society a spiritual atmosphere which is adequate to the changes and which may be sustained only by a balanced policy of the state in all spheres, so specific a sphere as ideology included.

Arguments over whether ideology is needed or not are largely unproductive. To put it no more strongly: After this term had been introduced in practice, last century, it became an object of such manipulation that in time it partially lost its original meaning. The same thing is also happening in our society, which lived for decades under the harsh conditions of a totalitarian system. It is not surprising that since its collapse the "ideology" concept has acquired a negative connotation and has recently been employed in political vocabulary with a large degree of skepticism. But does ideology as such, that is, the set of views and ideas which are formulated in any state, a developing state particularly, for the purpose of the exercise of foreign and domestic policy, the development of science, culture, and education, and the assertion of new moral values, merit such an attitude?

Evidently not, inasmuch as without such a system, which may be defined as ideological, a society of the modern type simply cannot exist. The leading states of the world have always aspired to the creation not only of a political and economic but also an ideological image attractive both to its own citizens and to other countries also. If the state allows a vacuum to occur in this sphere, it is frequently filled by philosophical precepts of a different kind.

Ideology is essentially a method, which has stood the test of time, of the consolidation and mobilization of a community of people for the accomplishment of political and economic tasks, a mechanism of the shaping of social behavior. But this is not a compulsory method but civilized influence on people's minds exerted by the state and the parties and public movements sharing its platform. The existence of other views and outlooks is by no means precluded here. As long as there is life, as long as there are society and the state, there will always be different ideological currents.

**The Current Social and Political Situation in Kazakhstan**

Kazakhstan has finally and irreversibly renounced an unequal life in the shadow of a former empire and has embarked on the building of a strong sovereign state with a socially oriented market economy and fundamentally new social relationships. The political system and state arrangement are changing fundamentally, and the republic has emphasized its commitment to a democratic course and international rules and principles. The highest value of the society we are building is man, in whose name and for whose good the transformations have been initiated. Guarantees of people's rights and liberties have been secured in legislation, and the ideas of consolidation, humanism, international accord, and the equality of all nations and nationalities have been laid down.

All this, strictly speaking, is a firm foundation for the consistent implementation of the reforms. But it would be an illusion to believe that changes in the social consciousness occur automatically with a change in political and economic systems. This is a far more serious and complex phenomenon inasmuch as it is connected with deep-lying processes of social life and changes in world-outlook principles and psychological stereotypes and the very tenor of the life of society and each person individually. We have all today come in for a dual load, as it were: It is as though both the economy and society find themselves between past and present. Even while having fully recognized that there is no road back, we must acknowledge that the system of management, science, culture, education, and spiritual life invisibly bear the imprint of the past.

The same is happening in the social consciousness also. Such a concept as "anomie"—the state of man's confusion under sharply changed conditions, when the established value system is reinterpreted and there is a radical change in life's values—became firmly established in scholarship back last century. This is a difficult test not



only for the individual citizen but for the whole of society also. And despite the fact that an absolute majority of Kazakhstanis support the reform policy, we must recognize that many people, while having apprehended the need for changes with their heart, so to speak, have yet to grasp their essence intellectually and are experiencing uncertainty, lacking an entirely clear idea of their future.

The state of a certain spiritual discomfort is being intensified by the economic crisis, which for the ordinary individual has been expressed primarily in the unchecked growth of prices, a fall in the living standard, and the unresolved nature of many social problems. Extremes of the political struggle frequently disorient people also. The most unexpected political speculation sometimes finds for itself a niche in the social consciousness.

In order to understand the situation shaping up in the political sphere of Kazakhstan today it is necessary to closely analyze the substance of the ideas that are being actively discussed in the press, in the party polemics, in economic circles, and, yes, in broad strata of society, perhaps.

Granted the entire complex picture of political views, and there is a great collection of them, it would seem necessary to examine the socialist and liberal views, as two poles of the current social and political diversity. Of course, this is somewhat of a simplification, but one that makes it possible to see the picture as a whole.

The **socialist platform** has certain supporters in society, although it is unlikely that it could be taken as a basis in reform. The period of wholesale criticism of the socialist idea has passed. The time has come for a serious analysis of what was done for the people by socialism in its Soviet version and of what simply cannot be accepted.

The creation in Kazakhstan in the years of Soviet power of a powerful industry and agriculture and unique production engineering complexes, universal literacy, urbanization, and much else would have been impossible without Kazakhstan's industrialization. Our present potential is to some extent the result of the former system. Only in polemical over-excitement could this be denied.

Orthodox supporters of the socialist idea are speaking with nostalgia about the past and insisting on its return and the institution of proceedings against politicians for their "crime," virtually. The illogicality of framing the issue this way is astonishing: While always urging a consideration of the objective regularities in history, the opposition is today putting the emphasis on personalities and incidental or temporary factors. Of course, individual leaders of that time did perform some role in accelerating the disintegration of the state. But if we keep to an objective, not emotional, viewpoint, it is obvious that socialism was in the most profound crisis as a system of socioeconomic and political relations. It may today be said affirmatively that it is a question of a crisis of extensive proportions.

**Economic crisis.** A key criterion of the efficiency of social systems is economic efficiency. By this criterion the centralized planned economy had ultimately conclusively lost out to the market economy.

**Political crisis.** The contradiction between the stated power of the people and the concentration of power in the hands of a very narrow elite of the intraparty bureaucracy had reached its logical conclusion. Formally political structures created the semblance of democracy, but in reality all decisions at the local and central levels were made only by the party leaders.

**National crisis.** Despite the proclaimed internationalism, the socialist system most brutally suppressed the free development of the nations for decades. Specifically, in Kazakhstan more than half the Kazakh people perished or emigrated, according to experts' estimates, in the years of forcible collectivization. All peoples of the country sustained colossal losses. National crisis is largely the creation of economic crisis. The relations of the center and the regions were of a semicolonial nature. The raw material focus of the republic's economy and its noncomprehensive nature were deliberately predetermined. To the same extent Kazakhstan was tightly tied to the center and other regions in a transport system whose purpose was to make an independent outlet onto the foreign market impossible. Only the threat of violence held back the hidden international tension. When the system fell apart, the territory of the former USSR flared up in international conflicts and wars. This is not the fault of people but the fault of past and present politicians. Violence—from the direct physical extermination of whole peoples through the constriction of the sphere of application of national languages—had driven the contradictions deep down. There were no other methods for their resolution. Despite all the statements about internationalism, behind the facade of official ideology steady negative stereotypes took shape in some peoples in respect to others, which at the everyday level are alive today also. The attempt to standardize all nations in a single super-ethnic community—the Soviet people—had manifestly failed.

Further, **ecological crisis.** The particular features of the socialist economic system with its abstract-nationwide, but in practice, departmental, ownership led to colossal ecological malfeasance on the part of the ministries and departments. The essence of the problem is that while disposing unchecked of the land and natural resources, the departments at the same time were not interested in environmentally clean industries and bore no real responsibility for the inevitable tragedies. This "no one's property" phenomenon brought about global catastrophes without precedent in previous history. The lack of ecological standards resulted in the confrontation of society and nature. Kazakhstan found itself in an extremely serious situation in this respect.

One of the biggest disasters was brought the Kazakh people by the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. Conducting nuclear weapons testing, underground included, in Kazakhstan, the system perpetrated one of the most monstrous crimes in the history of mankind against the citizens of its own state. Over half a million persons have suffered from radiation in our republic alone. Many of them have already departed this life at the height of their powers, hundreds of thousands have been deprived of their health forever. Several generations of children have been condemned from birth to live as invalids. And the tragedy continues in many families, which are giving birth to cripples.

Another catastrophe which came to Kazakhstan is the Aral Sea, which is disappearing from the face of the earth. This calamity has subjected the peoples of the vast Central Asia region to untold suffering. And not only them: Scientists have drawn a substantiated conclusion concerning the global destructive influence of the Aral cataclysm on vast territories of the planet.

But those who have suffered most from these experiments presented by the former regime as struggle for the "bright future" are primarily the people of Kazakhstan.

We have still to tally the entire damage inflicted on people, the land, and nature as a whole. If only to estimate the true dimensions of the catastrophes and to determine measures to eliminate their consequences. And the world also should have a clear idea of the actual ecological situation in Kazakhstan.

**Moral crisis.** There was a discrepancy between the ideological symbols and people's real values. The dual morals of the governing elite could not have failed to have brought about the similar morals of millions of people formally participating in various political activities—meetings, demonstrations, marches, and so forth—yet absolutely disbelieving of the proclaimed slogans. When, today, there is bewilderment as to why the system fell apart so easily, it is simply forgotten that it had long since lost the confidence of the people, who saw and understood our growing lag behind the West and the Soviet economy's accelerating slide into crisis. Socialist ideals in recent years evoked nothing more than irony. All this was known, but ideology obdurately continued to serve the ambitions of the ruling elite and to pass off its interests as all-state interests. Let us recall the myths of Soviet homespun ideology divorced from reality—the theory of the merger of the nations, the practice of the relationship of state and individual, when the latter was assigned the role of "cog," and the implanted party-mindedness of science, literature, and art. Even such natural feelings as love for the motherland, concern for the future, fidelity to the traditions of one's ancestors—all this was fitted into the Procrustean bed of the "moral codes of the builders of communism." This was not an ideology but a kind of speculation on people's moral principles.

But it should be considered that for many people, forswearing old illusions is a very painful process. Mocking their convictions is impossible. Engaging in a competent and honest polemic is another matter. It is essential to explain as lucidly as possible that under modern conditions equality via state redistribution, state paternalism, ideological uniformity, and the suppression of private property and the market would repel Kazakhstan from the world community. A return to the past is futile and could merely detonate society and lead to civil war. It is no less important to recognize that the ubiquitously asserted myths of socialism—of the kind we experienced—have collapsed not only in the CIS but throughout the world.

Despite a number of achievements of this system, useful and realized in practice, we cannot finish up at a historical dead end yet again.

Another direction of social thought puts the emphasis on traditions and national character. The **ideology of traditionalism** is logically connected with the crisis of socialist ideology. Truly, to what can we turn if the previous tenets have proven bankrupt? To, most likely, that which is most simple, comprehensible and at the same time profoundly moral and spiritual in the life of each people—traditions. Their role in the life of the people is indisputable. Cultural traditions have always been a source of social revival. A return to one's historical cultural roots is, of course, a positive process. In addition, it is necessary to abandon the simplistic interpretation of the relationship of traditions and social progress. The experience of the modern world shows convincingly that certain traditional structures are very organically interwoven in the fabric of the present civilization. Without experience, innovation is impossible also. It is traditions that enable a person to "keep his bearings" and adapt his way of life to the impetuous changes of the modern world.

Development of the national language, art, culture, everyday culture included, and the family is entirely supported in Kazakhstan. But the political ideology of the traditional type, which is based on a resuscitation of archaic forms of social arrangement, tribal mentality, and a system of legal views characteristic of the territorial organization of Kazakh society of the 18th-19th centuries, is categorically rejected here.

The immense space occupied by Kazakhs on territory from the Caspian to China required some structural formalization and particular centers of attraction. This coincided with the particular features of historical development of different regions and was accompanied subsequently by a system of administrative division consciously introduced by tsarism. On the other hand, the singularities of management of the economy also required a precise regulation of territorial issues. Regional affiliation, therefore, has primordially played an appreciable role in the political arrangement. But do we need to bring all this into the 21st century? After all, under modern conditions the rate of development of the

social and cultural systems of the Kazakh people are absolutely incommensurable with that period.

Thus despite the aspiration, understandable to some extent, to find in our own history effective political mechanisms, we need to be realists and to recognize that the political ideas and political symbols of past ages are not suitable for the end of the present century. Even in the past, incidentally, our great educators called for the prevention of a stratification of Kazakh society.

Also popular in social circles are **liberal ideas**. At the end of the 1980's and at the start of the present decade the general euphoria at their triumph and the affirmation of ideals common to all mankind and the rights and liberties of man as the highest value led to the optimistic conclusion as to the conclusive victory of democracy and democratic principles.

But there has come to be a gradual understanding throughout the world that complex processes also are occurring against the background of liberal ideology. Not to touch on other regions of the world but to speak about our former common space, mention has to be made of the growing social tension in society, which is expressed at times in the most extreme forms—armed conflicts, political confrontations, economic anarchy, and people's unbelief in the possibility of changing anything. Instead of the growth of a civilized market, speculative capital in all spheres—finances, trade, foreign economic relations—walks side by side with two companions—criminal elements and the corrupt nomenklatura. These processes have nothing in common with the modern world market, but they exist in reality, manifestly contradicting the very essence of liberal ideology. International conflicts, on the other hand, graphically demonstrate that arguments about democracy and values common to all mankind are not as yet capable of protecting human life and dignity.

Of course, the contradiction between liberal ideology and harsh reality may be explained by reference to the legacy of totalitarianism. This would be correct, but only partly so. There are more profound reasons.

Liberal ideals and liberal ideology are the result of the extensive, centuries-long evolution of Western civilization. The basis of these is composed of objective prerequisites—private property, the mentality of individualism, and democratic political institutions. Its rudiments with us were either absent or were interrupted almost a century ago. In addition, a strong legal system facilitating the realization of liberal ideas was created in civilized states. Outside of these objective prerequisites this process is extraordinarily more difficult.

The fact that the main and most populous support of the ideology of liberalism—the middle class—as it is customarily called in social science, does not exist in the republic as yet has to be seen also. Account should be taken of the actual cultural and historical situation as well. The point being that with a mechanical transfer of Western liberal ideology to Kazakhstan its proponents

would come up against such a phenomenon as culture—in the broad, including political, sense. Its nature and ideals cannot be changed in an instant. The type of political culture needs to be transformed gradually, in civilized fashion and on the basis of real reforms.

Thus an analysis of the political and ideological directions in present-day Kazakhstan testifies to the need for the search for particular paths in the formation of the ideological platform. We do not reject that which is valuable that has accumulated within it socialist and traditional and liberal views. But the tasks confronting Kazakhstan require, in our view, the conceptualization of somewhat different national ideological priorities.

### Toward Real Independence

We speak about the **transitional period**. What is its substance? To what do we aspire? There are a whole number of specific economic and political directions which are set forth in the constitution, documents of the executive and the legislature, and the programs of certain parties of Kazakhstan. But aside from the specific tasks, there is also a global purpose, without having achieved which we cannot successfully move forward along the path of the reform of society. It is a question of the **achievement of the real independence of the republic**. Despite its numerous attributes and the recognition and assertion of sovereignty, to say that Kazakhstan has acquired full independence would be premature.

We must in the next few years concentrate all efforts on this process. We have for this to resolve, generally speaking, the following key problems—to **strengthen state principles, build a state based on the rule of law, and ensure the formation of a full-fledged national market on a new production engineering, structural, and institutional basis**. Such a formulation of the issue will, most likely, meet with the understanding of parties and public movements, the work force, entrepreneurial circles, research and artistic organizations, and representatives of all strata of the population of the republic inasmuch as the said priorities are of an all-state nature and their realization could effect the profound modernization of Kazakhstani society. If we seek so necessary a consensus, we should also agree with such an inevitable condition: The achievement of real independence requires strong political, intellectual, and spiritual support. It is essential that we secure not only an economic, organizational, and personnel breakthrough in these directions but also create an atmosphere consolidating society. And we have to have here an ideological comprehension of our reality geared both to the immediate and the more distant future.

One of the main political aspects for us in the impending work is the **strengthening of statehood**. On the whole, this is a natural inference from the experience of world civilization: An objective need for an increase in the regulatory influence of the state, which is essential primarily to secure the emergence from the crisis and



stabilization of the socioeconomic and social and political situation, is necessarily manifested in an era of profound crises and upheavals. We should concentrate the main efforts here on enhancing the role and responsibility of the executive, strengthening the vertical line of management, and forming strong presidential rule. Both parliament and society as a whole agree on the need for an intensification of this process, to which the quite precise allocation of functions of the three branches of power in the country's basic law testifies.

But the formation of the state of Kazakhstan is not confined merely to adoption of the constitution. Especially since it was stipulated from the very outset that it is a constitution of a transitional period which has been created. It reflects the realities of our present day and the complexities and contradictions of our society. Its provisions and requirements are binding on all. But it is necessary to ponder the prospects, looking into the future, even now.

The present Supreme Council is fulfilling its historical mission and performing a great deal of work, laying the foundations of the country's legislative base. The next stage of societal development will inevitably require us to create a professional parliament with clearly defined duties and powers. It is important also that we reach a common opinion on which of the world's prevalent and approved electoral systems is the optimum and which of them is applicable for our republic. The next task is the legislative separation of the powers of the central state and local authorities, in terms of which the executive and representatives authorities locally are sufficiently plenipotentiary in the solution of their problems. The central structures would then be relieved of diverse current business and could concentrate on the strategic directions of political, economic, and social development.

It is essential to reform the judicial system also. Unfortunately, people still have no faith in the authority and competence of the judicial authorities locally. It is as yet too early to speak of the objectivity of the courts and the constructive nature of their activity; they are divorced from the problems of society, as it were. It is necessary to make the judicial system as efficient as possible and to rid it of the possibility, which still exists, of pressure being exerted on the part of the power structures, in the localities particularly. A most practicable path of this reform is the legislative enshrinement of the appointability of judges by the head of state following a recommendation of a special supreme judicial council, say. We could this way ensure the genuine independence of the judges and cut short any encroachment on justice.

As we can see, the process of the formation of Kazakhstani statehood is a complex, laborious, and diverse task. And there should be no ill-considered haste or unwarranted slowness here. It is important to secure the mutual understanding and interaction of all branches of power. We would be doing future generations a bad turn were we to loosen the foundations of the state for the sake of momentary political benefits.

The accomplishment of radical socioeconomic reforms undoubtedly belongs among the main national priorities. This is a key question of modern Kazakhstan and its acquisition of independence. The fate of the reforms is directly linked with the mechanisms of state control of the political sphere inasmuch as Kazakhstan's development of recent decades has been characterized by very complex and large-scale processes. It is in this period that a number of global programs have been realized on the territory of the republic. These include the development of the virgin and fallow land, the creation of industry's colossal raw material base, and nuclear and space research.

But the national, social, and cultural problems introduced into Kazakhstan by the realization of these programs went unstudied and uncomprehended behind the economic and military aspect of these processes. A qualitative change occurred—for the first time the proportion of the urban population exceeded that of the rural population. The unevenness of the development of the regions increased sharply. There was a change in the national composition of the population on account of the huge immigration from the European part of the country. A sizable group of an urban Kazakh population, with the concentration of the bulk of the nation in the countryside, appeared.

All of this could not have failed to have led to the appearance of very strong differences in political and cultural orientations. At the same time, on the other hand, the ostensible ideological unity was deliberately emphasized and exaggerated, and the differences and problems were ignored. As a result the ideological and political contradictions of different strata of the population grew. Today they are coming to be manifested actively.

It is for this reason that the molding of a new economic philosophy now occupies a special place. This is connected primarily with its direct influence on an acceleration of the progress of the reforms. The ideology of a democratic, rule-of-law society based on a pluralism of ideas is nothing other than a reflection of views on the forms of ownership and management. We have set as the strategic goal the formation of genuinely market mechanisms and a socially oriented multistructural market economy. That is, we have opted for the path of the creation of a society in which economic liberty and the economic interests of the individual are indisputable and where the free expression of beliefs and spiritual values is guaranteed by the state and the law.

But owing to the tenacity of past ideological stereotypes, the affirmation of these norms can hardly be painless. It is no secret that instances of the open rejection of the reforms at both the power and the everyday level are far from isolated with us. What is to be done in this situation: opt for a hard-line policy, establish the direct diktat of the state, organize the persecution of the opposition for criticism of the government? There have been many examples

of this in the contemporary history of the implementation of economic reforms, incidentally.

The actual social and political situation in Kazakhstan enables us to avoid such power actions lowering the republic's international prestige. It needs merely to be emphasized that both on the issues of a strengthening of statehood and in the economy there has to be a mutual aspiration of the government and the main political movements and parties to a convergence of positions on questions of the reform. It is not, of course, a question of some class appeasement and a ban on constructive criticism of the actions of the government and the formulation of alternative programs. The danger lies elsewhere. As the experience of certain CIS countries testifies, it consists of international and political destabilization, which, certainly, is in the interests of no political party and no single inhabitant of multinational Kazakhstan.

A cultured, civilized dialogue with all who are sincerely interested in Kazakhstan's breakthrough in economic space and time is essential. It is necessary to take account of all this and to formulate the basic principles of ideology in the economic sphere. They are geared to:

**the creation of a socially oriented mixed market economy** based on a combination of the competitive self-regulation of production and regulation of the basic parameters of economic development on the part of the state;

**support for national enterprise** in all its forms with the priority of private enterprise in the sectors directly producing material assets in the sphere of services, construction, transport, and trade;

**the structural reorganization of production** and the surmounting of its raw material one-sidedness with priorities in the fuel and energy and iron and steel complexes and the food and consumer goods market and in the development of the system of service lines;

**the social protection** of the population, particularly the needy and handicapped strata, assurance of employment, and the surmounting of unemployment and the unmanageability in migration processes;

**use of the economic advantages** from the middle "Eurasian" geopolitical location and **pragmatism in the choice of economic and political partners** in interstate relations.

The market cannot be built without the masses' recognition and acceptance of such categories as economic efficiency, the personal economic liberty of the individual, and private property. It is obvious that these categories cannot be firmly established in the consciousness without the corresponding social base, the formation of which is only just beginning. Under these conditions it is the state that assumes the function of defense of the new economic ideology. Without the active ideological support of the state a market mentality simply cannot take shape. It is essential to understand here that

the real market presupposes not only propaganda of its values but also a mastery of the essential mechanisms and skills. It is obvious that in Kazakhstan only the state can undertake the large-scale training of personnel equipped with this set of instruments.

A strengthening of state principles should be accompanied by the building of a society based on the rule of law. This is a task of national significance. We are talking primarily about questions of **legal culture and legal reform** in the republic, for without them there will be no social progress and independence will not be complete.

In a civilized society legal culture is an essential component of the general culture of each individual and a qualifications requirement of each official. There needs to be a most serious discussion about this inasmuch as without the establishment of the proper rule of law we can hardly reform the economy and affirm democratic standards in the life of society.

The market implies primarily the self-regulation of the relations of the commodity producers and consumers based on qualitative laws. Without precisely operating legislation, therefore, there is no market, nor can there be.

Democracy requires state power clearly protected both against autocracy and against mob rule. It can only be protected via observance of binding legal procedures, for both the violence of the minority and the violence of the majority are equally dangerous. Without law, therefore, democracy is impossible.

Freedom of the individual as the target idea of a state of civilization presupposes the sovereignty of the individual and protection of his inviolability and dignity, regardless of whether he is a child or adult, employer or employed, state official or rank and file employee. Such legal equality is possible only if there is general observance of the democratically adopted laws. Only the court can transform any social conflict into a civilized dialogue. That is, without the law there is no liberty.

It may be observed that in terms of its importance and complexity legal reform is the equivalent of economic reform. The building of a state based on the rule of law needs to begin with the state itself. This is a stringent demand of the market economy and the democratic society. If high-quality laws are lacking, the laws have to be constantly amended and revised. If the laws do not operate, "telephone law," as before, will. If legal thinking does not become firmly established in the consciousness, there will be those wishing to encroach on the functions of administration, investigation, and justice.

If we truly intend building a civilized society in which the ideas of right and ethics triumph, each citizen must from his school years assimilate their elementary principles, just as each of us knows the elementary principles of mathematics.

Like any sovereign state, Kazakhstan will maintain a defense capability and strengthen national security. We have adopted a military doctrine and a package of military laws, which specify both measures to prevent war and methods of defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic. Our doctrine has an exclusively defensive focus. We take account here of the doctrines of the states of the CIS and offer cooperation with them in the accomplishment of joint defense assignments. But however the situation in military questions shapes up, only political methods taking account of the balance of states' interests are a civilized method of the solution of international problems and conflict settlement. Kazakhstan has confirmed its commitment to this position repeatedly. We should also carefully consider the geopolitical factor as well. An exceptional balance of decisions in the military sphere which do not disturb in the least the continuing stability in the region is essential.

Maintaining defense capability is a most important state function. The political aspect is significant here also. Our armed forces are currently in the formation phase. The state has rendered and will continue to render them daily support. From its first steps the army of the republic is called upon to enhance combat readiness, be for the youth a true school of devotion to the motherland, and to multiply our people's truly illustrious combat and labor traditions. At the same time, on the other hand, it is essential to establish in society a respectful attitude toward the defenders of the fatherland. Military service should possess tremendous prestige, and the army's authority among the people must be made unshakable. Much will depend here both on the men themselves and on the government and public organizations, primarily those that work with the youth. We must not allow an unhealthy atmosphere to be created around the army or servicemen to feel themselves to be second-class citizens.

Strengthening the independence of the state, we should continue the development of the course in foreign policy. We are aware of the close attention to and increased interest in the international orientation of Kazakhstan. Attempts to predetermine the vector of the republic's outlet to the outside world are made openly or covertly from time to time.

It would seem extraordinarily important in this connection to adhere to a multipolar orientation on the basis of our geographical location and ethnodemographic and other factors. The basis of our international relations is an aspiration to establish mutually profitable political, socioeconomic, and cultural relations with all countries, near and far.

Taking account of the salient features of historical development, we are undoubtedly paying and will continue to pay paramount attention to an expansion of cooperation with Russia, the republics of Central Asia, and other states of the CIS, with many of which we are bound by close integration and allied, including defense, agreements.

The creation of the Economic Union will afford favorable opportunities for the consolidation of interstate contacts, economic interaction, the restoration under the new conditions of rational relations, the organization of efficient sectoral cooperation, and the expansion of information and cultural exchange.

We attach enormous significance to the dynamics of continental development. It is this that justifies the well-known initiatives we have put forward at the United Nations and also the steps connected with the convening of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia and the activity of the Asian Economic Cooperation Organization.

In foreign policy activity we will adhere consistently to the commonly accepted international standards and comply strictly with the commitments we have assumed.

And concerning one other most important factor of the formation of the sovereignty of Kazakhstan—**information independence**, without which the creation of an efficient ideological platform is impossible.

We are becoming more and more extensively a part of international information exchange, which is undoubtedly a positive phenomenon. But this process cannot be interpreted simplistically. An expansion of the international system of information does not mean an automatic extension of democracy in the region. Information channels in the world are distributed and loaded unevenly, which is connected with the limited range of languages of exposition of the information and the differing level of states' financial and technical possibilities.

The young independent states frequently find themselves under the strong pressure of opinions imposed from outside. As a result most complex internal processes with their particular logic are evaluated by an outside view and frequently explained superficially and, at times, tendentiously also. This results in a kind of barrier in the way of the establishment of the genuine independence of many states. But closing off outside sources of information would mean for us self-isolation.

The solution is to see behind the information announcements the essence of the political principles. The state is required to regulate the information balance. This is in no way contrary to the principles of an open society and makes it possible at the same time to seriously approach the achievement of genuine information independence. It is essential here that our mass media learn to uphold the interests of the republic and create their own information space in the world's political arena. We need to win an audience outside of the republic, especially since we have impressive arguments in support of our foreign and domestic policy steps.

Such are the basic national priorities, fidelity to which will bring us onto the path leading to the achievement of real independence. This is possible only on condition of the creation in society of an atmosphere of consolidation, stability, and spiritual harmony.



### Toward Ideological Consolidation

It is hardly necessary today to convince anyone that national movements, particularly in the young independent states, are performing a colossal role. It is they that are to a considerable extent upholding national interests expressed in a revival of the self-awareness, culture, spirituality, traditions, and language of any people. These processes are occurring currently in Kazakhstan also. Realization of the national idea has produced for society many positive results. And it would be a big mistake not to see this and to discern in nations' natural aspiration to self-revival merely a limitation of the rights of others or a sham appeal, as a tribute to fashion, to the past, frequently of a decorative nature.

No, this is a return to a normal human condition. And the peoples of the republic should on the one hand adopt an understanding attitude toward the changes taking place in the consciousness of the Kazakh people and render them spiritual and intellectual support. On the other, it should be seen that under the new conditions other peoples also are undergoing complex formation processes, which requires the same understanding and attitude on the part of the Kazakh nation. Everyone should understand that it is impossible to compel respect for oneself and one's national dignity while denying it to others.

It is perfectly obvious that under the conditions of multinational Kazakhstan there is only one way of realizing national interests, which consists of a guarantee of the equality of all peoples with the integrating role of the Kazakh nation. Any other is fraught with disastrous conflicts and a halt to the democratic reforms. The key ideological task for us in this connection is the assurance of **international harmony**.

The elaboration of a special integral concept of Kazakhstan's nationality policy for the transitional period incorporating a study of the specific requirements of the nations and nationalities living in the republic and realization of the provisions of the constitution concerning their free development would seem extremely necessary today. It is important here that the activity of the state authorities and public organizations primordially be geared to the development of the interaction of the peoples and their spiritual unity in the name of the achievement of the set goals. It is our duty to convert the polyethnic nature of society into a stable consolidating factor.

An important part in the accomplishment of this task could be played together with traditional institutions such as the educational system, the family, and the work force by national-cultural centers. They should be not only focal points of the preservation of national self-awareness and the development of the distinctive spirituality but also be schools of genuine internationalism. Taking advantage of their possibilities of work directly with people, the centers could do much to overcome

national narrowness and exclusiveness and manifestations of chauvinism, nationalism, and separatism. There is a sphere in which their influence could be particularly effective. I refer to our social life, people's everyday mutual relations. After all, it is here that conflicts, seemingly negligible, but dangerous in their consequences, in international soil at times arise.

Together with the state institutions they could do much for the development of cultural ties between the peoples and ensure a pluralism and the compatibility of the cultures with the free development of each.

Some nongovernment structure which could assume the functions of practical realization of the ideas of international harmony and unity and be a directive body of the Forum of Peoples of Kazakhstan will be necessary in the future, most likely. Its composition should make provision for the representation of all ethnic groups, well-known public figures, the most authoritative personalities in the republic, and the administration chiefs. The national-cultural centers could in conjunction with the public organizations channel the energy of all strata of society into a creative channel, study the deep-lying processes in the relationships of different social and national groups, and pursue a consistent policy aimed at excluding international or social tension in any region of the country.

An active part in this noble work could be taken by the public movements and parties. Primarily those whose program principles are aimed at the consolidation of Kazakh society in the name of the progress of the reforms.

Together with the affirmation of international harmony the **strengthening of intranational unity** would seem important in realization of the idea of the consolidation of Kazakhstani society. This problem exists today, and the task is to ensure that the national idea perform a unifying, constructive role in this case.

In the research aspect the history and nature of the intra-Kazakh division into zhuzy, clans and territorial groupings and the nature of its influence on the development of society past and present have still to be conceptualized. But the essence is that new and by no means innocuous trends of intranational division have emerged. The democratization of social life and a certain independence of the regions have come to be used as levers of monopoly control over resources by local elites. Various forms of clannish protectionism and clannish and territorial lobbies are at times manifested in the power structures and in the financial and commercial spheres.

As a whole, contemporary clan and tribal ideology is a highly dangerous form of intranational disintegration and disorientation. A leitmotiv of state ideology, therefore, should be the surmounting of clan stereotypes. The potential for this exists. This includes primarily the historically evolved national statehood. The unitary

state arrangement. The territorial integrity of Kazakhstan. The unity of the centuries-old culture. The entire population of the republic is united beneath these slogans today, and all the more should they call for the national unity of the Kazakh people.

Another most important ideological mission of ours is the **fostering of Kazakhstani patriotism** and the formation of the clear self-determination of each citizen. Specialists use for this term "self-identification." And it is by no means a question of citizenship as such, which pertains to legal acts with a precise juridical meaning. There is an appreciable difference between taking out citizenship and recognizing oneself to be a citizen.

Unfortunately, the understanding that henceforward we shall all be citizens of the independent, sovereign state of Kazakhstan, not the former USSR or the CIS, is of a very superficial nature. Moreover, certain strata of the population, having lost their former ideals and not having acquired new ones, are today experiencing a certain confusion, which is converting them into a sum total of the notorious "social atoms." The formation, on the other hand, of genuine patriotism and real civicism presupposes the precise political self-determination of the personality and a conscious choice of one's motherland.

It is essential to formulate a system of actions which helps each person feel proud of his involvement in our state, its rich and illustrious history, and its future. Both the problems and prospects of the country should be close and comprehensible to all people.

This task also concerns the entire system of education, the cultural authorities, public organizations, the mass media, and each family. And we need to start with the inculcation of a reverential attitude toward the country's flag, coat of arms, and anthem, obedience to the law, and respect for the authorities. We need to ensure that each person assimilate from his childhood years the essentially simple idea: Kazakhstan is my fatherland, and I am responsible for it, as it is for me.

Questions of the **establishment in society of high linguistic culture** should also be in the channel of constructive work on ideological consolidation. This problem has become heavily politicized as of late, although it should be viewed not from the standpoint of the exclusiveness of the official language and its counterpoise to others, as people have attempted to do, but, on the contrary, from its unifying role. The Kazakh language, as a part of the culture, should be an additional factor of the consolidation of all Kazakhstanis. It is the basis of cognition for all nations and nationalities of the culture, traditions, customs, and everyday life of the Kazakh people. Study thereof, not compulsory but deliberate, should commence for everyone from his childhood years and be supported organizationally and methodically. And everyone living here should clearly recognize the need for this approach. At the same time, on the other hand, all people should know that our legislation as a whole and the Language Act in particular protect them against

all restrictions and persecution based on knowledge or ignorance of the official and any other language.

The question of an enhancement of the consolidating role of the Kazakh language is pertinent for the added reason that in recent decades part of the Kazakh youth has come to be divorced from its native language environment, which has occurred on account of the artificial narrowing of the sphere of use of the native language.

This problem can be tackled in entirely civilized fashion. There is among this part of the Kazakh population a relatively great desire and readiness to familiarize itself with its national roots. Consequently, we should not be exacerbating the situation but creating the conditions for filling in the gaps. Moral sensitivity on the part of those for whom national culture and language are natural and organic is needed also.

Speaking of the language problem, it is essential to link it with our general goals. Kazakhstan aspires to join the world community on a par with others. Linguistic self-isolation is incompatible with this, however. A channel of introduction to the immense flow of information in the modern world is Russian. For this reason knowledge of Russian is a positive factor for the peoples of the republic.

On the whole, it is essential to inculcate in young people of all nationalities an aspiration to the constant enrichment of linguistic potential. The study of European and oriental languages today together with knowledge of one's own and the official language are a command of the times. The state is required to create the necessary conditions for study in this case also.

Any constructive, not destructive, ideology in Kazakhstan should also take account of the fact that our state is not only multinational but also multireligious. A religious perception of the world is characteristic of hundreds of thousands of citizens, and the number of followers of various creeds continues to grow. There has also been a change in the **place of religion in society**. Even recently it was, to put it mildly, on the periphery, now it is a real component of social and spiritual life. The sphere of charitable activity of religion, specifically in the field of health care, education, and culture (the creation of kindergarten and retirement homes, hospitals, and educational institutions) is expanding. It is common knowledge that values common to all mankind are the basis of the moral principles of various religions. The religious communities are doing a great deal to maintain in society a healthy atmosphere, peace, and harmony and to establish spirituality. It is important that the followers of various creeds can recognize their involvement in the creation of the new statehood and have a vital interest in its strengthening and development. The renunciation of the ideological confrontation with religion and the adoption of the constitution and

the Law "On Freedom of Religious Belief and Religious Associations" afford extensive opportunities in this respect.

At the same time it is essential to convey to the consciousness of all that the secular nature of the state permits the most democratic solution of the questions of free choice of any religion or atheism and assures the equality of the creeds. Also important is an understanding that the separation of religious associations from the state not only creates favorable opportunities for the satisfaction of religious requirements but also presupposes their noninterference in the activity of all state institutions and organizations.

It is necessary to strive for fulfillment of the provisions of the constitution concerning the impermissibility of the creation of political parties on a religious basis and the political activity of religious associations. We need to counteract attempts to use religious feelings for instigating conflicts in society and to promote the positive directions in the activity of the religions. The effectiveness of the new ideological propositions, on the other hand, will also depend on how extensively and successfully the dialogue of the main social forces, including the clergy of various creeds, is conducted and to what extent its participants display a will to joint search for paths of mutual understanding and cooperation in the name of the well-being of the multinational people of Kazakhstan.

An appreciable influence on a strengthening of the consolidation of society is exerted by the creation of an **atmosphere of stability and civic harmony**. Much will depend here on the skillfully organized dialogue of the state and the new political institutions—political parties and public movements. As a whole, it is still too early to speak of qualitatively and quantitatively evolved multi-party conditions. But we must foster in society a tolerance of the views of political opponents. On the whole, the opposition is a normal and even useful phenomenon. But the main thing is that parties and movements operate in a constructive spirit and engage in criticism in the true meaning of this word, not carping. We need ideas and versions of this program or the other capable of serving the common good, not general arguments and altercations. The state authorities are adhering in relation to the parties and movements at the present time to a centrism contributing to observance of statewide interest, not the interest of a part of society. We will continue to actively support structures establishing political stability and at the same time to cut short anticonstitutional, unlawful actions based on extremist ideas.

Parties and movements, to whatever orientations they adhere and however contradictory their platforms, can do much for the consolidation of society. The trend of their unification in the form of a roundtable is a fact of positive value.

Also extremely important is the role of the parties and public movements in the shaping of political culture and the creation of political traditions which are new for us.

Without this, stability and civic accord, as the basis of consolidation, become barely attainable.

It is essential to understand that we need stability for the sake of continuation of the reforms and determination of their correct pace corresponding to their particular stage. Specifically, a certain cultural adaptation is needed for the continuation of privatization. That is, we need to identify the "reference points" at which we need to stop and closely analyze the path that has been covered. Not only for the purpose of adjustment but also with the aim of preparing and acclimatizing the public consciousness to them. Such an approach is very important in political reform also. We have consciously moved to gradually transform the political system, although even this is evoking rebukes from the radicals. There should be no haste in personnel matters either, incidentally. Stability is immeasurably more important to us.

The revolutionary leap forward syndrome is a very dangerous ailment for society. Sociopolitical revolutions are not the best way to develop the state. A task of the present generation of Kazakhstanis is the creation of a society in which mechanisms of the evolutionary type operate and in which its renewal is consistent.

The **ideology of modernization**, which is a complex multilevel phenomenon, contains a consolidating principle also. This is both the ideological platform of the economic reforms and the transformation of political institutions and a new type of social behavior.

When people speak today about the danger of the modernization of Kazakhstan and recall the deplorable experience of the 1930's, they forget two facts. First, we are talking about an entirely different modernization, second, it is not of a forcible nature.

Truly, the forced collectivization and compulsory transition to other methods of management struck a colossal blow at the people, undermining primarily the entire tenor of life for years. Politically, the modernization amounted at that time to affirmation of the totalitarian idea in all spheres of society. It is this uniformity that we have to overcome. Unless society is modernized, we will simply lose the future. There would, at worst, be a restoration of totalitarianism in this form or the other.

Modernization presupposes the formation of a developed civil society. And this incorporates primarily the sum total of voluntary associations of people: the family, public organizations, religious, cultural, and economic associations, trade unions, and so forth. Their common characteristic is that they are truly voluntary, nonstate, and nonpolitical organizations. It means people's entire private property and particular customs, habits, and rights. It means the sphere of life that is protected against outside interference.

The formation of such a civil society requires gradual evolution. **Economically**, the basis thereof are nonstate enterprises, that is, all economic associations of the citizens on a voluntary basis and in accordance with



independent initiative. When this sector of the economy becomes just as significant as the public sector, the degree of the citizens' economic freedom will enable them to determine their future themselves.

**Socially**, this means primarily the family and all nonstate public associations of the citizens, but formed for other than political purposes. They may vary from a fellowship of scientists or unofficial mass media through a sports club or economic organization.

Finally, **ideologically**, this means ideological pluralism and real freedom of speech and freedom of worship.

The modernization of Kazakhstan presupposes the formation of a civil society which is a condition of the freedom of each citizen and the stability of society as a whole.

A certain modernization of political institutions and the formation of a mass democratic consciousness are essential in addition to this.

Utopian notions of democracy as some anarchic freedom manifestly do not correspond to the political arrangement of truly democratic societies. In actual fact, the organization of political life in them is somewhat different. Politics there becomes a sphere of professional activity, and the population participates in it via local government, elections, and the mass media. It is such an arrangement, not demonstration anarchy, which is the indicator of the stability of democracy. This system includes a multiparty arrangement and numerous civic movements, national-cultural centers, and economic and cultural foundations. But the main thing is that in the civil society the state sharply restricts its interference in the economic and private life of the individual.

It should be considered that the formation of a civil society is impossible also without a modernization of values. It is essential to renounce state paternalism. We have become accustomed to the state being responsible for each and everything, the subject notwithstanding—the retiree who has given the best years of his life to social labor or a perfectly able-bodied individual. Henceforward, however, support will be rendered only the groups of the population that actually need it. The accentuated social policy is aimed primarily at the needy, large families, the handicapped, retirees, and students. But this is one aspect of the problem. Any economically independent person, in the private sector particularly, should understand that economic freedom demands responsibility also. A person must himself be responsible for his well-being, as long, by virtue of different circumstances, as he is not among the socially vulnerable strata. This high individual responsibility for his material and social position should be a principal ethical norm.

It is essential also to effect a transition from group to individual choice. In the new economic, political, and cultural sphere the highest value is individual liberty,

individual choice. Kazakhstan has subscribed to international legal instruments giving individual freedom and choice priority not from tactical considerations. It is the ideological axiom of the modern world. The former system of group control has already been demolished. It is essential to create mechanisms of inner self-control, which will require a change in the entire system of education.

Finally, it is essential to determine the **institutions of realization of the new ideological platform**.

In speaking of the ideology that has departed our political arena we mean that its institutions and the immense machinery that worked on it have disappeared together with it also. Of course, there can be no question of its reconstitution inasmuch as we have proclaimed entirely different principles and approaches not only to the content but also the organization of ideological activity.

But, as in any democratic society, a system of the dissemination of modern knowledge, essential political and socioeconomic information, and the propaganda of moral values and behavioral standards in keeping with the transformations which are being effected must be created here. Professional machinery is undoubtedly required for this, and its functions consist also of helping people figure out the far from simple questions of our life and analyze social and political phenomena and economic and international problems.

The reform of society should necessarily be based on a broadly erudite stratum of propaganda workers and ideologists, primarily in the person of public servants. They should be active conduits of political and economic strategy and tactics to broad strata of the populace, particularly in the localities. Incompetent, conservative officials should be replaced by progressive specialists, people of the market generation, who know the fundamentals of political science, sociology, and psychology and who are convinced and energetic and capable of in-depth generalizations and independent evaluations.

The educational system, science, culture, artistic organizations, and the mass media should participate in molding the political culture of society and in realizing humanitarian ideas contributing to its progressive development.

The platform of ideological consolidation requires all-around discussion. The shaping of a new world outlook of Kazakhstani society is only at the initial stage. But we must be able to discern the actual outlines of our future concerns. Future generations will be able to look even further.

We are not today building an epoch-making ideological structure. But it is important to understand that the transitional period is not a period of stagnation, it has its own logic of development, its own long-range goals, its own ideological substantiation. It is today that the foundations of the civilized development of the country, of the society toward which we have begun to move, are being laid. We need to cast off the shackles of the former

thinking and the fear of the unknown. We need to understand that we are treading, generally, the paths trodden by world civilization. But our salient feature and difficulty is that no one before us has accomplished a transition to the market simultaneously with the building of statehood and the democratization of society.

Kazakhstan has opted conclusively for the path of progress. We can negotiate it only by having adopted as allies efficiency and purposiveness and by having mobilized the enormous material and moral potential.

#### **Cotton Industry Sees Difficulties Ahead Without Government Support**

944K0499A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 29 Oct 93 p 2

[Article by Fedor Grigoryev, economist, and Lyubov Dobrota, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent: "An Investor Gathers Momentum"]

[Text] The Kazzagotkhlopkoprom Production Association has earned a reputation as an active investor in South Kazakhstan Oblast. Its capital, invested in several joint ventures with Western companies, is helping "develop the economy from within" and meet the demands of the consumer market.

South Kazakhstan, the most northerly cotton-growing area in the CIS, produces high-quality raw material for the textile industry. Several mills in France have been using our cotton fiber for quite some time now. The fact that excellent cotton quality has been achieved is not attributable to the farmers, but rather to procurement specialists. They help select the best plant types and decide on the optimum planting schedule. Another weighty argument has also been added since the arrival of the market economy: the dollar.

Prior to 1988, each year South Kazakhstan Oblast, like all parts of the Central Asian republics, would receive an "order" from Moscow, telling it where to ship its cotton, and how much to send. Accounts were paid in rubles at stable low prices. Later permission was granted to sell an insignificant amount of cotton on the world market for dollars. However, the return was small.

Incidentally, even today, when the export quota for the "distant abroad" totals 25,500 tonnes, or one-third of all cotton procured, net revenues in dollars and marks is extremely small. Customs duties and all sorts of other fees consume more than one-half of hard currency receipts, with only 40 percent going to the association and cotton farms.

There is only one other legal way to make ends meet: barter. But in contrast to some other enterprises that have also obtained the right to engage in foreign economic operations, Kazzagotkhlopkoprom has not gotten into buying pantyhose or automobile cassette players. It uses its hard currency to buy whole factories at once.

When the official opening of a joint venture with the South Korean Telbone Company to manufacture VCR-TV combinations was held in Shymkent a month ago, many of those attending were surprised to learn during the presentation that cotton growers were among the founders. Improvements have been made in the design of the NAM system. The new Ordabasa videocassette system is markedly technically superior to its predecessor.

The cotton company was the first in the CIS to assemble Rank-Xerox copying equipment, selling more than 1,000 fax machines at comparatively low prices in every oblast in the republic. The Farat Joint Venture provides servicing and repairs for them.

The next stage in cooperation was the establishment of a joint venture with the English to manufacture cotton wool. The raw materials for this facility, located in Turkestan, will be noils—a waste product of cotton processing. The construction is being closely watched by Uzbekistan, which at this time has no facilities for the manufacture of absorbent sterile cotton.

The first unit of the plant should begin operations in December. Negotiations are under way regarding the purchase of equipment for a second unit which will manufacture various cosmetic and medical items. In this way the joint venture will have a guaranteed profit both in rubles and in hard currency. Kazzagotkhlopkoprom will also get a share of the dividends, and that means it will be able to finance the construction of a copying equipment plant, a cotton spinning mill and other facilities that the oblast and the republic badly need.

The South Kazakhstan association currently has companies from eight developed countries around the world as its partners. Its specialists find equipment that other enterprises in the region need on the world market at low prices.

The production association would seem to be in a very secure position. But in these unpredictable times no one can guarantee prosperity. The association and its customers were hit hard by the introduction of a 30-percent duty on cotton exports to countries in the "near abroad." The government has promised to repeal this duty for enterprises in those republics which are parties to inter-governmental agreements, but that has not happened yet.

Much time and effort must be expended on filing raw cotton procurement prices with the republic's State Committee on Prices. Do they not realize that it is simply not to the association's advantage to artificially deflate or inflate prices? The former would drive a wedge between suppliers and the association, and the latter would weaken the cotton's competitive position.

One constant headache for the association's management is connected with directed state loans for raw cotton procurement. The new year's cotton harvest has

begun, but the R64.5 billion [rubles] required to purchase it are not in the Agro-Industrial Bank yet. There is no money for fuel or spare parts for cotton harvesting combines, nor any money to pay off last year's debts to farms. The CIS's epidemic of defaulted payments for products has not spared cotton growers either. Payments from customers are not being received on time, and so it was not possible to pay off last year's debts on schedule. The capital promised to extend the term of the loan until 1 October, but did not keep its promise—money was needed immediately for the grain harvest. Yet under contracts concluded with the farms any default on payments to them will result in substantial fines.

The solution, according to Sh. Usmanov, general director of Kazzagotkhlomprom Production Association, is to issue stock in the association as soon as possible and establish a commercial bank. The farmers and their authorized representative—the production association—are fully mature enough for greater independence. Even now, foreseeing delays in funding from the budget, they have reached agreement with the Tel-bone Company regarding favorable hard currency lending during the harvest period. Yet this will only cover less than one-third of their financial needs. So at this point there is still no way to get by without state support.

### **Kazakhs Eye Persian Gulf as Entrance to World Markets**

944K0499B Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 3

[Article by T. Kostina, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent: "Access to the Persian Gulf Will Give Kazakhstan a Way To Reach the World Market"]

[Text] The Iranian Embassy in Almaty held a press conference on the eve of a visit by Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani to the Republic of Kazakhstan. Iran's ambassador told journalists about his view of the role of the press as a means of rapprochement and mutual understanding, saying its functions are "to reflect reality as it is, on the basis of truth." Complaining that previous reports about Iran very often have not corresponded to reality, the ambassador gave the media representatives a brief history of his country and a report on the state of its economy. Devoting particular attention to oil as an export item, Rasul Eslami denied the claim that all profits from oil exports are being used to purchase weapons. He also analyzed and criticized the former Iranian regime and discussed the Iran-Iraq war and the state's path of development since the Islamic revolution. As for Iran's policy in regard to Kazakhstan and the other former Soviet republics, he said that that policy is to help those states along the path of independent development.

The visit to Kazakhstan by Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani (who during his 10-day trip will also visit Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan)

is a reciprocal visit after last year's trip to Iran by President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The delegation includes minister of foreign affairs Ali Akbar Velayati, minister of economics and finance Morteza Mohammad-khan, minister of roads and transport Akbar Tor-kan, and other ministers. Iran's delegation of representatives will include approximately 100 individuals, among them public officials, members of the government, bankers, industrialists and businessmen. Mr. Rafsanjani will be accompanied on the trip by his wife and daughter (incidentally, Miss Rafsanjani is chairman of the Iranian Women's Association).

During the visit there are plans for visits to Almaty and Karaganda, as well as discussion and signing of a number of documents in the areas of economics, politics, cultural cooperation and education. In the opinion of Rasul Eslami all this will serve to reinforce and expand the agreements reached during Nursultan Nazarbayev's trip to Iran. No specific economic cooperation projects were mentioned. However, the ambassador did invite everyone to a special exhibit by the Islamic Republic of Iran that is currently in Almaty and which should provide a complete picture of the capabilities of Iran's heavy and light industry and of 80 different companies.

The ambassador promised to open Iran's borders to Kazakhstan's products so they can reach the world market. The same will be true of oil and gas when they reach the Persian Gulf.

In short, the ambassador is convinced that by reaching the Persian Gulf Kazakhstan will be able to gain access to the world market. An enticing prospect. As is the two sides' stake in it.

### **Psychological Acceptance of Privatization Difficult**

944K0499C Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 29 Oct 93 p 2

[Article by Sergey Nesterenko, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent: "In People's Minds Privatization Is Not the Same Thing It Is on Paper"]

[Text] Oh, if it were only that simple: just say the word and—presto!—restructuring! Doing things one way today and another way tomorrow, and all with equal ease. No, things do not work that way. And somewhere in my subconscious mind I knew in advance the kind of answer I would get to the question about changes in the economics of sovkhozes and kolkhozes since privatization that I posed to the Akmolinsk Oblast Agricultural Administration.

"You ask what has changed?" said V. K. Ilyushchenko, head of the oblast agricultural administration's Economics and Planning Department, a slight trace of irony in his voice. "Actually nothing, or at least not so far. There are many reasons for that. Of course, on the one hand only a short time has passed since the beginning of privatization; a majority of farms came under new types of ownership at the end of last year. But that is probably



not the most important factor at all, but rather the fact that becoming an owner on paper is one thing, and actually becoming one, having the sense of being an owner, is something else altogether. It is the latter that we still lack. So trends in the development of privatized and non-privatized farms by and large do not differ at all."

Owner... That sounds good, but... What point is there in being an owner without freedom and independence, freedom to produce, freedom to set prices, freedom to sell one's produce, and independence from the dictates of bureaucrats? Our prices are still set by the state, and the state continues to issue state procurement quotas to farms for three years. Nor does our private owner have the right in most cases to sell what he produces without instructions from higher up.

Judging by what Vladimir Kuzmich said, the idea of privatization meets with various kinds of reception from the oblast's agricultural enterprises. Relatively large and smoothly functioning farms have generally greeted the idea of ownership with enthusiasm, while it proved necessary to force most unprofitable farms in the direction of happiness, in compliance with the president's edict. Later, when amendments were made to the edict, privatization proceeded at a more restrained pace. And still no one knows when 123 out of 152 farms in the oblast will decide whether to become property owners or not. Rural residents are not prepared to make that decision, because for many people privatization is *terra incognita*. "The state just wants to divide us." "Why privatize, when everything is fine the way it is?" "Who needs dividends, which we don't know when we'll ever see—wages are more dependable!" These are some of the opinions heard from members of labor collectives whenever the topic of conversation turns to changes in the form of ownership. And there has been so much trouble stemming from incompetence even after privatization: it seems that just as soon as the final documents are filed with the state property committee someone is already wanting to split off, someone else is being thrown out, and claims are being filed against someone else—just look at the kind of owners we have become! Naturally this approach to understanding a sense of ownership troubles the staff of the oblast agricultural administration, just as they are troubled by the possible view that will be taken of certain types of agricultural production by the future owners.

"Naturally any farmer is interested only in growing crops that yield a profit," muses V. K. Ilyashchenko. "But what about livestock farming, which is currently unprofitable? It is not likely that all property owners will behave in a civic-minded way, and some might, chasing after profits, stop raising livestock altogether, and then we might find ourselves with no meat."

The state should start deciding now what it should do in this situation: either order farmers to keep on raising livestock (but then what kind of sense of ownership could they have?), or provide meat producers with very large subsidies. Incidentally, those who think that only

the socialist world has subsidized farmers are wrong. Even such major industrial powers as the United States and Canada provide very substantial support to their farmers.

All right then, we should help those who operate at a loss through no fault of their own and no matter what they do, but what about owners who simply do not want to work the way they should? During a recent visit to the virgin lands President Nazarbayev stated quite firmly that there should be no unprofitable farms in our state, and that they should be completely dissolved and sold on the auction block to thrifter farms or to industrial enterprises.

The oblast agricultural administration supports this idea, but at this point does not really have a clear perception of how the process would actually work.

"Well, people are going to say 'we have already had something like that'—for example, we did dissolve one unprofitable farm. It was combined with another farm, a larger one. As a result the first farm's operations did not improve, and a once-strong farm got weaker. As for the sale of unprofitable farms to enterprises, we do not know whether there will be many industrialists interested in acquiring a burden like that: the capital investment required is huge, and no one knows when the profits will come, or whether they will come at all."

Many property owners presently bear a grudge against the state, and their reasoning goes somewhat like this: When tenant farms were established, they got all kinds of breaks, like lending on favorable terms, and funding. But we run into obstacles everywhere we go, and we cannot even get loans very easily—we have to put up collateral that is worth some dollars!

Incidentally, not everything about privatization is bad, nor is it bad everywhere. Recently the oblast has seen the process of stock issuance by producers with processing enterprises occurring at quite a rapid rate. On many privatized farms people have realized that now they really must tighten their belts for a time and put their profits back into production. Various processing facilities and enterprises for the manufacture of consumer goods have sprung up on farms like mushrooms after a rain.

Generally speaking, the market economy is beginning to come into its own in rural areas as well. But when will it finally take off? The answer to that question depends on many factors. Perhaps the most important of these is that when we accept privatization in our heads and not just on paper, then we can hope for success.

**Kazakh Industries Try To Find Right Markets**

944K0499D Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 22 Oct 93 p 1

[Article by Vladislav Nikolayev, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent: "We Are Manufacturing New Products... but Can We Sell Them?: The Only Way We Will Be Able To Is by Thinking About Markets Now"]

[Text] In the past this was never an issue—there was a shortage of everything. Agents from Russia sat in the Balkhash Non-Ferrous Metals Refinery director's waiting room from morning until night. Balkhash brass was delivered by plane so that defense plants would not shut down. Now the warehouse is full of brass and bronze rolled stock, and no one wants it. It is no longer being sent to Mongolia, Vietnam and Cuba as a form of "fraternal assistance." No customers have come forward in Kazakhstan. Yet Balkhash is currently completing construction of a new rolling-mill department... Where will its products go?

The Zhezkazgantsvetmet [Zhezkazgan Non-Ferrous Metals Refinery] and Balkhashmed [Balkhash Copper Refinery] associations have long been wondering what they are going to do with their sulfuric acid. During the first half of the year Kazakhstani customers purchased only 52,000 tonnes of acid, and Russian customers bought a little more, yet out of environmental considerations alone the two associations should be producing half a million tonnes. They have the capacity to do that, but right now that equipment is idle.

In Zhayrem they have mined mountains of barite, but no one needs it, either. There has been a sharp drop in demand for lead and zinc ore. During a visit to Zhezkazgan Prime Minister S. Tereshchenko said: "We need to become a part of the world market, but no one there is waiting on us and our products." It turns out that the world market is saturated with lead, zinc, copper and cable, yet Zhezkazgan Oblast is rapidly creating new capacity for the manufacture of copper wire rod, enameled wire and cable, and is developing a new tungsten deposit. Where will all this be sold, and to whom? The Kumolinskiy Mining and Concentration Combine has been under construction for a long time and will manufacture rhodusite, but now it turns out that no one needs that product, because defense expenditures are decreasing.

In view of our tremendous natural resources many people think it should be easy to attract foreign capital to develop them. But in reality that is not happening. When they arrive in Zhezkazgan Oblast, foreign specialists immediately start asking the kind of questions to which we do not have any clear-cut answers. These include the details about surveys of mineral deposits, the extent to which all useful components are being recovered, the availability of advanced technologies and infrastructure and—one of the most important questions—availability of transportation to market. Yet on our side all these things are often based on emotion.

Someone once said that barite was in demand and began to mine it, but it turned out that what was in demand was not barite, but rather manganese, which had been ignored. At the end of this year Zhezkazgan will begin manufacturing copper wire rod, but its price on the world market is only 50 percent higher than the price of copper, and demand is much lower. When the wire rod starts going into cable manufacture, Kazakhstan will be fully supplied with cable. Will we be able to sell the surplus? How much will Kazakhstan need of various metals and items manufactured from them? No one can answer those questions. Our enterprises do not know market conditions either on the world market or in the CIS.

The oblast's economy is very inert and materials-intensive, and it is difficult and sometimes impossible to reorient it toward new types of manufacture. Currently efforts are being made in Sayak, Zhayrem and Karazhal to manufacture marble plates and jewelry, but there are plenty of these products on the world market already. With new products it will take time for the market to recognize and value them. The only thing that is well known is Zhezkazgan copper, so that is what people will buy. Will our cable be in demand immediately? We have only one hope: to sell it at a lower price. But in that case we run the risk of anti-dumping sanctions by international organizations.

Recently the Zhezkazgantsvetmet Association calculated its expenses for the coming year and its potential losses, and they totalled R25 billion [rubles]. Even at current prices electric power will cost R75 billion. And that is the most profitable enterprise in the oblast. At the Balkhashmed Association losses are projected to begin this year.

Nor are we seeing the emergence of a "natural economy," since up to 90 percent of the materials and equipment required must be imported from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Yet Kazakhstan's president has decreed that we can only purchase an amount equal to the money we have earned from shipments of our own products and equal to the amount of funds in correspondent accounts at banks outside the republic.

No matter how you look at it, in a market economy sales markets are of prime significance. The lack of attention to this issue is the weak link in reform.

**South Korean Experts Evaluate Kazakh Economy**

944K0490A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 30 Oct 93 p 1

[Article by Nikolay Zhorov: "Big Changes Anticipated in the Republic's Financial and Banking Systems and Privatization Policy"]

[Text] Yesterday Kazakhstan President N. Nazarbayev received a group of economic consultants from South Korea. The group consisted of leading economic scientists from the Korean government's economic planning office, the government's institute for development, and the institute for economic research.

The activities of the group were led by Korea's former deputy prime minister, Dr Kim Mahn Je.

Agreement on the group's work in our republic was reached during a meeting on 13 May of this year between N. Nazarbayev and Kim Shin Yong, chairman of the South Korean group of the Khankhva [transliteration] company.

In the course of two months the experts from Korea worked in Almaty, where they studied the details of the financial and banking systems, foreign exchange relations and privatization policy.

A report was written on the basis of the collected and generalized data characterizing the current situation. In this case the South Korean experts made specific proposals regarding the matters they studied.

The report was presented together with the proposals to N. Nazarbayev at a meeting attended by Prime Minister S. Tereshchenko and other leaders of interested departments.

Kim Mahn Je briefly described the project offered for study, which consists of four parts, and suggested that Kazakhstan take South Korea's road to establishing market relations. The third and fourth parts of the project presented in the report pertain to analysis of the problems of privatizing and reorganizing the banking system.

In the opinion of the leader of the group of experts, privatization is being held back in Kazakhstan because little capital has yet been accumulated in private hands.

A proposal was made to create 20 holding companies that could help more than 200 large enterprises to travel the road linking denationalization to full market relations. Rather than the planned 3-year period of mass privatization, the Koreans propose a more gradual road over a period of 5 years in order to avoid major upheavals. They advise beginning mass privatization with competitive, strong enterprises.

The experts believe that the existing banking system is the largest problem on the road to reform. Presence of a large number of small banks is an obstacle to a clear financial policy.

In the opinion of Kim Mahn Je capital needs to be concentrated in Kazakhstan in one or two large banks. For example a large bank for Kazakhstan's reconstruction and development possessing authority abroad could be established by merging the capital of the Turanbank and Kredsotsbank [transliterations] with the National Bank. The capital of the Alembank and Kazsberbank [transliterations] could be merged into a second bank.

A proposal was also made for reorganizing small banks and establishing a minimum amount of authorized capital. It was revealed in the course of discussion that many of the proposals enjoy support among members of the Kazakhstan government.

Besides this, N. Nazarbayev said that the republic will have to abandon subsidies to unprofitable enterprises. But this should not proceed as it did in Russia, the president stressed. There, around 10,000 enterprises may go bankrupt in the course of such an approach, which is 30 percent of their number. Russia is huge, and it can endure, but Kazakhstan couldn't. Some enterprises, in the president's words, will receive support from the state. Included among them are the giants of metallurgy—Karmetkombinat, Balkhashmed, and chromium producers.

N. Nazarbayev thanked the group of Korean scientists for the work they did, and recommended inviting them to act as experts and specialists in banking affairs. They are to provide assistance in drafting documents on reforming the banking system.

Following the meeting with the South Korean group N. Nazarbayev met with 30 directors of the largest enterprises of the former defense complex. The hope is that they will lead the Kazakh economy out of its stagnation. A huge engineering and technical potential capable of solving the most serious problems is concentrated at these enterprises. A specific task was posed to each director.

#### **Regional State Enterprises Take First Steps Toward Privatization**

944K0490B Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 15 Oct 93 p 2

[Article by Sergey Gorbunov: "Not Yet the Masters, but Working Toward It: The First Steps of Regional Holding Companies"]

[Text] The rate of privatization in the republic and the forms and methods of denationalization will continue to be a topic of dispute among legislators, producers and citizens for a long time to come. Because despite the seeming simplicity of the matter, it is not all that simple to divide up state property without infringing upon the interests of both the individual and the state as a whole, and without undermining the economic foundations of the society in the effort. There can be no debate that mistakes and a struggle between departmental, local and group interests are not excluded on this road. All of these "collisions" may be discerned at the Pavlodar Irtysh Joint-Stock Company (formerly a meat-packing plant) and the Pavlodarmoloko State Joint-Stock Holding Company (formerly an oblast dairy industry association).

They became the first-born of denationalization in Kazakhstan. Their experience was generalized at a republic seminar. In what way is it valuable? First of all in that an attempt was undertaken to combine the interests of meat and milk producers with those of the processors of these products—the meat-packing plants and dairies.

"In our joint-stock company," said Zaure Nurmukhanova, the director of the Irtysh Joint-Stock Company,



"there are presently 105 sovkhoses and kolkhozes. And each month another 5-6 farms submit applications for membership."

**Zaure Malgazhdarova, might they be doing this out of desperation? Who are they going to give their livestock to, and where are they going to process the meat, if your enterprise holds a monopoly?**

"That's not at all the way it is. There's also the Ekibastuz Meat-Packing Plant in the oblast, after all, and we don't believe that we would have any serious competition if meat packing plants and sausage-making shops were to be established in the rayons. The simple fact is that our production is well-tuned, the procedures are fully developed, and we make maximum use of raw materials and by-products of slaughtering the animals (horns, hooves, hides, internal organs, blood etc.). Naturally the profit is larger as well. The stockholders themselves control the schedule of animal deliveries and meat prices, and determine the need for production renovation. With Almaty's help we have begun construction of a new meat-packing plant, and we are currently reorganizing the presently operating one for the production of sausages and smoked meats. Together with the oblast's banks we have established a joint-stock company for the production of lidaz and other medical preparations. We have already erected the building frame, and the heat will be turned on in the winter. Or here's another example showing that we are taking over as the masters. As you know, the price of water has gone up, which has reflected upon product cost. So we drilled a well on the territory of the packing plant. It seems like a little thing, but last year this gave us a savings of 30 million rubles, while this year it will be somewhere around 200 million. Let me say one more thing. In the beginning some of the stockholders mistrusted us, and they sent over their own observers to see if we butcher the carcasses properly and if we are not hiding any of the meat products and profit. Today there are no misunderstandings, and our partners have persuaded themselves that we are working 'for the same pocket'."

**But isn't there a merger of interests here between the producers and processors at the expense of the customers?**

"Are you referring to 'jacking up' the prices? This also is disadvantageous. First of all, given today's wages and the large number of poor, the demand for meat products has fallen as it is. Second, the oblast agricultural committee has worked out an average purchase price for meat. The farms at which livestock breeding is not very profitable need to think about how to surpass this price. To be honest, though, disputes often arise at meetings of the board of stockholders. Citing the high cost of fuel, equipment and electric power, farmers demand a higher price for the meat they deliver. And so I have to persuade them, and at times prove by calculation, the such demands are unfair. As an economist, I know that this approach is far afield of market methodology, but the people couldn't withstand 'shock therapy'."

The Pavlodarmoloko State Joint-Stock Holding Company was born out of a conflict between two variants. The former oblast dairy association was constituted of independent rayon and city dairies, but they were bound together by shared economic stimulation funds and capital investments.

"This," said Vladimir Samsonov, director of the Pavlodarmoloko holding company, "allowed us to build a big plant and a whole milk substitute shop in Pavlodar, a city dairy in Ekibastuz and an ice cream shop in Aksu, and to renovate several rural enterprises. According to the first variant our structure should have remained as before, with the one difference that the milk producers were to be included as stockholders. In the second the rayon and city dairies would have separated from us completely, and then joined the holding company on a voluntary basis. I am not opposed to such independence in principle, but many of them do not have the resources even to make the priority payments, and they are putting no thought into renovation and new procedures."

**"Vladimir Yemelyanovich, isn't there a longing here for the old methods of leadership?"**

"That's got nothing to do with it! I've been working in the sector for more than a decade, and no matter what we are called, no matter what structural changes we make, our task is to process milk and get it to the customer. But now we've gotten to the point where last year we had to import ice cream into the oblast all the way from Rostov! Once I said to a certain dairy director: 'Can't you set up ice cream production at your dairy, you do have vacant production space after all, don't you?' To which he replied, 'Excuse me, but I'm independent and I decide for myself what I'm going to do.' All right, so let there be 'minor principalities,' but then let them also maintain their businesses at the proper level, and not come to me with their hands outstretched, asking me to pay their debts. Because the only thing that they are really concerned about is increasing their own wages."

Vladimir Samsonov also has his own opinion about mutual relations with milk producers. Before, in the words of the holding company's director, besides the basic taxes the oblast associations commonly transferred a certain percentage of their earnings to the producers. Now as much as 51 percent of the profit goes to the farmers. And in order to increase their total deductions, they inflate the prices of the milk they deliver. As in the Irtysh Joint-Stock Company, disputes and mutual reproaches are inevitable. Samsonov is making every effort to hold back this price race, so as not to be left with unsold goods.

It should not be thought in this case that Samsonov is a conservative, or that he opposes a market economy. "I'm for it," he said at the beginning of our interview, "but on a civilized basis, and in honest partnership." He and his colleagues are seeking markets and the ways of making products cheaper and of developing new procedures. Quite simply, he is deeply troubled when he sees the

tested system falling into ruin with the years, and the processing sector failing to receive adequate attention and priority consideration from either legislators or the government, and how the race for independence is damaging the overall effort. But Samsonov does have his opponents as well, who are also certain that it is time to abandon gigantomania, and to follow the example of developed countries by processing milk and other products deep in the countryside, at miniplants, thus reducing high transportation costs and product losses during shipping and transloading.

Such is the content of the first experience of two Pavlodar joint-stock companies. They are essentially in the first stage of privatization, in which the state is providing support to them: by owning the controlling block of stocks, by setting prices, and by adopting particular decisions. But the stockholders are displaying increasingly greater independence and initiative. A contract system and testing of engineers and technicians with the purpose of preparing a reserve of middle-level executives were introduced at that same Irtysh company at Nur-mukhanova's suggestion, and a system of stimulating the workers under which the theft of meat, which was a phenomenon of epidemic proportions in former years, would decline is operating. And as Zaure Malgazhdarova said, the workers themselves come to her and suggest particular innovations and ideas helping to increase profit. And little by little Samsonov is breaking down the psychology of rising prices, persuading people that income could also be increased by selling relatively inexpensive products—that is, by hastening money turnover. The advantages of joint-stock ownership are already making themselves evident here. But there are many questions as well. No matter how you look at it, joint-stock companies—both producers and processors—are still monopolies. They dictate prices to the purchasers of their products. And the latter are forced to take them, because there are no serious alternatives in the oblast to the joint-stock companies. On the other hand, were we to do away with them all at once, we could be left with an unworkable situation in which small producers are unable not only to fight for a place in the market but even to maintain themselves. But that is how things will turn out if the state fails to adopt a multiprofile program for the development of processing industry, and if it does not accept the responsibility of supporting small processing enterprises for some period of time. After all, given the 10 percent profitability established for processors, they will not survive in the face of the current price gap between industrial and agricultural products. Moreover a large part of the expenses of the farmers has been transferred to the republic's citizens in the form of legalized deductions from the profits of holding companies, because in purchasing the milk and meat, the citizens are the ones who create this profit. This is perhaps an item of interest for the Antimonopoly Committee.

In short, things are not all that simple. Nonetheless, privatization has begun in the processing sector, and it

must be brought to its logical conclusion, as was done in economically developed countries. Producers and processors have not yet become the full masters of their production operations, but they are striving for this.

**Kazakh Interests in Relations With China Evaluated**  
*944K0391A Almaty AZIYA in Kazakh No 44 Oct 93 pp 1,3*

[Article by Yelbay Saghyr: "Relations With China."]

[Text] Only one idea is now in the mind of Kazakhstan, which has achieved its independence and has quickly entered into relations with the countries of the world: "we must still become known to foreign countries." However, the question: "which kind of countries should we choose," has still not been taken up so far. Leaving aside the question of a country or a people, is not each person a world unto himself? From that point of view, just as the establishment of relations with each person is in terms of the scope of knowledge, humanity, moral qualities, and nationality, similarly we establish relations with separate families composed of individuals and even with a nation. For that reason the question of the degree of relations with a given country, the need to become known to that country and in what way are leading questions of diplomacy. To answer these questions we must, first of all, before we become known to a country, strive to know that country as much as possible. This is because becoming known, in other words, means "disclosing one's secrets." When secrets have been disclosed, just like the proverb: "the Wolf keeps secret his leanness; do not expose a dog's fur to the dog," one's leanness cannot but be exposed to the light of the day, along with twisted things from a thousand places. But if secrets are not disclosed, we say "stay off a horse which you do not know about [know the secrets of]" and go over to polite [but distant] relations.

What a country will do after it has obtained one's secrets, or even a country which has not obtained one's secrets, depends upon the aims and culture of the country in question. In particular, more than distant countries, it is necessary to have a deep understanding of neighboring countries which "come to your village and help you herd your sheep," share your breath, and watch how you lay your pipes.

We Kazakhs, who have passed the time taking the view: "a neighbor's pay, the pay of Heaven," with regard to individual families and neighboring ауыл, would seem to think of other nations in the same terms. The complicated history of our people over many centuries are clear proof of our words. Nothing more need be said. Has the lack of concern of we Kazakhs during our first relations with the Zhongghar [Dzungar] Khanate not left behind any regrets!? Moreover, you might ask how the Zhongghar Khanate in the east, so many times smaller than the Kazakh Khanate, was able to inflict upon the Kazakh people the disaster of "vagrancy with white heals [in the snow], the deviation [from the trek] out of great suffering." The Zhongghars, through frequent contacts, caught

sight of the wide and beautiful Kazakh steppe and laid their plans. In such a time of struggle, the Kazakhs, with their internal "hostility," being separated into hordes and into clans, found out how to carefully exploit their "merits" by becoming 40 knives. Later the Russian colonialists were able to seize the entire Kazakh steppe. They even took special advantage of the Kazakhs' lack of connections with one another, our carefreeness. Thus, as a result of our honored properties, we could not get free of Russia for three hundred years...

Leaving other things aside, forgetting that a nation is an independent state, we [should] investigate the peoples and regions within that country. After we have carried on our research, we form many special organizations of various kinds and go on researching, wasting a lot of money. For example, there appear to be tens of organizations in the Chinese People's Republic researching Central Asia (Kazakhstan in particular, as its foundation). Kazakhstan has not formed such organization since its independence. On the other hand, they were formed during the time that the USSR was strong and in its prime. Not long after the Republic of Kazakhstan declared its independence, a book entitled "General Condition of the Republic of Kazakhstan" suddenly appeared in China. When the book was published, it represented, to be sure, no general effort. The Central Asia Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region wrote and published the book. At present, young students who go to study at institutions of higher education must take examinations based upon that book. You can understand if intelligent people do not say what is really behind the "good will..." It is enough to remember only the need to take examinations based upon the book in China.

As for Kazakhstan, whether it is research institutions, or educational institutions, we are only concerned about ourselves. At the most, we learn or research foreign languages. But there is no a single organization carrying out special research about our near neighbors, or about other countries in the world connected with us. On the contrary, there are some unneeded organizations now functioning, for example, the Uighur Research Institute under the National Academy of sciences. This organization is now superfluous. In our view, this institute should be reorganized as a Turkology institute. This is because it is hard to understand what possible need Kazakhstan should have for making special efforts to research our Uighur kinsmen among the Turkic peoples. In fact, if state finances improve, it would be all the more wonderful if we should create research institutes for every one of our Turkic-speaking kinsmen. However, everyone understands that just now our young republic is utterly without resources. For that reason, if there is not an Uighur Research Institute but a Turkology Institute under the Republic of Kazakhstan National Academy of Sciences, this would make it convenient for us to study the languages, history, cultures, literatures, art, national

political economies, and education of Turkey, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Karakalpakstan, the Uighurs, Bashqurt, Tartars, and the Turkic-speaking countries and fraternal peoples. One thing which we cannot forget to mention in this context is one "quality" remaining in Kazakhstan, especially among the Kazakh people, from our former irresolution and obsequiousness. And what is this: "unreasonable trustfulness." For example, when the Uighur Research Institute was formed, Uighurs were hired there as a matter of course. If a Korean or German research division was established, it was filled up with Koreans and Germans gathered from here or there. Does not the question arise of exactly whom one wants to study when one establishes Uighur research and nationality research departments? One should not say, when establishing an institute or opening a division, "know yourself;" the Uighur people knows itself very well and likewise the Korean and the German people. In this connection we must know a people, that is, the Uighurs, the Koreans, the Germans, or the Kazakh people. For that purpose the research workers of that institute must be Kazakhs. Only then will they view the people, who are their subjects, from a Kazakh point of view and be able to solve urgent questions in the interests of Kazakhs. What this means is research in ideological areas serving Kazakhstan.

However, it is altogether unfortunate that there is no research organization specially intended to study our great neighbor to the East, the Chinese People's Republic. The establishment as soon as possible of a Chinese research division, if need be within the Oriental Research Institute of the Republic of Kazakhstan National Academy of Sciences, is urgently needed for our young republic. This is because China is a country with an age-old culture. Today it has many people and a great history. It is a powerful country. Study of its history, and knowing the composition of its peoples, understanding the secret of the quick prosperity of what was only recently a poor country, would doubtless teach Kazakhstan many lessons. For our republic to have China as a neighbor is certainly no easy thing. This widely known nation caresses the feet of Singapore. This unsparing country wears the shroud of Vietnam. For that reason, it is proper to follow the path of Japan, Korea, and India in maintaining neighborly relations with China. These countries are like the greatest friends of China, but do not allow a single Chinese to live on their soil. As for us? China, which is covered by a billion and a half people without discord, is a master of rich economic experience. The whole world market is heating up, and, today, when the market simply consumes any disorganized nation, we see ourselves quietly passing the time as a nation combining few people, a lot of land, and such riches. But we have no reason to be complacent. Under such circumstances, there is not a little we can learn from China where the peoples economy is developing rapidly year by year in addition to guaranteeing a billion and a half people work and food. Is the Chinese People's Republic at present saying that "there are no



disputes over land with Kazakhstan, no border questions?" No it is not. The idea is that the Zhetisu [Semirychye] and Balqash regions of today's Kazakhstan is our land. It was stolen from our country at one time by an unequal czarist Russian treaty, which is described in school and higher education textbooks, and which continues to be instilled into the minds of the younger generation. God only knows what cunning things the present younger generation, who have been tempered with the understanding that "failing to speak of evil is not good thing," and who will inherit the nation in the future, will do. For that reason, if our leaders do not deal with these kinds of gnawing questions now, it is difficult to say that Kazakhstan's future will be quiet. Thus we must carry on a thorough research about Chinese history, China's historical territories, and the historical circumstances whereby the Kazakh steppe was divided up by the bayonet. There are in the Chinese People's Republic also, in addition to close Kazakh, Uighyr, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tatar relatives, our [other] Turkic-speaking kinsmen. To advance a more or less open view about the fate of Turkistan, where these peoples live, or to take any sudden action, could have a negative influence upon the friendship of the two countries. From this point of view, it is proper that our Uighur kinsmen do nothing extremely disorganized and that the Kazakhs keep their mouths shut. This is because China is a "dragon" that one should not come in conflict with. For that reason, every citizen of Kazakhstan must offer carefully considered thought and views or, as it is written, "measure ten times, cut once." It is proper that government delegations, trade and cultural organizations, tourists, etc. from Kazakhstan be completely prudent and alert. We, Kazakhs, must absolutely not joke about this or be negligent, and must always be careful about what we say. This is because, as a "consequence" of many centuries of close interaction with Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and, in particular, as a result of 70 years of internationalism, we have come to completely understand these peoples. And, whatever the connection, the inhabitants of our republic know the characteristics, personalities, cultural, feelings, and other sides of these peoples like the five fingers on their hands. However, our ancestors (from Uisin to Abylaykhan) have had no contact with China. We have no experience with such relationships. That is to say, our relations with China are starting only now. For that reason we cannot enter into relations until we know completely the national character, qualities, and personal feelings of the Chinese people. Only when this is the case, can Kazakhstan and China live together as friendly neighbors in peace. However, if we do not understand, and if we do not do our research, if we close our eyes in Kazakh foolhardiness, if we say "it really does not matter," and sign any kind of agreement or decision, and are not careful, it will weigh heavy upon the fate of the people. This is the problem. Our contemporaries today, thinking about the future of the nation, loving their country, are saying and writing that "China is on the move." The concerned organizations must make a great effort to take preventive measures against this sort of thing. However,

there is no one concerned with the question "in what ways and how is China on the march?" Do we remember the friendship visit of Republic Premier S. Tereshchenko to the Chinese Peoples Republic during the early spring of 1992 and all the "hoopla?" During that trip Tereshchenko signed some 10 treaties. To be sure, such great comings and goings in the international arena by Kazakhstan, friendly relations with such major countries, are something to be proud of. However, it is a well-known fact that every other step of an inexperienced young country will not be an entirely lucky one. Leaving aside the others, we will discuss one of the 10 treaties. "Economic, trade, and cultural comings and goings between the Chinese People's Republic and Kazakhstan will not require visas. Visits by individuals for personal reasons will, as before, require visas." That is to say, Chinese "delegations" coming for trade, for kin, for an excursion, and for other reasons do not have to appear one by one before our chief ambassador in Beijing, Murat Aweyev. We were shocked to hear from one of our Chinese friends on "trade:" The Chinese People's Republic is going to send hundreds and thousands of delegations to Kazakhstan... Thus, if the Chinese are not on the march in Kazakhstan, who is? Why should the Chinese, who even without this are overflowing China's boundaries, not appear in multitudes taking advantage of favorable "decisions." Is it not a matter of "a stray arrow also hits some sad soul." On the other hand, our kinsmen in China never get to the Kazakhstan Embassy in Beijing. They have difficulty getting a visa to travel on personal business to Kazakhstan. One of our kinsmen from China said that, when village people come with bribes to go to Beijing, their wish is not granted. See how we have harmed our kinsmen through that "agreement" draw up to give unlimited rights to China! "If leather rains from the skies, the slave will still have no shoes," as the old saying goes. To make the matter short, Chinese are flooding into Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs cannot come. This is something we "did" to ourselves. Since the premier has gone and signed a treaty which "created no barriers to those coming for trade, tourism, or excursions," if we now say "get out!" to Chinese citizens coming on such "business," the Chinese government will come and say to us: "Oh Kazakhs, if you are going to be a country you have to keep your word. If you are not, be ready to fight." Who can blame them? This is because, as we have said above, a billion and a half people are pressed for space and having a difficult time. For that reason, the primary policy of that government carried out by Chinese citizens is: "inside China, or without, be it as it may, look out for yourself." For that reason, there seems to be no limitation placed on China's citizens wishing to go abroad. For China knows well that it cannot find, even if it looks everywhere in this world, a[nother] country like Kazakhstan which is very rich, which has abundant land, few people, and little understanding about itself, and which is furthermore a neighbor and a careless, trusting young nation. This is because several countries where the Chinese had the possibility of entry have had other thoughts after the "Singapore Tragedy." For example, Germany once and

for all halted the coming of Chinese three years ago. Leaving aside other things, the nationality of Taiwan and Hong Kong is Chinese, but these countries have begun to set limits on those coming from the Chinese People's Republic. It has been two or three years since America itself, the great country on the other side of the world, enacted a resolution preventing Chinese from coming. Judging from this, only Kazakhstan opens its arms widely to Chinese and creates special opportunities for them. If something is not done about our China policy, there is no use saying: "we will clean up the Chinese problem." The reason is that if one throws out a thousand Chinese for a couple of months, a few thousand more arrive in a few weeks. Some thoughtful people are grumbling at home, but, as long as the "Beijing Treaty" signed by Li Tan and Tereshchenko stands, it will simply not be possible to do anything about the Chinese stream flooding in. This is the result of the treaty, along with the "love" inside Kazakhs for the Chinese. Thus, when the market has us by the throat, in a difficult time when the high cost of things tugs at our garments, can one take into careful consideration the Kazakh who bends down when he sees a dollar in the road. It is no secret that the Chinese, who are flooding into Kazakhstan as their future home, are buying interesting Kazakh things and Kazakh women. When you give your daughter in marriage, it is for love. That is what it is. This is because, if we are really Kazakhs, from where would we get the idea of "feasting sons-in-law who are not Muslims?" Now it is impossible to send back the Chinese...however one decides to do it. The only way is to review the treaty in question. When it has been reviewed, all comings and goings between Kazakhstan and China will be by visa. If the treaty in question is annulled, licenses will be sold to firms exporting to China and this will be made a source of income. Thereby the likes of Kazakhstan business people, affected by the entry of thousands of Chinese, will be able to get on their feet.

That is the sum total of it. We have said a great deal, and we have said very little. All of this springs from our not knowing the Chinese properly. This is because the Chinese are not the Russians you know, who say "than's brother" in their happiness at a five kopek profit. These are not our Uzbek elder brothers who set out with their right hands in the robes. They are also not our Kirghiz kinsmen who come wandering about and who come when we want them and return, saying "Oh Kazakhs, may it be so!" The Chinese are a people who do not let others know their secrets easily, who are particularly cunning, falsely polite, completely vindictive, sullen in character, and who are venturesome, carefully fulfilling plans set for the centuries. China is a great country to our east. It is not easy to be a true neighbor to China. To achieve that, first of all, we need to form a special China research institute and have it take part in official research in order to obtain correct knowledge and a clear view about China. Even if we call it a "China" research institute in the old way, we must make a special effort to prevent Chinese from filling up the ranks of that organization.

In conclusion, today everything is needed for an independent Kazakhstan. Among these things, we particularly need knowledge about other countries in the world. For this reason, it would be good to form organizations to research the countries very much connected with the interests and fate of Kazakhstan. If such research organizations prepared information and materials for the branches of the government, we would avoid the type of hastiness described above. For that reason, my brothers, we must love our hard-won independence with the sincere love of our hearts and learn how to defend it to the utmost of our abilities.

### **Iran's Role as Major Kazakh Business Partner Is Growing**

*944K0492A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Oct p 1*

[Article: "Iran Becoming One of Kazakhstan's Biggest Business Partners"]

[Text] President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, on an official visit to Kazakhstan, was given a send-off at the Almaty Airport in the morning of 26 October.

An honor guard was formed at the runway. The national anthems of Iran and Kazakhstan were played. Presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Nursultan Nazarbayev inspected the honor guard. The VIP said his farewells to officials seeing him off.

After the honor guard passed in review Nursultan Nazarbayev bade a warm and heartfelt farewell to the Iranian leader at the airplane ladder, and wished him a safe journey.

The head of Kazakhstan said at a subsequent press conference improvised then and there that he was fully satisfied with the results of talks with the Iranian president, and with the agreements they reached, primarily in the economic sphere. There is good potential for increasing diverse business ties between the two countries, which can now be utilized highly productively owing to the extensive transportation system currently being established, including rail, motor, air and sea lines of communication. In the future, Nursultan Nazarbayev emphasized, Iran may become one of the biggest importers of Kazakhstan's agricultural products; the exchange of goods is growing in many other directions as well.

Because of bad weather in Karaganda Oblast, which the Iranian president had intended to visit, his itinerary was revised. Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani stopped in Aktau, where he inspected the seaport and acquainted himself with the possibilities of its expansion and reconstruction through the efforts of the two countries. An infrastructure that will make possible the shipment of a large quantity of oil, grain, livestock products, industrial goods and equipment by sea across the Caspian between

Kazakhstan and Iran is to be created here. The guest also visited other facilities of the oblast center.

He was accompanied on a tour of the city by Minister of Power and Fuel Resources Kadyr Baykenov, the co-chairman of an intergovernment joint Kazakh-Iranian commission on commercial, economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation; by Myrzatay Zholdasbekov, our republic's ambassador to Iran; and by Fedor Novikov, the head of Mangistau Oblast's administration.

The Iranian president took off for Baku from Aktau.

His first visit to Kazakhstan, which was made at the invitation of Nursultan Nazarbayev, occurred in a spirit of mutual trust and good will, and it is seen on the whole as having been productive for both sides. Nine documents were signed on the basis of the results of the talks, including a protocol on mutual deliveries of goods in 1993-1994. Thus relations between Kazakhstan and Iran are now regulated by almost 25 different agreements, which create a strong foundation for growth of diverse cooperation.

Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani invited Nursultan Nazarbayev to make an official visit to Iran at any time convenient to him. The invitation was gratefully accepted.

#### First Stage of Army Reform Nears Completion

944K0492B *Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*  
in Russian 27 Oct p 2

[Article by Col Kim Serikbayev, Cand Mil Sci: "Reform in the Army: The First Stage Nears Completion"]

[Text] As we know the reform of the republic's armed forces is proceeding in three stages, each of which is planned to last 1.5-2 years. Its first stage is nearing completion. Have we been able to accomplish what we planned, and what kind of changes are happening in the army? It was to these pressing questions that an article by L. Bakayev titled "The Kind of Army We Need" in this year's 25 August edition of KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA was devoted. It illuminated a number of issues rather objectively, but I believe that there were some inaccuracies in conclusions pertaining to military doctrine.

Having had the opportunity to participate both in the development of military doctrine and other legal documents and in implementing them in the interests of creating the republic's own armed forces, I would like to share some of my ideas.

L. Bakayev writes that there are three contradictory principles in Kazakhstan's military doctrine. Leonid Nikolayevich sees the first contradiction in the presence of a theater of military operations (TMO) and the possible appearance of centers of military tension on one hand, and the assertion that there is no adversary on the other. What can I say? The obsolete notion that if you

have an army, you must have an adversary as well, is firmly entrenched in our consciousness, especially among the military. But the situation of recent years has necessitated new approaches and new conclusions.

Coexistence of states in the present stage is unique in that the old division of all countries and coalitions into enemies and allies has, from our point of view (that of the author's collective that wrote the doctrine), become unsuitable. Therefore Kazakhstan does not feel any country of the world to be its adversary, and it makes neither territorial nor any other claims upon them. This is what is new in the foreign political activity of our young sovereign state, as expressed in its military doctrine. It is an objective fact that Kazakhstan is located at the junction of three theaters of military operations—European, Near Eastern, Far Eastern. Naturally in the event of a military conflict in any of these TMOs, a threat of Kazakhstan's involvement in a war against its will may arise. But does this really conflict with our belief that no country of the world is our adversary?

The second contradiction L. N. Bakayev sees is that "despite the presence of legislative acts prohibiting the use of Kazakhs in military contingents outside the state and participation of Kazakh servicemen in 'hot spots,' adherence to collective security is proclaimed." However, significant changes have occurred since publication of the Supreme Soviet's decree prohibiting the transfer of Kazakhs to other regions. A number of agreements and a treaty on collective security have been signed by the heads of Commonwealth states. This was preceded by consultations and meeting within the system of representative, legislative and executive power of the CIS. Consequently the military doctrine was approved in December 1992 and servicemen were sent to defend Tajikistan's borders in June 1993 by a joint decision of the Supreme Soviet and the republic's government. This is evidence that the Supreme Soviet, the sole supreme legislative body of the republic, does not consider its decisions, once adopted, to be dogma, and that the corresponding changes may be made in support of the interests of both national and collective security.

And finally, if we consider that the main objective of collective security is to adopt effective measures by which to prevent any kind of conflict, primarily through political and diplomatic resources, then it becomes obvious that there are no contradictions of any kind in this case either.

"Third," L. Bakayev writes, "it is proclaimed that nuclear weapons will not be used, even though Kazakhstan does not have its own nuclear forces, it does not possess the right to control them, and there are none located within the state." These arguments do appear justified at first glance. However, once again the advent of new legal documents determining both the right of ownership and the agreement on joint development of a unified nuclear policy are not accounted for.



Presence of an interlocking system in the hands of the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine allows them to participate in the control of nuclear weapons on one hand, and blocks the possibility for the president of Russia to single-handedly decide to press the nuclear button on the other. Under these conditions Kazakhstan's clear position, which is spelled out precisely in its doctrine, was met with the approval of the world community.

Now about military personnel and military science. We have an extremely urgent need, writes L. Bakayev, "to undertake decisive practical steps" to train personnel. The main directions of solving this problem were spelled out back in April of last year at a conference with the president, and he approved them.

We can now summarize some of the results. Some of the officers that had been discharged into the reserves have been returned to regular ranks, graduates of civilian VUZes who are also reserve officers have been called up into the army, and Kazakh officers serving in other regions are returning. The border and fire engineering schools were reorganized for the training of specialists with a higher education, and the Almaty Higher Combined Arms Command School was transformed for multiprofile training.

A five-year agreement was signed with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense for the training of specialists in Russian military VUZes. Several graduates of military schools are studying in Turkey. There are plans for sending representatives of the republic to other states for training. However, these measures are not enough to completely solve the personnel problem. It is especially difficult to predict the future, after the term of the agreement with Russia, mentioned above, expires. It would probably be pertinent here to recall the old saying "Put your hope in God, but don't make any mistakes yourself."

One promising way of eliminating the shortage of national military personnel is to train them in military boarding schools. There are three such schools in the republic—in Almaty, Karaganda and Shymkent. They were opened in 1983, and they are still on the balance sheet of the Ministry of Education, even though the personnel are trained primarily for the Ministry of Defense. These schools need serious and urgent assistance. Experience tells us that we need to transfer them to the subordination of the Ministry of Defense.

A proposal by some veterans who recommend establishing junior lieutenant training courses in Leninsk, Kurchatov, Priozersk and other cities deserves attention. As far as opening our own military academy is concerned, as I see it this is still an unreachable objective for us. But when it comes to forming military faculties under the military departments of civilian VUZes and at the Aktyubinsk Civil Aviation School, this is something we need to think about.

L. N. Bakayev is absolutely correct when he proposes that we develop Kazakh military science, upon which the entire

personnel training system is based. But the first thing we need to do is create the science. I feel that it has become urgently necessary to establish a special administration of VUZes, military science and nonmilitary training in the Ministry of Defense that could forecast and develop the concept of personnel training, and develop an extensive program of establishing and furthering military science.

Now about the ways of solving the army's crisis. The facts L. Bakayev offers as evidence of the crisis do actually exist in the army. But I cannot agree with the opinion that "this crisis is one not of the soldiering masses but of their command": This can lead to the wrong decisions.

Analysis shows that "dedovshchina" became widespread in the army in the early 1960s, when persons serving terms for criminal acts were called up into the army. As for "zemlyachestvo," its development is associated with events of recent years. Higher political organs that became absorbed with administration by injunction, window-dressing and demagoguery lost sight of the problems of education. All of this promoted transformation of "dedovshchina" and "zemlyachestvo" into an ugly, abnormal army tradition, and led to the revelry of violence and brutality and the army's demoralization. Termination of military-patriotic work and the repeal of all forms of conscript training also contributed to the fall in the prestige of military service.

It is absolutely clear that criticism alone isn't going to solve anything. In our opinion the vacuum in educational work could be filled by establishing a new institution in the republic's armed forces. The president supported the initiative for its establishment by his edict of 18 January of this year, which introduced the institution of deputies for educational, social and legal work into the armed forces, from the defense ministry level down to company commanders and persons equal to them.

As the president noted in the report he gave at the republic's ideological conference, we need to develop our own state concept, one which must be based on instilling Kazakh patriotism. The president's directives obligate commanders and leaders of educational institutions to clearly determine the forms and methods of such education. Consequently the problem will not be solved without a deeply thought-out concept and a detailed plan.

The success of any reform depends not only on the preparedness of the personnel but also on proper statement of personnel policy. Authoritarianism and protectionism, which are abnormal phenomena in personnel policy, must give way to collective decision making and objectivity in deciding the fate of every officer. Analysis of military history shows that as a rule, when a commander is ungifted, this has a sharply negative effect on troop combat training in peacetime, while in wartime it leads to unjustifiable death of people, and defeat. You can't hide mediocrity with an officer's trouser stripes and sheepskin hat.

The adoption of the legal documents only created the foundation for the reform. Figuratively speaking, the present stage of the army's development may be likened to Kazakh yurt with only its wooden frame assembled.

Reform in the army is a process that includes numerous aspects that fall outside the scope of this article. Its implementation requires serious work and a long time. I believe that participation of competent persons directly or through the mass media in the reform could help to hasten it. Perhaps the time has come to organize and conduct a scientific-practical conference, to which a wide range of interested persons could be invited. As our laws stipulate, security and defense are the business of all the people.

### **Kazakh Ecological Conditions Examined**

944K0393A *Almaty ATA MEKEN in Kazakh* 12 Nov 93 p 3

[Editorial: "Environmental Conditions in Kazakhstan, Facts From the Press Bulletin Issued in the Third Quarter"]

[Text]

#### **Condition of the Atmosphere**

During this quarter it was observed that the atmosphere was polluted in Leninogorsk City in particular. This was connected with pollution by nonferrous metal industries and the occurrence of climatic conditions unfavorable for the dispersal of the city's air mass.

Dust: there was a great deal of dust in the air in Aqtaw City in particular. It was four times greater than permitted levels. At the same time, the amount of airborne dust was three times above permitted levels in the cities of Zyryan and Shymkent. In comparison to the third quarter of last year, there was no appreciable change during the third quarter of this year in conditions in these cities other than the accumulation of a great deal of dust in Aqtaw City. The administration of Aqtaw City is devoting attention to these facts and will carry out measures to prevent dust from spreading in the city.

Sulfur dioxide: This harmful substance is above permitted levels in Leninogorsk City (2.5 times), Oskemen City (two times) and Balqash City (1.5 times). By comparison with the third quarter of last year, it has been observed that sulfur dioxide has decreased in the air of Leninogorsk City. There have no appreciable changes in the other cities.

Carbon dioxide: in as much as it has accumulated at moderate levels, this harmful substance is not above permitted levels in Kazakhstan cities. It is at permitted levels in Petropavlovsk, Semey, and Oskemen cities where concentrations are greatest. By comparison with the third quarter of last year, heavy concentrations were observed in Semey City. There were no changes in the other cities.

Nitrogen dioxide: in half of the cities tested, levels of concentration were equal or less than permitted levels.

The areas where concentrations were greatest were Oskemen City (1.8 times above permitted levels), Almaty City, and Aktobe City (both 1.5 times greater). By comparison with the third quarter of 1992, the level of air pollution by nitrogen dioxide had increased in Oskemen but decreased in Pavlodar. The other cities remained unchanged.

Nitrogen oxide: Levels of this dangerous substance were noted in 10 Kazakh cities. On the average, levels of concentration were not above permitted levels. It was most concentrated in Oskemen City and levels there were about 70 percent of permitted levels. By comparison with the third quarter of last year, nitrogen oxide concentrations increased in Almaty, but decreased in Zhambyl. Quantities in other cities remained unchanged.

Phenol: this harmful substances was also observed in 10 Kazakhstan cities. In Leninogorsk City it was four times above permitted levels, and three times in Temirtaw. Average amounts accumulating in Oskemen, Almaty, Zyryan, Qaraghandy, Petropavlovsk, and Semey were one-two times above permitted levels although concentrations in Pavlodar were at permitted levels. By comparison with the third quarter of 1992, phenol concentration levels had risen in Oskemen, Semey, and Qaraghandy, but there were no appreciable changes in other cities.

Formaldehyde: it was found in the air of nine cities. It was determined that in Zhezkazghan, Leninogorsk, and Almaty concentrations were six times above norms (permitted levels). Concentrations in Qaraghandy, Aqtobe, Zyryan, Oskemen, and Shymkent were four-five times above norms. In Petropavlovsk concentrations were twice norms. By comparison to the third quarter of last year, formaldehyde concentrations increased in Almaty, Zhezkazghan, Qaraghandy, and Oskemen and decreased in Zyryan and Leninogorsk.

Ammonia: this was observed in five cities. Shymkent was the city with the highest concentration, 3.5 times above norms. Aqtaw, Zhambyl, Qostanay, and Temirtaw were more or less at norm levels. By comparison to the third quarter of 1992, ammonia concentrations increased in Shymkent but decreased in Temirtaw.

Hydrogen fluoride: average concentrations of this substance were two times above norms in Aqmola City. Concentrations were at permitted levels in Zhambyl and Shymkent. By comparison to the third quarter of 1992, concentrations were up in Aqmola while concentrations were on the decline in Zhambyl.

Arsenic: concentrations in Leninogorsk and Oskemen equaled norms.

Chlorine: chlorine concentrations were not above permitted levels in Pavlodar, Oskemen, and Shymkent.

Pollution by airborne metals such as cadmium, nickel, copper, lead, and zinc was determined in 13 cities. In

just Shymkent alone, lead concentrations were 1.5 times above norms. By comparison with the third quarter of last year, a decrease in lead pollution was observed in Balqash and Leninogorsk. Quantities of copper, nickel, cadmium and zinc in the air were at public health levels in all cities.

#### Water Pollution Levels

Research carried out by units of the Kazakh Bureau of Climatic Research have shown that in the third quarter of the year water was primarily polluted with nitrogen and nitrates, oil products, metals (copper and zinc), and phenol. The quality of water in the Zhayyq [Ural], Nura, Ile, and Qaratal basins had improved compared to the same period last year. However, water pollution had become worse in a few places. The Yelek river in the vicinity of Algha City was polluted between the fourth and the sixth class; that is, it was considered very polluted. The flow of the Sherubay and Nura was polluted between the fourth to the fifth class. It was observed that water quality in Lake Balqash, in the Yertis Canyon, and in Toranghylyq strait of Syrdariya had deteriorated considerably.

It was not observed in the third quarter that the waters of the Zhayyq, the Syrdariya, Shu, Talas, Ile, Qaratal, Nura, Sarysu, Tobyl, and Yesil river basins and Lake Balqash were polluted above acceptable levels.

Facts regarding the pollution of water in the basin of the Yertis River were not presented in the third quarter. Due to fuel shortage, an analysis of its water chemistry was made at the end of the month but there has been not time to analyze the materials.

#### Radioactivity

Radiation near natural sources in Kazakhstan was nine-15 microcuries per hour, and 20-60 microcuries per hour at places where there were major layers on cliffs. Increased radiation was observed in Kokshetaw Oblast. There are a number of natural sources of Uranium there.

Contributing to the increase of radiation in Kazakhstan were the effects of nuclear tests carried out in Kazakhstan, the industrial activities, the Selebe and Chernobyl disasters, and the Lobnur Testing Area in China. At the same time radiation was connected with precipitation.

Since 1949 there were 510 nuclear explosions in Kazakhstan. Some 470 were in the Semey Testing Area, eight at Kapustin Yar (Ed.: according to other information it has been proved that there were 11 tests at Kapustin Yar, that is in the Oral Area), one in Aqtobe, 17 in Atyraw (at the Azghyr Testing Area), 17 in Aqmola, seven in Western Kazakhstan Oblast (Ed.: one may add in the above eight), three in Mangghystaw, three in Shymkent, one in Qostanay. The combined power of these explosions, that is radioactivity, was 12.9 million curies. Most of this was concentrated in the center (epicenter) of the explosions. We are currently researching the effects of this radioactivity on the environment.

It is possible that the technical activities of various industries spread radioactive pollution into the environment as well. For example, judging from preliminary information, uranium production and processing industries have accumulated 419 million tons (252,000 curies) of radioactive waste. There are 1.6 million tons (500 curies) in mining industries not producing uranium. It is estimated that there are 11.4 thousand units (32.6 thousand curies) in industries utilizing products produced by the "Izotop" Production Union and 12.3 million tons (12000 thousand curies) of waste products at energy and experimental reactors. Based upon preliminary data, the total amount of radioactive waste is 233 million tons with a total radioactivity of 13 million curies.

Leaving aside nuclear explosions on the surface and in the air, highly radioactive substances producing 0.03-700 roentgens per hour have been lost and have remained unknown. It is well known that such sources were found in 1990 in Almaty and Qzylorda. They were found in 1991 at Almaty and in Kokshetaw, and in 1992 in Mangghystaw, at the "Ozenmunay" fence (not one group but four). Similar radioactive materials have been stolen from an oil plant in Atyraw Oblast. There has been observed contamination from radioactive sources due to the disintegration of storage containers at the Belogor Combine, at the Qaraghandy Metallurgical Combine, at the Mangghystaw Expedition. The fact that industrial radioactive substances used by oil producing plants have been turned over to the people, and that we have lost control over them, is extremely dangerous. Such pipes and hoses have been used at the "Khimik" and "Qurylyshy" companies in Mangghystaw Oblast, at the 58th Mobile Column of the Northern Kazakhstan Oblast Water Administration, and by garden crop producers in the area of Oskemen City. At the same time, it is well known that radioactive equipment was used on 40 occasions at the Zhanga Ozen fields, and on 21 occasions at the Zhetibay fields. The Republic of Kazakhstan chief procurator is looking into the fact that radioactive pipes were given to Taldyqorghan Oblast in 1992.

Dear reader! If you read this, you must be careful about receiving and using whatever you receive, from wherever it comes.

#### Now What About Our Food and Drink?

State sanitary control organs in our republic have continued to test specially certified products (i.e., products having special permission) to prevent the spread of pesticides and nitrates into the environment and likewise to prevent harm to human health. Official services are carrying out an internal control (veterinarian, in the markets, botanical protection and planning-research stations in the fields).

Looking at some facts: contamination of food products with pesticides during the third quarter of 1993 increased somewhat (0.9 percent) over the same period last year. Pesticide residues were above republic averages in Kokshetaw and Taldyqorghan oblasts (respectively



5.4 and 4.6 percent). Pesticide residues have increased in milk products. It is alarming that harmful substances in milk products brought to factories in Almaty City from Almaty Oblast have not decreased.

Pollution of plant agricultural products prepared as food has remained unchanged. The figure was 3.2 percent for the third quarter of this year for the entire republic (compared to 3.1 percent for the third quarter last year). This indicator is higher than the republic average in Northern Kazakhstan Oblast, 10.5 percent, in Qyzylorda, 9.4 percent, in Eastern Kazakhstan Oblast, 8.2 percent, and in Aqtobe Oblast, 5.6 percent. Nitrates were especially noticeable in Zhambyl, Aqtobe, Eastern Kazakhstan, Northern Kazakhstan, Qaraghandy, and Kokshetau Oblasts.

#### **Some Measures To Protect the Environment**

Harmful substances issued into the air are decreasing primarily due to the decline of industrial production. On the other hand, they are increasing in Zhezkazgan, Pavlodar, and Almaty Oblasts. Since, during the nine months of the present year, the "Balqashmys" Production Union and the "Zhezkazghantustimetall" Corporation produced 83.2 thousand tonnes of pollution above what was allowed, the chief state inspector of the Republic made the decision to stop work at "Balqashmys" from 1 July. Only since then have the interested parties devoted attention to the problem of the processing of sulfur anhydrides and halting the production of pollution above norms. A fine of 3 billion rubles has been levied on the industry and 1.8 billion rubles has been paid. A complaint has been made to the government and to the Republic procurator's office.

The Shymkent lead plant has violated laws on the protection of the atmosphere. (As a result sulfur dioxide and sulfuric acid vapor have increased excessively in the small Qazyghurt Rayon of Shymkent City.) The responsible workers have been punished and a fine has been imposed on them. The fact that the public raised the alarm allowed measures to be taken against the "Silikat" Corporation in Semey City. Since rubber was used to heat bitumen in the residential rayons of Oskemen City (when roofs were being tarred), the quality of the rayon worsened considerably. This method was prohibited at the request of the oblast environmental administration.

We note that in the process of testing measures were taken to reduce the issuing of harmful substances into the air at the Pavlodar Reinforced Concrete Plant, at Almaty Healing Center No 1, at the Qaraghandy Metallurgical Combine, etc.

However, planned measures and the demands of inspectors were not always carried out. Work was ordered stopped at the Leninogor Polymetal Corporation on 21 September due to violation of environmental laws but this order was not carried out. The affair is now being prepared for prosecution by the procurator's office.

Land is being ruined, polluted, and mineralized in our republic. The Shalqar Agricultural Union in Aqmola Oblast has dumped trash wherever it wants. The "Aqtobemunay" Union has dumped residual fuel at drilling sites. The Qostanay Administration for Mechanized Work has obtained soil without permission; industrial wastes have been dumped on fertile land in Bozvyshen Rayon of Northern Kazakhstan Oblast, etc., etc. Fines have been levied as measures against violation of law.

Republic cities and urban settlements are still not adequately equipped with plumbing. Reservoirs to collect drainage water in Oral, Petropavlovsk, Qostanay, Zhambyl, and Pavlodar (Bylqylda) are overfull. Measures have not been taken by the Ministry of Energy and of the Fuel Industry to process drainage water at Ekibastuz, and at the Leninogor Thermo-center. For these and other deficiencies, the Qaraghandy No 1 Machinery Factory, the Taldyqorghhan Kazakh-German Union (hide processing) Industry and others have been halted. Moreover, the case of the chief engineer at the Aqtobe Chrome Fittings Factory has been turned over to the procurator's office.

There has been no control exercised over the placement of wastes in Zhezkazgan, Pavlodar, Qyzylorda, Kokshetau, Semey, and Eastern Kazakhstan Oblasts.

On 14 July, 1993, the Cabinet of Ministers issued a resolution on "Development of State Resources and National Parks in the Republic of Kazakhstan." According to this resolution, funds are to be allotted to them and facilitations for workers at natural reserves are foreseen.

The Ministry for the Environmental and Biological Resources has drawn up a "Scheme for the Development and Disposition of Republic of Kazakhstan Natural Reserve Resource Projects During the Period Up Until the Year 2005" and the scheme has been turned over to the Cabinet of Ministers.

Chiefs of oblast governments, in collaboration with the Ministry of the Environment, have been given until 1 January, 1994 to produce other organizations out of reserves and national parks.

#### **New Nuclear Power Plant at Semey, Potential Problems Discussed**

944K0461A Almaty YEGEMEN KAZAKHSTAN  
in Kazakh 28 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by Dawitali Stambekuly: "The Testing Area Has Been Closed but the Danger Is Still Present."]

[Text] Between 13 and 17 September there took place in the region of the Semey Testing Area, more specifically, in Kurchatov city that for so many years remained off the map of the republic and was surrounded by secret weapons, a scientific and technical conference on the theme: "Plans for the Development of Nuclear Energy in the Republic of Kazakhstan and Its Reliability and

Safety." Participating in the conference and exchanging views were nuclear energy specialists from the United States, Canada, Japan, Russian, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The primary purpose of the conference was to draw up directions for the development of nuclear energy in our country under the leadership of the Republic National Nuclear Center. What does that mean? This means that the former testing area, the equipment and reactors used for tests there, will be used for peaceful purposes, that is to supply energy to industry and the economy. However, there will be nothing easy about this. This is something which will be resolved only after a lot of discussion. In particular, there is concern about future safety. Thus, our reporter shares with us some of his thoughts arising from the conference regarding these issues.

It cannot be hidden that, towards the end of the 20th century shortage of energy supplies in all corners of the world are cooling the people's economy. It is clear that this crisis is giving our country something to think about, along with the other Soviet republics which have now achieved their independence.

This conference taking place in our Republic also discussed plans drawn up for the future of energy in our country. Energy, in Kazakh terms, light and heat, are certainly sources of life. At present it is possible for any thinking citizen of our sovereign country not to think about energy? However, if we are not to depend on others for the sources of life, are there possibilities for us to create them ourselves?

Do we need nuclear power plants or do we not need them? We need them. If we can develop them in a way not dangerous to our lives what is wrong with that?

There is a throbbing which has remained behind in the hearts of our people. It is the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. No one has yet forgotten it. They cannot forget it. This being the case, the most important question is the safety of human life. What must we do to achieve this. On this account the question must be posed more broadly and more directly. We must provide a complete and thorough ecological evaluation of the damage to the environment and to the people due to explosions and tests in Kazakhstan, and, likewise, in all of the nuclear testing areas of the world. Likewise, we must broadly research the effects of a nuclear power station on the environment and on the people.

Together with this, the questions of protection in social and economic terms of those harmed by explosions in the former testing area, of assisting the people in ecological, biomedical and psychological terms, of regulating from a legal and political standpoint the resolution of very critical environmental questions, of creating a mechanism for economic security, must assume primary priority. In order to accomplish this, we must form an authoritative international commission. Without this an uneasy people will make known its alarm at the damage, aside from the benefits of a nuclear power station.

According to what was said at the conference by the scientist-specialists, a nuclear power station built according to the work plans of the National Nuclear Center is not something that can be completed in the near future. It seems that it would take 10-15 years. However, looking very critically at preparatory work going on now is something which will be a guaranty of the life of the people. This being the case, we must not keep the work which has begun out of sight of the people.

Indeed, I am not against the objectives for the development of the people's industry and enterprise. However, we must not forget that nuclear power specialists are subordinates, and we must remember that a great deal of secrecy is associated with their work.

There is another major question which must be discussed here. That is the danger that Kazakhstan will remain a repository for radioactive wastes. This is a problem for Semey Oblast in particular. There is no doubt that the former testing area has been closed. However, there are still radioactive wastes left behind by the explosions. We must not forget that they will still present a problem after our time has passed.

Burial of these radioactive wastes has now become a major issue. Ghadilet Andianuly, director of our Republic's National Nuclear Center, in answer to my question, said: "It is right that you should be alarmed about this. However, we cannot take things which came to life here and bury them in other places. Countries will not receive the radioactive wastes of others. Bearing this in mind, we must look for the right way, make wastes safe and bury them on our own lands. Major measures will be needed to achieve this. However, at present we cannot say where we will bury these wastes. State permission and a decision will be necessary for this. At the same time, the views of local people will be heard.

On the other hand, the talk of building a nuclear power plant is something different. It must take place when our Republic is suffering economic difficulty. Its importance is very great for removing industry and the economy from crisis. A safe nuclear power station could have a major influence upon a clean environment. The reason is that many thermo-electrical power stations in our republic produce massive amounts of dust, smoke, and cinders. If we take into consideration that on top of this, 16 billion tons of wastes from the production and processing of valuable resources are collected in the storage areas of industrial establishments. All is nothing but poisons. Thus, to be free of this a safe electrical station is needed."

We listened to the speech of Professor Yoshi Fujie, chief of laboratory research for nuclear reactors of the Tokyo Technology Institute. According to what Yoshi Fujie said regarding the safety of nuclear reactors for humans, there is no nation ahead of Japan in this area. For example, while the accident at Chernobyl shocked the world, there have also been accidents in the United States, Britain, and France. However, there has not, up

to the present, been a single accident in Japan, which in one of the smallest territories in the world has the largest number of nuclear energy reactors, 42. It appears that the first nuclear power plant was opened [in Japan] during the second half of the year 1950. In the future the number of nuclear power plants in Japan will reach 55. We thought that we must take our example from a country which has so successfully dealt with the atom.

One interesting thing, is that the dangers of a nuclear power plant do not frighten the Japanese. The professor proved this completely. The reason is that the Japanese seem confident of the knowledge of their nuclear specialists and scientists. When we think about this, it becomes apparent that we also need scientists and specialists with profound knowledge, who have been produced by our people. Whatever we say, we know our own souls. This is the reason why we look with less confidence on others who come to take advantage of us.

In this connection we must speak of the educational establishments which are to be opened by the Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center. They will prepare future atomic scientists and specialists of our own nationality.

As for specialist cadres, Fedor Fedorovich Safanov, deputy chief scientist for the Semey Testing Area, USSR state prize laureate, mentioned, in this connection, that many scientists of the former testing area had gone to Russia. When I asked: "what will you do now?", the major-general replied: "I will remain in Kazakhstan. I will become one of the scientist-specialists of the nuclear power plant."

This person drew attention to the involvement of the National Nuclear Center with the area's environment, to questions such as turning over the task of investigating the testing area and quickly cleaning up the radioactive wastes there, and to overcoming the danger when the subterranean riches of the area are recovered. In any case these are proper concerns. We will have to investigate each of them individually in the future. The investigation should begin now.

Nuclear energy should inspire not a little fear in human beings. In support of this we may mention the accidents at nuclear power plants in the United States, Britain, and Ukraine. According to official information, nuclear production appears to have polluted the surface of the earth at a level of 6 million curies.

Two and a half thousand of the 60,000 nuclear weapons made during the age of nuclear testing have been exploded for test purposes. More specifically, it is no secret that almost 1,000 have been exploded in the United States, and more than 500 in the former Soviet Union, most of them in Kazakhstan. Each explosion has done irreparable damage to the environment, and to the people living in the testing area. Since the closure of the Semey testing area, efforts to overcome and clear up the damage have gone forward very slowly. The ones responsible have not had to explain their guilt before the people.

Let us take a quick look at one fact. The United States has spent a total of 10 trillion dollars on all types of arms since the Second World War. At present, however, up to 200 million dollars are appropriated each year to clean up the environment. With us there is no money at all for such work.

To tell the truth, in our country the ecological rights of people are not protected. Due to little oversight, the sources of nuclear power and the nuclear industry are continuing to increase pollution by radioactivity. First and foremost, the ecological rights of citizens must be protected at the state level by a special law.

"Make no mistake about it. What we are doing is discussing now the future of nuclear energy." So said V. Vasilenko, chairman of the Council of Experts for Social Ecology of the "Nevada-Semey" International Antinuclear Movement. We are on no easy path. As we have said, local people must still bear in mind one frightening thing. This is the fact that things have not been collected from test sites in the testing area. It seems that presently the livestock of the people are being pastured in these areas. It has been claimed that testing area authorities have been forced, because of a lack of funding due to market pressures, to leave the area unguarded or otherwise unsecured, and that they have no choice but to sit on their hands. But does it have to be like this? On 29 August, 1991, our hair stood on end when we realized that there was still the danger of an explosion prior to Republic of Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev issuing an official edict to close the Semey Testing Area. Since the Russian and Kazakhstan governments did not quickly make a decision about this, the situation remained very difficult. The local people were very alarmed at this. In fact, the testing area has been closed, but we cannot free ourselves from the danger. This being the case, we are thinking of building a nuclear power plant in the 21st century. This will prove a correct decision. However, when a nuclear power plant remains incomplete, how can we clean up the mess in the testing area? The thought disturbs us that with one labor remaining incomplete and still dangerous, how can we begin a second, new effort?

## UZBEKISTAN

### Edict on 1 December Increase in Wages, Pensions, Stipends

944K0488A Tashkent VATANPARVAR in Russian  
23 Nov 93 p 1

[Uzbekistan Republic Presidential Edict on Wage, Pension, and Stipend Increases on 1 December 1993, signed by President I. Karimov in Tashkent on 22 November 1993]

[Text] 1. The following will be established within the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan as of 1 December 1993:

a minimum wage of 24,300 sum-coupons a month, representing a 1.5-fold increase in the average wage;



a nontaxable minimum income of 24,300 sum-coupons a month for citizens;

a minimum work pension of 26,300 sum-coupons a month, representing a 1.5-fold increase in all existing pensions.

2. Stipends for the students of VUZ's, tekhnikums, and vocational and technical institutes will be increased by an average of 1.5 times, and the 50-percent discount on meals in student cafeterias and snack bars will remain in force.

3. Ministries and departments, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, the administrative councils of oblasts and the city of Tashkent, and budget-carried organizations and institutions will arrange for the timely recalculation of personnel salaries, in accordance with the rates of the standard wage and salary scale and with a view to the minimum wage established by this edict.

4. The Ministry of Social Welfare of the Republic of Uzbekistan will arrange for the recalculation of pensions in accordance with this edict.

5. The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan will define the sources of funding for costs connected with the salary increases of budget-carried institutions and organizations and the increase in pensions and stipends.

6. Economically accountable enterprises and organizations, irrespective of property status, are advised to increase their wages in accordance with this edict and to the degree allowed by their sources of income, and to apply for special bank credits in the event of temporary shortages of funds.

7. The implementation of this edict will be overseen by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

[Signed] I. Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan  
Tashkent,  
22 November 1993

**Decree on Supplemental Measures To Protect Consumer Market, Strengthen Monetary Circulation**  
944K0488B Tashkent VATANPARVAR in Russian  
23 Nov 93 p 1

[Decree of Uzbekistan Republic Cabinet of Ministers on Supplemental Measures To Protect the Consumer Market and Strengthen Monetary Circulation in the Republic, signed by Chairman I. Karimov in Tashkent on 22 November 1993]

[Text] In view of the cessation of the circulation of the 1961-1992 type of banknotes of USSR Gosbank and the Bank of Russia in virtually all of the countries of the former USSR, and for the purpose of protecting the domestic consumer market and strengthening monetary circulation in

the republic, in addition to earlier decrees on this matter the Cabinet of Ministers hereby decrees that:

1. All regular payments of wages and other monetary payments for November 1993 will be made in "sum-coupons" starting on 29 November this year.

2. Starting on 1 December 1993, all 1991-92 USSR Gosbank bills of 200, 500, and 1,000 rubles will cease to be accepted as legal tender within the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Banknotes of these denominations in the possession of citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan may be used in the following manner:

a) prior to 1 December 1993—in accordance with Decree No. 550 of the Cabinet of Ministers of 12 November 1993 (to pay for goods and services costing up to 25,000 rubles and not listed in Addendum 1 of that decree);

b) as deposits in all Savings Bank branches by citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan with a permanent residence permit within the following guidelines:

Citizens opening new accounts may deposit up to 200,000 rubles prior to 4 December 1993;

Citizens with personal accounts may deposit up to 200,000 rubles in 200-, 500-, and 1,000-ruble notes in these accounts from 1 December to 4 December 1993;

Amounts exceeding 200,000 rubles may be deposited in a separate interest-free account prior to 4 December 1993 without any restrictions.

3. On 1 December 1993 the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan will cease to circulate the 1991-92 banknotes of USSR Gosbank in denominations of 200, 500, and 1,000 rubles and will establish the procedure for the surrender of remaining banknotes of these denominations by enterprises, associations, and organizations.

4. The earlier procedure for the unrestricted use of 1961-1992 treasury bills and banknotes of USSR Gosbank in denominations of 1, 3, 5, 10, 25, 50, and 100 rubles as parallel currency will remain in effect.

5. The Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank and Savings Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan will submit proposals to the Cabinet of Ministers on the procedures and dates for the issuance of "sum-coupons" from private accounts.

6. The Central Bank, Savings Bank, and Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, and the administrative councils of oblasts and the city of Tashkent will arrange for strict oversight of the implementation of this decree.

[Signed] I. Karimov, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers  
Tashkent,  
22 November 1993

# **New Prices for Foodstuffs Go Into Effect 1 December**

944K0488C Tashkent VATANPARVAR in Russian  
30 Nov 93 p 1

[Text] The Uzbeksavdo and Uzbekbriyashuv state associations and the Ministry of Finance have decided to coordinate the new levels of contract (free) prices for the main foods sold to the public on quotas for the continued progress of economic reform, in accordance with Decree No 360 of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan of 16 July 1993 on the gradual transition to free prices, with a view to the need to protect the

domestic consumer market and to stop the attempts to take foodstuffs out of the republic illegally.

The following average retail prices will go into effect on 1 December 1993:

meat .....3,000 rubles per kilogram  
milk .....200 rubles per liter  
vegetable oil .....1,000 rubles per kilogram  
sugar .....1,000 rubles per kilogram  
tea .....2,000 rubles per kilogram  
household soap .....100 rubles per bar

On 1 December 1993 noodles will be removed from the list of quota goods and will be sold to the public at effective current prices.

**Retail Price Levels in Some CIS Countries (rubles/kg)**

Cities	Meat	Vegetable oil	Sugar	Tea	Soap (1 bar)
Almaty	3000	3500	2700	8200	350
Ashgabad	3600	840	850	4100	300
Dushanbe	7000	1200	1500	3100	260
Bishkek	1400	2740	1000	2600	500
Minsk	2500	4580	1880	3500-9000	400
Tashkent	3000	1000	1000	2000	100

It is significant that the new retail prices will not cover the increase in actual production costs and the costs of purchasing foods in other regions, and the state will have to continue allocating large sums to subsidize

them. Subsidies for December, for example, have been estimated at 9.1 billion rubles for meat, 2.1 billion for whole milk, 1.6 billion for tea, and 1 billion for soap.

## ARMENIA

**Karabakh Commander on Status of Military Forces***944K0440A Yerevan AZG in Armenian 23 Nov 93 p 4*

[Interview with Samvel Babayan, commander of the armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, by correspondent Maksim Hovhannisian]

[Excerpts] Samvel Babayan was born in Stepanakert in 1965. He is a graduate of the local School No. 7. He served in the Soviet army from 1983 through 1985. He has been an active participant in the Karabakh movement. He was imprisoned in 1991 during the Safonov Polyanichko regime. After staying in prison for six months he was exchanged with Azerbaijan's deputy chief justice who was "kidnaped" by Samvel's comrades headed by his brother, Garo. Samvel is one of the organizers of Karabakh's first guerrilla squads. During the "Ring" operation his squad liberated the Dzamdzor village of the Hadrut region. He then participated in the liberation of Khojalu, Kharadakhlu and Shushi. Subsequent military operations were planned and implemented under his leadership. He is also a deputy in the Supreme Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR]. He is married and has two children. Below is an interview with Samvel Babayan, commander of the NKR armed forces, by Maksim Hovhannisian, head of the NKR's information and press department. The interview was conducted last week just before the regrettable incident at Matakhis [involving an attack on the Russian envoy] for which the NKR State Defense Committee severely criticized the leadership of the defense forces.

[Hovhannisian] Let us begin this interview with the most important question: Do we or do we not have an army?

[Babayan] We do. Despite all of its flaws, today our republic has a regular army which is able to defend our borders against enemy incursions and ensure that people can work in peace. Furthermore, if it becomes necessary to strike at the enemy on its own territory to ensure the security of the people, our army is capable of accomplishing such tasks.

[Hovhannisian] How was the idea of creating a regular army born?

[Babayan] When we liberated Shushi and opened the Lachin corridor, we realized that we need to create a regular army in order to preserve our military gains over the long run. Many agreed with that idea but did not take any concrete steps. At this point certain mistakes were made. Then the painful period of failures began. First we lost Shahumyan, then most of the Martakert region. Many people lost faith in our forces. Despair became our greatest enemy.

In order to overcome this string of failures it was necessary to launch a decisive counterstrike against the enemy. That could only be done by a well-trained regular army, which we did not have.

At the beginning it was very difficult. Many of the guerrilla squads refused to obey general orders, and their forces operated in a haphazard manner. It was relatively easy to implement our plans in the Askeran region and the results were observed quickly.

The process of creating an army began to move forward in August of last year. Of course, it cannot be said that we have solved all the problems associated with the creation of an army. However, we have established a barracks regime in the army, except that a battle proposal by the general command is not considered a battle order. Also, orders are carried out in a qualified manner, although not always. That is related to the training of the army. Mechanisms of army life are being created and perfected with each battle.

[Hovhannisian] These days there is much talk in the press about the offensive operations of the NKR army. It is said that the army has a vested interest in such operations.

[Babayan] Yes, some newspapers have written that everyone wants peace except the army. That is not true. What the army is doing has only two objectives: to ensure the security of the population and the inviolability of our state borders and to force the enemy to recognize our national rights. All of our operations are coordinated with the NKR leadership. Let us take the demilitarization of the Kelbajar region. Without that operation it would be impossible to return the refugees from Martakert to their homes because there was always the danger that the enemy could strike from behind. There was a time when the panicked residents of Martakert were not only abandoning their homes but were also deserting the ranks. Now the situation is completely different. Today the borders of that region are defended only by the military units of that region.

Let us take another example. Why was it necessary to demilitarize the city of Agdam? First, it was necessary to stop the artillery attacks from Agdam on Askeran and Stepanakert. Second, it was necessary to force the enemy to sit at the negotiating table. As is known, the first official Azeri-Karabakh talks began after the fall of Agdam. However, Azerbaijan declined to continue that dialogue at the instigation of certain international forces.

[Hovhannisian] The world press and international organizations hastily condemned the advances of the NKR army. Despite those condemnations, we undertook military operations on the southern front. How can that be interpreted? Are we thumbing our noses at world opinion? Are we confronting international forces? Is not our posture defiant?

[Babayan] That is how it appears at first glance, but the actual state of affairs tells a completely different story. As you know, in 1991 the Azeris occupied 24 villages in Hadrut with their "Ring" operation. Second, they were shelling Martuni, Hadrut, Edillu and other Armenian population centers as well as the Lachin corridor continuously from Fizuli and Kubatlu. Third, we made it



known to them that things will not end with Agdam and that they must reckon with the reality that has been created. It is these considerations that prompted the launching of military operations on the southwestern front. As a result, there were Azeri-Karabakh talks in Moscow sponsored by the Russian Federation. It is not a secret for anyone that NKR gained international recognition as a party to the conflict only after our military successes. People recognize might. I repeat: the NKR army wants peace, and, in my opinion, we must have a strong and battleworthy army so that peace will come quickly.

The Azeri side requested several times to extend the ceasefire. We agreed, although we know very well that they are using that time to regroup their forces. We are similarly preparing to greet the enemy appropriately.

[Hovhannisian] Let us return to the problems associated with the creation of an army.

[Babayan] The [NKR army] must be a battleworthy mobile entity equipped with modern weaponry; it must be ready to strike at the enemy at any point in the republic; and it must be able to defend our borders on land and in the air. I do not think that it is possible for NKR to survive without such an army.

[Hovhannisian] That is how it has turned out to be. Perhaps one of the peculiarities of the Karabakh movement is that our fedayeen [guerrilla] boys have risen to the highest ranks of the army. These boys are patriotic, brave and prepared to defend our land, but many of them have no military training. Some of them have not even served in the [Soviet] army.

[Babayan] That was the case at the beginning. Today we have in our army hundreds of senior professional officers who have received serious training in the Soviet army. As for the fact that many of the commanders are yesterday's fedayeen boys, those men have learned the art of war on the battlefield and passed muster by hard experience. We have young people who are formally trained and who want to serve their homeland in the ranks of the NKR army. They are the real future of our army. I would like to take this opportunity to appeal to all staff officers from Karabakh who serve in the armies of Russia and other countries: Brothers, return to Karabakh, and let us defend our homeland together.

[Hovhannisian] What has been the principal accomplishment in the creation of the army?

[Babayan] Today every soldier in our army takes a ceremonious oath, and the orders of the commanders are being executed without objections at all levels. We also managed to end the practice of serving in the army while staying home. Today we are strictly maintaining a barracks regime in our military.

I also consider an important accomplishment the creation of quite normal, technically satisfactory bases for different domains of military service. For example, we

take pride in our tank repair facility where everything has been built on solid foundations.

Until recently our barracks were housed in buildings formerly occupied by schools and kindergartens. We have now built, with our own resources, barracks with basic facilities, training centers for different military units with their own firing ranges and other facilities.

[Hovhannisian] Doubts have been expressed in the foreign press that little Karabakh does not have the economic means to acquire such quantities of military equipment and that Armenia is helping us.

[Babayan] The first part of that statement is true. It is true that economically we are not that strong, especially in conditions of a blockade, to acquire as many weapons and as much ammunition as we have in our hands today. However, they are wrong about the sources of such acquisitions. We have captured 80 percent, if not more, of our military means from the enemy. Various anecdotes circulate among our soldiers about this subject.

[Hovhannisian] For example, about one-time-use aircraft and tanks provided to us by Ukraine and Turkey through Azerbaijan.

[Babayan] As for the question of what is our military leadership focusing its attention on at this time, we believe that, having been defeated on land, the enemy will try to attack by air. Now we are working in that direction, with some success. [passage omitted]

### Army Chief of Staff Replaced

944K0439A Yerevan AZG in Armenian 23 Oct 93 p 1

[Text] Yesterday President Levon Ter Petrosian signed a decree releasing Norat Ter Grigoriants, first deputy minister of defense and chief of the general staff, from his responsibilities at his request and appointing Lt Gen Hrach Hmayaki Andreasian to replace him. Circles close to the president's staff maintained that this replacement does not imply any changes in military policy. The same sources also indicated that Norat Ter Grigoriants has not yet been offered a new position.

### Security of Georgian Rail, Energy Links Viewed

944K0439B Yerevan AZG in Armenian 23 Nov 93 p 3

[Article by Armen Baghdasarian: "Is the Railway Explosion First of a New Series?"]

[Text] As is known, the rail line entering Armenia was blown up in the Azeri-populated Marneuli region of Georgia early in the morning of 18 November. While Russian mass media reported that a 27-meter segment of the rail line was blown up, Armenian sources reported a 100-meter segment destroyed. It would not be correct to say that the explosion was unexpected, because it is easy to see that with the onset of the cold the gas pipeline and the railway entering Armenia from Georgia should become the favorite target of Azeri diversionists, given that the

problem of guarding these lines of vital importance to the republic has not been solved.

On 18 November, the Armenian foreign ministry issued a statement in connection with the explosion saying: "This terrorist diversion operation was planned and executed by the authorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan. This criminal act against the Armenian Republic and its people, a new manifestation of the policy of state terrorism endorsed by Azerbaijan, is an attempt by the warmongering circles of that state to bring the Armenian nation to its knees and to force the Armenian authorities to abandon the principle of finding a just and civilized solution to the Karabakh problem by methods that are categorically rejected by the international community. Azerbaijan has once again confirmed that political elements who are bent on solving the current conflict by the force of arms still enjoy strong influence in governing circles." In this particular instance the railway was repaired relatively quickly, and train traffic from Georgia into Armenia has resumed. However, nobody would be especially surprised if the explosions continue. While the explosions had two targets last year, the gas and the railway line, this year they have a third target: the Caucasian electrical power transmission line through which the Sakenergo administration is obligated to supply Armenia with electricity from Russia at the rate of 100 megawatts.

It is nice to have trust, but it would not be bad if there were more substantial guarantees on issues that are of vital importance. Experience shows that such guarantees can only be had with the military control of communication routes. Once again we have to broach this issue because, despite various agreements, the gas pipeline and the rail line are generally not protected. Meanwhile, the situation in the republic is much worse than what it was last year despite the assurances given by the authorities. It turns out that the constantly-heard phrase "this is our last winter" also depends on the good will of our neighbors. Of course the Armenian gas repairmen have already rushed to the scene of the explosion. Of course, the prime ministers of Armenia and Georgia are having serious talks and will eventually remember the age-old friendship between our nations. However, those do not change anything and are not likely to change anything ever.

The situation in the Azeri-populated eastern regions of Georgia is extremely tense, and the explosion of the railway line is an excellent opportunity to send [Georgian] military forces to protect that segment of the railway. Armenian units could join those forces thus reducing Georgia's burden significantly. After all it is not that hard to protect a 40-kilometer railway segment, and as they say: "If the mountain will not come to Mohammed... [Mohammed has to go to the mountain]."

### Activities of Military Training School Reported

944K0439C Yerevan HAYASTANI

HANRAPETUTYUN in Armenian 15 Oct 93 p 4

[Text] Two years ago the special republic boarding school named after Field Marshal Hamazasp Babajanian, a former commander of armored and tank forces, was converted into a boarding school for military training by the decision of the Armenian government. On October 18, the school will hold a ceremony whereby 100 students who have passed their examinations will take their oath to serve their homeland selflessly. Vrezh Hovhannisian, the commandant of the [school] battalion, told the correspondent of NOYYAN TAPAN: "The students at the school have their own special military uniform. They specialize in military science and physical education. The young men are trained in judo, hand-to-hand combat, mountain climbing, swimming, light athletics and skiing. The specialization subjects are taught by officers and athletics instructors. Special attention is paid to the teaching of English and Russian. In the future it is planned to teach the languages of countries neighboring Armenia. The school admits those 14 to 16-year-old young men who possess the appropriate physical and mental capabilities." The director of the school has visited a U.S. military base where he observed first-hand the methods of training American professional soldiers. According to the commandant, some of the school's graduates have entered the school of the Karabakh liberation struggle and participated in numerous tough battles. The school has also signed agreements with Russian military training institutions, whereby the graduates of the school are able to continue their education at those institutions. The Armenian Ministry of Defense will pay for the expenses of such continued training.

### Central Bank Governor on New Currency Measures

944K0439D Yerevan HAYASTANI

HANRAPETUTYUN in Armenian 23 Nov 93 p 3

[Interview with I. Isahakian, governor of the Bank of Armenia; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts]

[HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN] Mr Isahakian, could you first say a few words about the situation preceding the decision of the State Commission on Money Circulation and the organizational measures that the central bank undertook?

[Isahakian] In earlier statements I mentioned a few times that, based on all classical examples and the experience of other nations, before putting a new national currency into circulation it is necessary to have an intermediate means of payment which will take upon itself the full weight of inflation. During that period, the government, the central bank and the entire public must take steps to prevent the decline of the economy and to stabilize it. Only after that can genuine monetary reform take place.

However, in recent weeks events unfolded very rapidly, as the president of the republic noted with justification. We were forced to replace the 1991-1992 issue 1,000, 5,000 and 10,000-ruble notes with dram bills. Thus we were unable to implement the classical method—we could not have done it. I must say that we had only 1 to 1 and ½ weeks for organizational and preparatory work. During that time, the State Commission on Money Circulation and the working group associated with it performed important work. [passage omitted]

[HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN] Mr Isahakian, although the Commission's decision is quite clearly drafted, some issues need to be made more comprehensible to our people. For example, if a citizen buys something and pays 10 dram, should that be interpreted as 10 dram or 2,000 rubles?

[Isahakian] It should be interpreted as 2,000 rubles. For example, if a citizen buys something that is worth 100 rubles and pays with a 10-dram bill, then the seller must return 1,900 rubles. Similarly 25 dram is equivalent to 5,000 rubles, 50 dram to 10,000 rubles, 100 dram to 20,000 rubles, 200 dram to 40,000 rubles and 500 dram to 100,000 rubles.

[HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN] Will not the concurrent circulation of 1, 3, 5, 25, 100, 200 and 500-ruble bills with the Armenian notes create a certain confusion?

[Isahakian] Of course, there will be certain difficulties at the beginning. However, both the buyers and the sellers must be very careful. I think that they will get accustomed fairly quickly. This issue is also of immediate concern to the directors and accountants of enterprises and corporations. I must say that nothing has changed. If they had, say, 100,000 rubles on their books, that should be counted the same way as before. In the future, when we make a full transition to a national currency and introduce notes and coins with lower denominations and in luma [presumably a subdivision of dram], then all accounting can be done in terms of dram. For the moment, ruble notes in lower denominations will perform the function of the notes I mentioned.

[HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN] This means that this is the first stage of a full transition to a national currency.

[Isahakian] Yes, it is an intermediate stage. We will have entered the final stage when we introduce notes with lower denominations and coins. At this time we are embarking on a new era in the life of our republic. The government and the central bank must take all necessary steps to ensure the stability of our currency and to raise its exchange value. That is not dependent on the currency's name or looks. That depends on our economic base and productivity of our economy. We are all committed to strengthen the dram. That means encouraging exports, the production of goods that consumers demand and making imports manageable. It is also important that we cut the budget deficit by correct financial policies

and that we build hard-currency reserves. Thus our financial situation and the stability of our currency depends on us.

[HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN] Here is another issue that needs to be explained to the people: according to the Commission's decision, sums of more than 50,000 rubles will be deposited in a savings bank for six months with an interest rate of 48 percent per annum. Based on the experience of past years, the people are a little worried. To what extent is the repayment of those funds guaranteed? Can the people be certain that they will not lose their money?

[Isahakian] The people can rest assured that their deposits will be returned. I believe that the people trust the savings banks because the indexation of funds deposited in August has already inspired some confidence. Confidence in the savings banks increased especially among rural people who received their payment for their produce from the savings banks without any problems this year. If we could pay those sums in conditions of dependence on the Bank of Russia, we can be more certain making those payments on time now.

[HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN] Can the people use those deposits to pay, for example, for certain services in noncash form?

[Isahakian] We are thinking about that issue. After 27 November, when we will know how much money was changed and how much money was deposited, those issues will be examined and somehow resolved.

[HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN] Now a technical question: Can those citizens of the republic who have not had the time to obtain an identity card or who have lost theirs exchange their rubles for dram? How about those who are away from the republic on business or who are away from their homes in hospitals or sanatoriums?

[Isahakian] First, if a person does not have an identity card he or she cannot exchange his or her money. This does not apply to military servicemen.

Those individuals who are outside the republic because of their work can apply to the appropriate exchange boards provided that they have the necessary documents. As for those citizens who are in hospitals or sanatoriums or away from their permanent homes in other parts of the republic, if they do not return to their permanent homes by the expiration of the deadline for exchanging their money, they can exchange their money by presenting their identity documents to the post office or savings bank at their location. The procedure is the same. The exchange is done only once and their identity documents are stamped as appropriate.

[HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN] Would you like to say anything else to the people?

[Isahakian] Based on the experience of exchanging 50 and 100-ruble notes in 1991, I would like to ask the people to be very careful, to remember where they have



kept their ruble notes—excuse the expression, under pillows or inside cracks in walls (although I do not think that in conditions of rapid devaluation anybody would have kept large sums)—so that complications do not arise in the future. I would also like to remind them that there will be only one exchange and one chance to open a deposit account.

#### **Nagorno-Karabakh To Adopt New Armenian Currency**

944K0439E Yerevan YERKIR in Armenian 23 Nov 93 p 2

[Interview with Karen Nersisian, head of the finance and credit department of the Council of Ministers of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, by HAYLUR correspondent Shushanik Abrahamian; date and place not specified]

[Text] The Armenians of Artsakh face the reality of changing their currency. Doubts about whether we will remain in the Russian ruble zone or whether we will adopt the Armenian dram have been finally settled. The Council of Ministers decided to put the Armenian dram into circulation in Stepanakert.

Karen Nersisian, head of the finance and credit department of the council of ministers of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, answered the question of HAYLUR correspondent Shushanik Abrahamian.

[HAYLUR] Mr Nersisian, a decision has already been made to put the Armenian dram into circulation in Stepanakert.

[Nersisian] The exchange of currency will take place in Stepanakert in the same way it will proceed in Armenia.

[HAYLUR] Have any preparatory steps been taken, because the people of Artsakh were in chaos in the preceding days?

[Nersisian] Yes, we have also created exchange boards. There is also a central board which is headed by Minister of Finance Spartak Tevosian.

All the money safes have been sealed so that there will be no circulation of the old currency. A special commission has been sent to customs inspection points so that there will be no flow of old currency from the outside. The corporations and enterprises of the republic have been given instructions to create their own appropriate boards.

[HAYLUR] You said that the exchange of currency will proceed in the same way as it will in Armenia, that is, 1 dram will be exchanged for 200 rubles. There are no collective farms in Armenia. How will the workers of collective farms [in Karabakh] be paid for their labor?

[Nersisian] There are many special cases which have been taken into account. Eventually everything will come out fine.

[HAYLUR] What about the case of people who are serving in the army or on the front?

[Nersisian] The army also has its exchange board which will take care of everything.

I think that everything in our republic will proceed smoothly without any unnecessary confusion.

#### **Academician Assesses Republic's Current Economic Situation**

944K0417A Yerevan YERKIR in Armenian 10 Sep 93 p 4

[Interview with Academician Mikayel Kotanyan by Candidate of Economic Sciences Suren Gevorgyan: "Market Economy: An End or a Means?"]

[Text] Academician Mikayel Kotanyan, a well-known economist in this republic, heads the National Academy's Institute of Economic Sciences. At a time when the young and inexperienced leaders in power were breaking all economic ties with Russia one after another, in the naive belief that this meant liberation from colonial rule, M. Kotanyan was one of the few economists to raise a voice against that naive policy, the bitter fruits of which we are now tasting. It is not too late to make use of his knowledge and experience. We present below an interview with Mikayel Kotanyan by Candidate of Economic Sciences Suren Gevorgyan.

[Gevorgyan] Mikayel Khachiki, it has been almost three years now that the republic's leadership has been trying to change over to a market economy. What is the present level of the economy?

[Kotanyan] First of all we must bear in mind that in governmental and economic policy the market is not simply a goal but rather a means of achieving improvement in public affairs, of raising living standards, and of satisfying needs. Therefore the transition to a market economy must be accomplished by means of raising the level of prosperity, not by worsening living standards. Living standards have declined in particular this past year. This was a result of an incorrect economic policy. Under conditions of freeing of prices and an economic decline, retail prices on necessities sharply increased in comparison with the same period last year. Armenia showed the highest prices for foodstuffs among all the CIS member states. It was calculated that, according to figures for the first quarter of 1993, the per capita cost of a minimum market basket in Armenia amounted to 12,476 rubles per month. And this was in conditions where the average pay for a state employee for the first quarter of 1993 was 4508 rubles, an average of 2500 rubles per person per month, while consumer spending was a mere 950 rubles (1490 rubles when counting in the month of June).

Unemployment in this republic is growing day by day. These government figures represent the true state of affairs as regards the people's living standards. All this

attests to the fact that this republic is at a critical point in the decline of living standards.

**[Gevorgyan]** The government considers transition to a market economy to be the cornerstone of privatization....

**[Kotanyan]** Ensuring diversity of property ownership is one of the important conditions of a transition to a market economy. The issue at hand is by what method diversity of property ownership is being accomplished, by what principles of social justice, and under conditions of what socioeconomic situation. To accomplish this, those conditions selected as a point of departure must not worsen the condition of the people, but should ensure a stable rise in living standards, rather than putting additional stress into the social situation. Thus privatization and multiple ownership is merely a precondition for transition to a market economy, not a solution to the problem, as is naively believed by the top people in our republic's economy. They believe that privatization will solve the problems of transition to a market economy and that we shall immediately find ourselves in a common market-economy association with countries that enjoy a high level of production, technological sophistication, and civilized socioeconomic relations. All this is merely a pipe dream. There are many countries in the world that have private ownership of one type or another but still cannot even think about transitioning from a simple bazaar-type economy to sophisticated market relations.

**[Gevorgyan]** Are the results of land privatization not proof of what you say? The republic's agriculture has been thrown back to the level of the 1960's.

**[Kotanyan]** Land privatization in this republic was carried out in a most unsophisticated fashion; its purpose was not so much the development of agriculture as the speedy dismantling of the existing economic system. This task was entrusted to persons who had no knowledge whatsoever of the village or of agriculture. The land, livestock, and property were simply squandered, farms and agricultural complexes ruined, with nobody giving any thought to the question of what food supplies the government would use to feed the urban population and the military or what raw materials would be supplied to light industry and food processing industry still under government operation. Incidentally, land privatization has not been carried out at such a bold pace and scale in any other country. Even in the German states following reunification, in conditions of a powerful West German economy, East Germany's economic structures were not demolished. They have been maintained, and are gradually being restructured. 80 percent of the farm operations are being maintained, in spite of the fact that the state is providing economic incentive to stimulate development of the farm economy. This is due to the fact that certain economic conditions are necessary for transition to a privatized farm economy, and certain economic conditions are essential as well to ensure that people are psychologically prepared to work as independent individuals.

**[Gevorgyan]** Efforts are presently being made to argue that if collective farms and state farms had been preserved, by now they would have been looted and plundered. Is this not an involuntary admission of the government's powerlessness to preserve state property?

**[Kotanyan]** That is truly a result of self-delusion and ignorance. Even today the state farms which were preserved to one extent or another are the only sources for replenishing meager state food supplies. One can read statistics to become convinced of this. The fact is that state farms, in addition to "feeding" themselves, also allocate food supplies to the state, while the contemporary farmer is accumulating assets; the farmer has forgotten his duty to give a portion to the state....

On the whole the economy has become a system out of control, which is careening toward the abyss. Suffice it to note that generated national income in 1992 was approximately equal to the 1975 level, declining by 42.6 percent in comparison with 1991, while gross output has dropped correspondingly by 39.4 percent.

**[Gevorgyan]** This decline has continued in the first quarter of this year, while the newly-appointed prime minister had promised to halt the economic downswing within this period of time.

**[Kotanyan]** That is absolutely right. According to the 1993 socioeconomic development program submitted by the government, the target is to boost industrial output volume 32.3 percent, while according to figures for the first quarter it amounts to only 48.6 percent of the total for the corresponding period in 1992. This means that the new government has failed to halt the swift decline of the economy. All figures pertaining to economic results in comparison with the previous year are negative numbers. There is no point in speaking about growth or even about stabilizing the economy.

**[Gevorgyan]** Incidentally, the prime minister has addressed the Supreme Council requesting postponement of this month's accountability report....

**[Kotanyan]** He is doing the appropriate thing, since he has nothing to say.... The previous prime minister resigned because of the flimsiness of the present prime minister's submitted plan, which was approved by the parliament.... The new prime minister, however, has not implemented any part of this plan. None of the economic statistics are positive. This, as well as what the people think about the situation, are of no importance to the prime minister. Of importance is the fact that the president of the republic is pleased with his work. It is "God's" will, not the people's will....

It is simply amazing how, after all of this, government officials, including the president and the prime minister, can calmly tell the people that progress has occurred in our societal and economic affairs. Can they really believe that the people have lost their ability to reason and that they believe "their chosen saviors"?

**[Gevorgyan]** Mr Kotanyan, do you see any way out of this difficult economic situation?

**[Kotanyan]** Ensuring the physical survival of the people and solving the fundamental issue of social protection have become a matter of paramount importance in this republic today. In past years, however, this issue was not substantially addressed in the government's plan of action, while it was totally absent in the plan for 1993. The goal can be achieved through a system of state guarantee of minimum means of existence. There must be established on the one hand a certain relationship between prices for the minimum means of existence and fixed prices, and on the other hand between wages, minimum pension and subsidy amounts. Each and every citizen must be provided with foodstuffs of various types, in a guaranteed manner, by the state, and this also applies to an assured annual ration of clothing, including footwear, which should be provided at very low prices on a quota basis to every citizen of this republic, with the addition of a system of compensation for paid and municipal services. The state must take over the task of solving the problem of ensuring physical means of existence, securing the necessary resources by means of state procurement, humanitarian aid, and other means. This is the foremost, urgent item in this republic under present conditions.

The next most important issue is the drawing up of a complex program of the republic's economic development. This must be grounded on the preservation and further development of the genetic resources of our people. With its centuries-old history, the Armenian people have proven that it displays exceptional skills in the fields of science and education, literature and music, the applied arts, aesthetics and sculpture, architecture and construction, engineering, and commerce. Securing and further development of the above by the state is the most rapid and reliable way to implement reforms in this republic and to make an early entry into the world market. Unfortunately the state is promoting primarily an unregulated, profiteering system of commerce, and this greatly aggravates the social situation.

Finally, one must clearly recognize that the long duration of the process of worsening of the people's standard of living and the absence of programs to correct the situation at the present time seriously endanger the prospects of transition to a market economy, and it becomes unacceptable to people. This situation essentially means collapse of the process of reforms, and this can be of fateful significance to the future of the republic.

**[Gevorgyan]** Development of the economy is essentially dictated by the system of government management. Can one consider the presently functioning system to be productive?

**[Kotanyan]** Essentially the republic and economic management model is a repeat of the Russian Federation model. Russia is an extremely large state, with its population as well as its resources and territory. It therefore

definitely needed substantial decentralization of the economic management system and a broadening of local (state, autonomous republics, etc) functions, in order to give many of the entities below the national level a status of specific economic management and regulation. This is a characteristic of a multinational state which possesses ethnic and territorial integrity.

The Republic of Armenia is a small state, which assumes, based on the scale of the state, a state system of government, and therefore it requires a very limited decentralization of economic management. If we add to this our distinctive, specific geopolitical requirements, it will become apparent that the Russian variation of decentralization of economic management is unacceptable for our republic. The group which is carrying out our "economic reforms," however, lacking knowledge of our republic, failed to grasp those distinctive features and was unable to tailor legislative formulations to these features. The only solution was to repeat (with cursing and adjustment to the Armenian pattern) the Russian orientation, Russia's adopted resolutions, laws and decisions.

One other important and disturbing question deals with choosing a system of state management which will further promote democratization of the country's political and economic affairs and will ensure further growth. We should note in this regard that none of the CIS countries, including Armenia, is ready for a presidential system of government.

Presidential government requires an appropriate political sophistication, an arena for economic and law-related activities in which each citizen, political and public organization functions only following laws developed on the basis of a democratic constitution, and where there is no possibility of violation of the constitution at all levels of government. In order to create such a situation, a certain period of time is required for psychological restructuring of the people.

This applies in equal measure both to the masses and to officials involved in economic management. It follows from this that in Armenia the parliamentary system of government must be maintained for the foreseeable future.

#### **Turkish Government Ban on Armenian Language in Schools Decried**

944K0442A

**[Editorial Report]** Istanbul JAMANAK and MARMARA in Armenian report on their front pages on 11 November that a year-old dispute between Armenian schools and the Turkish Ministry of Education ended with a final decision from the Ministry of Education (Decree No. 434 dated 23 September 1993) declaring that "all subjects, except Armenian language, will be taught in Turkish" in Armenian schools. The papers report that Armenian parents, upset with the latest decision, urged the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul to appeal the decision.



The two dailies publish on their front pages on 23 November the text of an appeal, in Turkish, by the boards of trustees of Armenian schools in Istanbul to the Ministry of Education. Copies of the appeal were sent to Turkey's president, the speaker of the Turkish parliament and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The appeal states that the right of private Armenian schools in Turkey to teach in Armenian stems from the Treaty of Lausanne which Turkey signed in 1923 with Allied Powers ending all hostilities. The appeal quotes the relevant articles of the treaty guaranteeing the right of the use of Armenian in private Armenian schools and adds that this right was codified by Law No. 625 on Private Educational Institutions and that it is also enshrined in the 1982 Constitution. The appeal concludes that, as a result, "the administrative measure dispatched to our schools by the Training and Education Council [of the Ministry of Education] has no legal or judicial basis."

The appeal adds: "We request respectfully that, in view of the reasons enumerated above, this administrative measure which has caused great distress to our schools, students, their parents and our community be reviewed and repealed."

A front-page editorial in MARMARA by the paper's publisher Robert Haddecian on 26 November says that the controversial decision by the Ministry of Education jeopardizes the mission of the Armenian schools in Turkey and notes that no Turkish government, even during the "darkest days for democracy," repressed the right of Armenian schools to teach in Armenian. The editorial says: "We do not wish to mention the Treaty of Lausanne here, because even if there was no Treaty of Lausanne, today's democratic Turkey would gladly permit our schools to use Armenian as their language of instruction without hindrance because this is what the doctrine of this era requires even in the case of groups which are not considered minorities. In any event Turkey did not wait for the democratic ideas of today to bloom to respect the principle of permitting Armenian instruction for 70 years. However, today, with an unexpected and astounding step and an approach that contravenes principles of the modern era, our schools have been instructed to stop teaching in Armenian, except for the Armenian language. It is very odd."

The editorial questions the motives for such a decision saying that the use of Armenian in Armenian schools has not in any way harmed Turkey or instilled disloyalty among Turkish citizens of Armenian ancestry. The editorial concludes:

"We would like to hope that the appeal of His Holiness the Patriarch to the Governor [of Istanbul] will have a favorable outcome, although we believe that the Governor's Office is not the correct authority to which such appeal should be addressed because the issue arises at the level of the Ministry of Education. However, if the said appeal does not produce the desired outcome, His Holiness the Patriarch must think about other appeals and measures."

## Claimant to Throne of Armenia Appears

### Royal Heir Proclaimed

944K0441A Yerevan AZG in Armenian 27 Oct 93 p 3

[Excerpts] The third session of the Court of Ancient Armenian Princes convened at the Armenia Hotel on 24 October.

At the session, attended by Grand Prince Roland-Hovsep I, an appeal was issued to all Armenian political parties, religious, political, cultural and public organizations and businessmen. The participants also endorsed the bylaws of the Court of Ancient Armenian Princes. The bylaws will soon be submitted to Armenia's Ministry of Justice, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the Kingdom of Western Armenia [as published] for registration.

The session also endorsed the following resolution: "The Court of Ancient Armenian Princes recognizes fully and without qualification Roland-Hovsep I Vladislav-Anton-Paul von Bagratuni-Antonian-Antonyevich Poghos Anetsi (who lives in Budapest, Hungary) as the head of the Royal House of Bagratuni, prince of princes, king of kings, the legitimate heir of the royal throne. The members of the Court pledge to trust, to be loyal and to be subject to His Excellency and elect him, on an inheritance basis, as the head of the Court of the Ancient Armenian Princes." [passage omitted]

It was also decided at the session to recognize the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as an independent and autonomous Armenian state.

The session also elected first deputies and deputies to the president of the court as well as the court's chief secretary and secretary. The session was attended by 42 Armenian princes and princesses, members of Armenian princely families dating back 3,000 to 4,000 years, such as the Artsruni, Mamikonian, Pahlavuni, Bagratuni, Voshtuni, Benklants, Amatuni, Gnuni, Gntuni, Silkuni, Khorkhoruni, Urtsayts and Havnuni families. Also attending the meeting was Prince Norair Pahlavuni, the well-known Armenian reporter from Washington's "Liberty" radio station. The head of the Pahlavuni family was elected as one of the first deputies of the president of the court.

### Editorial on Royal Claims

944K0441A Paris HARATCH in Armenian 18 Nov 93 p 2

[Article by Arpi Totoyan: "The Savior of Western Armenia: Don Quixote II Bagratuni"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The 15 October issue of BANBER in the latest batch of papers from Armenia features a gem of a page for those who are not satisfied with important subjects.

BANBER bills itself as the "press organ of Armenia's Christian Democratic Union." It is a compact weekly in four pages and circulation of 5,000 edited by Khachatur Dadayan. [passage omitted]

The second page of the said issue features an "Appeal" which is designed to impress in the reader's mind the unique nature of the weekly for a long time. The "Appeal" is addressed to "all the Armenian political parties, ecclesiastical, political, cultural, scientific and public organizations and businessmen of the world." [passage omitted]

The "Appeal" is signed by "the grand prince of the Armenian kingdom, Roland I Bagratuni-Antonian-Anetsi, heir to the Armenian throne, king of kings, prince of princes, heir to the throne of the Kingdom of Western Armenia." The most visible participation of this person to the said "Appeal" seems to have been the drawing "Roland I" at the bottom of the page. We call it a "drawing" because the grand prince probably made his first attempt to write in the Armenian script by drawing the letters of his name possibly copying them from a signature given to him—as I would have done if I had to sign my name in Japanese. [passage omitted]

As for the contents of the "Appeal," it proclaims: "On 10 February 1994 we will create the emigre coalition government of the Kingdom of Western Armenia and we will appoint the leaders of provinces, kingdoms and principalities." Roland I found bases for this step during his tour of Armenia and Karabakh, when it was revealed during his "meetings with the leaders of most of the political parties and organizations and representatives of cultural, scientific and economic circles" that "the ancestors of most Armenians are the victims of the 1915 genocide or have been deported from their homes, and the Armenian question awaits a solution to this day." [passage omitted]

Roland I's revelations are not limited to the fact that the Armenian question remains unresolved. He was greatly rejoiced when he "heard that Armenia won independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union." Unfortunately that joy was not unmitigated because "the Armenian republic has not done anything so far to find a solution to the problem of the 1915 genocide through political and diplomatic means and to have western Armenia returned to the homeland." Fortunately, this

descendant of the Bagratunis declares with a populism that does not befit a man who aspires to become monarch: "Considering the will of the Armenians of the entire world, we decided to participate actively in this matter." This is followed by the declaration of the formation of the emigre coalition government of the Kingdom of Armenia and details are provided. The declaration says that a constitution must be endorsed until 1995 by a "bicameral or tricameral National Assembly" whose "deputies and senators, numbering 250 to 350, will have been elected by the Armenian communities of the world." The declaration adds that "the Kingdom of Western Armenia must join the UN, NATO, the CIS and the European Union." [passage omitted]

Despite its generally comical appearance, the "Appeal" outlined above has a serious and disturbing aspect. The "ideas" expressed, in their distorted western Armenian edited and typeset by an eastern Armenian, betray the presence of a ladle sticking in from outside—a ladle that does not belong to the community that was dreamt by [19th century Catholicos] Khrimian. The effect of that ladle is to disturb and to create discord. The "Appeal" is also notable for its supportive attitude toward the "Kurdish people" and an "independent Kurdish state." The former is mentioned as a group that "is subjected to massive brutality by Turkey," and the latter is given the same weight as western Armenia: "This government must resolve the issue of independence peacefully, in conjunction with the issue of creating an independent Kurdish state." Can these propositions be explained by compassion or a sense of justice toward an oppressed people? There is also a question of timing: Why does such an appeal come at a time when the Turkish press does everything possible to gain credibility for its charges of collaboration between Armenians and Kurds?

The list of such questions can grow much longer, and they can only cause more concern. One of the most important of such questions, however, concerns the propriety and responsibility of the press. How can a newspaper that bills itself as the press organ of a political organization undertake such dangerous steps? [passage omitted]

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